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TAXATION
ALLISON DUNHAM*
During the war the several states hacl little need for new
revenues as plenty of money rolled in from old sources' and
few new areas for spending opened up. The result has been
that the changes in State taxation have not, on the whole,
been as substantial as in the federal field where the pressure
of finding new sources of revenue to pay for the war expendi-
tures has resulted in major revisions.
Furthermore developments in state taxation can not be
catalogued for all returning veterans but only on a state to
state basis. The review of developments in Indiana taxation
that follows does not purport to do for Indiana tax law what
has been done for returning veterans in the field of federal
taxation. The only claim of this review is to discuss some of
the legislative, administrative and judicial developments in
Indiana since 1940 which the writer believes may be import-
ant in pointing the reading and study of a returning Indiana
lawyer so that he may refresh himself in Indiana tax law.
Even in the federal tax field the most effective "refresh-
er" will be grappling with an actual tax problem in real
practice. Experience may show that many of the problems
in Indiana tax law suggested here, do not in fact raise prob-
lems for the practitioner. If at all helpful the following com-
* Assistant Professor, Indiana University Law School.
1. Inheritance Taxes: 1940 1944
Value of resident estates upon
which taxes were declared ...... $58,867,661.78 74,863,557.09.
Amount of inheritance tax imposed 1,410,142.00 1,356,803.56
Number of -resident estates ...... 3,105 4,176
Valuation of estates of
non-residents .............. 1,420,111.12 1,519,663.93
Amount of taxes imposed ........ 20,950.94 43,901.02
Number of non-resident estates.. 87 106
Amount of additional ("estate
tax") imposed ............. 144,474.41 129,315.88
Number of estates subject to tax.... 14 3
Indiana Year Book (1940) p. 154; Indiana Year Book (1944) p. 732.
Intangibles Tax Collections 1940-1944 were as follows:
July 1 1939-July 1 1940 .......... 1,337,824.94
1940- 1941 ............ 1,535,034.47
1941- 1942 ............ 1,899,331.14
1942- 1943 ............ 1,496,981.30
1943- 1944 ............ 1,405,090.55
Indiana Year Book (1944) p. 730
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ment should set the returning veteran to his own reading
and to discussion with other members of the bar in order to
discover what changes in fact have occurred in tax practice.
With this limited objective in mind, the material that
follows will outline the developments in the tax laws of In-
diana as to veteran's benefits, as to inheritance taxes, in-
tangible taxes, gross income taxes, property taxes and certain
miscellaneous taxes. The material is not exhaustive either as
a catalogue of changes or as a critical analysis of the problems
created by the changes.
TAX RELIEF AND BENEFITS TO MEMBERS OF
ARMED FORCES AND VETERANS
The several sessions of the General Assembly since 1940
have enacted various reliefs and allowances from tax im-
position to members of the armed forces of World War II.
In addition the 1943 General Assembly provided, as amended
in 1945,2 that all "persons" who have served, or are now
serving, or who may hereafter serve as part of the armed
forces of the United States in World War II from September
16, 1940, and the wives, widows and children of such persons
are entitled to the same rights and privileges as are now
given to "soldiers, sailors, nurses andlor other veterans, their
wives, widows and children of the first World War" under
Intangibles Tax Collections on Banks and Building & Loan Asso-
ciations:(year end June 30) Banks Building & Loan Associations
1940 $1,543,773.23 $290,616.91
1941 1,637,595.02 316,244.92
1942 2,025,017.04 324,821.25
1943 1,996,246.29 344,349.95
1944 1,633,894.79 363,104.48
Indiana Year Book (1944) p. 730, 731.
Gross Income Tax Collections 1940-1944 were as follows:
1940 $23,648,497.28
1941 26,054,478.48
1942 33,739,322.56
1943 34,236,158.53
1944 40,838,398.04
Indiana Year Book (1944) p. 193.
Property Tax assessments and taxes levied 1940-1944 were as
follows:
Assessed valuation Tax levied
1940 3,870,120,130 103,014,677.39
1941 3,954,977,650 105,146,724.27
1942 4,167,003,009 99,322,975.91
1943 4,347,960,407 106,672,636.89
Indiana Year Book (1944) p. 709
2. Ind. Acts 1943, Ch. 254, p. 724, Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns 1943 Re-
placement) §59-1007a, as amended by Ind. Acts, 1945, Ch. 141,
p. 308.
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existing or future statutes. To entitle a person to these bene-
fits separation from service must be under conditions other
than dishonorable. The Attorney General has ruled3 that
this 1943 act gives the benefits to all "persons" in the armed
forces in World War II even though the World War I bene-
fits extended only to enlisted personnel. Thus officers of
the present war are entitled to rights and privileges given
only to enlisted personnel in World War L
Property and Poll Taxes
Ch. 2 of the special session of the General Assembly for
19444 provided the following rights and privileges to members
of the armed forces of the present war:
Exemption from poll taxes5 from January 1, 1941 until
24 months after termination of hostilities or until six months
after discharge, if discharged prior thereto. The exemption
extends to persons who "have been, now are or shall here-
after be" members of the armed forces. Provision is made
for refund of the poll taxes already paid for the period
exempted.
Exemption from Penalties, Fees and Interest on Real
or Personal Property Taxes6 is provided during the same
period as the poll tax exemption. The penalties previously
imposed are forgiven and the act furmrx p3-id- -
fund of penaltiez ana i~nrest already paid. It also provides
that there shall be no tax sale of property of members of
the armed forces for failure to pay taxes becoming due dur-
ing the period of military service. This exemption is not
applicable if the total assessed valuation of all property
owned by the member of the armed forces exceeds $20,000.
Application for Mortgage Exemption may be made by a
statement filed by the member of the armed forces or by
some relative in his behalf. Previous to this 1944 amend-
ment the application for mortgage exemption had to be filed
by the person or another person under a duly executed and
recorded power of attorney.8 The Attorney General ruled'
3. Ops, Ind. Att'y Gen. No. 80 (Aug. 2, 1945).
4. Ind. Acts 1944 (Spec. Sess.), Ch. 2, p. 6.
5. Ind. Acts 1944 supra, n. 4, §§ 1-4.
6. Ind. Acts 1944 supra, n. 4, §§ 5, 6,
7. Ind. Acts 1944 supra n. 4 § 6%.
8. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1943 Replacement) §64-210.
9. Ops. Ind. Att'y Gen., 1945 p. - (Jan. 20, 1945).
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that this 1944 provision was not retroactive, so that a person
could not in 1945 file for a mortgage exemption for 1943,
even though that person and his family were out of the state
during the time provided for filing in 1943 as a result of
service in the armed forces. An emergency act in 19450
corrected this by providing that all members of the armed
forces who were residents of Indiana during the years 1942,
1943 or 1944 who failed to file applications for mortgage
deduction because of the fact that they were away from the
county of their residence during the time for filing applica-
tions are granted the right to file in a manner specified in
the act. Provision is made for refund of any taxes over-
paid on account of failure to file for the mortgage exemption.
The act is also made applicable in a specified manner to
members of the armed forces for the year 1945 and sub-
sequent years.
The 1944 act11 also provides that requirements in various
license applications laws 12 for proof of payment of poll and
personal property taxes are waived for members of the
armed forces from April 14, 1944 until 24 months after
termination of hostilities or until six months after discharge.
The 1944 act 3 further provides that real estate owned
by the entireties is considered for the purposes of this act
as if owned by the memit of the armed forces alon-
None of the provisions of the act are applicable if the
person receives a dishonorable discharge.' 4
The Attorney General has pointed out' 5 that this law
(and presumably all others conferring benefits on members
of the armed forces) should be read in connection with the
Soldiers and Sailors Civil Relief Act of 1940.16 Whichever
act, the Act of Congress or that of Indiana General Assem-
bly, conferring the most benefits on the member of the armed
forces in the particular case is controlling. Thus where the
Indiana law exempting members of the armed forces from
penalties and interest charges is applicable only if the person
10. Ind. Emergency Acts, 1945, Ch. 26, approved Feb. 17, 1945.
11. Ind. Acts 1944 supra n. 4, § 7%.
12. See Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, Supp. 1943) §42-102.
13. Ind. Acts 1944 supra n.4, § 8%.
14. Ind. Acts 1944 supra n. 4, §8.
15. Ops. Ind. Att'y Gen. 1945, p. - (January 20, 1945).
16. 50 U.S. C. § 560.
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owns less than $20,000 worth of property, the federal law is
applicable without any limitation in amount so that if a
veteran owns property valued at more than $20,000 only a
6% interest charge can be imposed as provided under the
federal law.
The Attorney General has ruled1 that although the vet-
eran does not attempt settlement of his delinquent taxes
within six months after discharge, the penalties that would
have accrued up to that date are to be excluded in calculating
the amount due.
In 1941 the General Assembly allowed a $1000 deduc-
tion on taxable property of honorably discharged soldiers,
sailors, marines or nurses of World War I, who were dis-
abled with a service connected disability of 10% or more.18
It further provided that this exemption would not bar the
recipient from any other exemption provided for in the tax
laws. Accordingly, the Attorney General ruled' 9 that receipt
of a similar deduction under Burns 64-205 for total disability
would not bar receipt of benefits under the act of 1941 if the
person met the qualifications of both. The mortgage exemp-
tion20 may also be claimed and presumably the exemption
of $1000 for residence of the blind2' if the individual quali-
fies under all the provisions. Under Ch. 254 of the Acts of
1943, referred to above, 22 this benefit to veterans of World
War I is made applicable to members of the armed forces
in the present war, and is extended by the 1943 act to of-
ficers of this war retiring for a service connected disability,
according to a ruling of the Attorney General in 1945.23
Intangibles Taxes.
No specific legislation providing for benefits and allow-
ances for veterans has been passed by the General Assembly
with reference to intangibles taxes.
17. Ops. Ind. Att'y Gen., 1945, p. - (Jan. 20, 1945).
18. Ind. Acts, 1941. Ch. 95, p. 236, Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1943
Replacement) §64-223.
19, Ops. Ind. At'y Gen. 1941, p. 73.
20. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1943 Replacement) §64-209.
21. Ind. Acts 1943, Ch. 186, p. 558, Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1943
Replacement) §64-226.
22. supra n. 2.
23. supra n. 3.
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Inheritance Taxes.
An emergency act of 194524 provides that the inhertance
tax shall not apply to the transfer of the first $25,000 of
the estate of any decedent who was a member of the armed
forces in World War II and who has died, while so a member
or shall die as the result of injuries received or diseases con-
tracted in service within one year after termination of World
War II by presidential proclamation.
Gross Income Tax.
Ch. 282 of the Acts of 1943 amended Section 1025 of the
Gross Income Tax Act to provide that members of the armed
forces were exempt from the payment of the gross income
tax on compensation received from the military or naval
service after December 31, 1941 while in active service in
the present war. With respect to other income members of
the armed forces were not required to file a return or pay
the tax until until six months after termination of hostilities.
If a return is filed there will be no penalties or interest if not
paid until the six months after the end of the war. If a
member of the armed forces dies on or before six months
after end of war the tax due on income from other than
military compensation is wholly forgiven and waived.
The Attorney General has ruled26 that this amendment
is retroactive as to payments of the tax measured by receipts
from active military service and that refunds could be claimed
under the general refund provision of the gross income tax
act 27 by a claim filed by the taxpayer or an authorized rep-
resentative. However as to the provisions forgiving taxes
on the death of the member of the armed forces the Attor-
ney General has ruled that no refund was authorized for
taxes already paid as the act does not exempt such income
from taxation but only forgives the amount due. If paid it
was paid in discharge of an existing liability.
In 194528 the General Assembly excepted from the gross
income, taxable under the gross income tax act amounts, re-
ceived by reason of any law of Indiana or act of Congress, as
24. Ind. Acts 1945, ch. 103, p. 225.
25. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1943 Replacement) §64-2610.
26. Ops. Ind. Att'y Gen. (1943) p. 162.
27. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1943 Replacement) §64-2614.
28. Ind. Acts 1945, ch. 143, §2, p. 319.
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benefits, allotments and/or allowances by any person who
has served or is now serving in the armed forces of the U.S.
in World War II or any prior war and by any wife, widow
or children of such persons if residents of Indiana.
INHERITANCE TAX
Very little of significance, either in legislation or in
judicial or administrative interpretation of the Inheritance
Tax laws has occurred since 1940.
Legislation. Previous to 1943 Sec. 829 of the Inheritance Tax
Act made no provision for a determination that an inheri-
tance tax was not due, without an appraisement by the county
assessor or a special inheritance tax appraiser in counties
of more than 400,000 population. Ch. 176 of the Acts of
1943 amended section 8 to authorize the court to examine
the schedule filed by the executor and if the court is satis-
fied that there will be no tax payable, it may, after notice
to the estate and the tax commission, enter a decree finding
no inheritance tax payable. The 1943 amendment further
provides that in all counties, the county assessor is to be the
appraiser for the inheritance tax appraisement.
Ch. 103 of the emergency acts of 1945, effective March
2, 1945, provides a $25,000 exemption for estates of members
of the armed forces who die while so a member or who shall
die within one year after end of war as a result of injuries
received or disease contracted in military service.
Judicial and Administrative Interpretation.
By Ch. 159 of Acts of 193730 it was provided that if
no proceeding is taken to determine the inheritance tax on
the property of any decedent within 10 years after his death
it shall be conclusively presumed that no inheritance tax is
due. In re Batt's Estate-' decided in 1942 interpreted this
provision to apply to estates of decedents who died prior to
the effective date of the act. While this interpretation of a
statute of limitations clause is not novel, the important point
of the case is that it appears to place no duty on the ex-
ecutor or administrator to apply for a determination of the
29. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §6-2408.
30. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1943 Supp.) §6-2430.
31. 220 Ind. 193, 41 N.E. (2d) 365 (1942), 139 AXL.R. 1391.
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tax within the ten year period and the entire burden of col-
lecting the tax now is on the State.
Decedent died in January 1928 in which month the
administratrix was appointed. On May 27, 1938 more than
10 years after her appointment she filed a petition in the
court administering the estate showing that no proceeding
has ever been begun to determine the inheritance tax on the
property of the decedent and seeking an order that all the
property of the decedent is free and clear of any inheritance
tax liability. The State demurred which was overruled and
then sought the appointment of an appraiser to appraise the
estate for inheritance tax purposes.
The State contended that it was the duty of the admin-
istratrix to make application to have the tax determined and
that as agent of the state she is estopped from asking the
relief prayed. Judge Fansler speaking for the court said
that the administratrix is not agent of the state for purpose
of collecting the tax and that she is not estopped from assert-
ing the limiting statute until she has made application to
have the tax fixed, otherwise the statute is a nullity. The
State's contentions that the purpose of the act was to remove
the lien but not destroy the tax itself and that it was not
to be applied to property of decedents dying before its en-
actment were also rejected.
The interesting point of the case is that the decision
places no duty on the administratrix or executor to have the
tax determined and places it entirely upon the state. While
Section 782 of the Act makes it the duty of executors, admin-
istrators and trustees to file a return and imposes a penalty
(which the court may waive) for failing to file a return,
the executor may now do nothing and the State must take
the steps to have a tax determined within 10 years. If the
executor has no other reason for speedy settlement of the
estate, he may wait 10 years and avoid the tax unless the
state takes steps to collect it.
In Cornet v. Guedelhoefer,33 (1941) the Court held that
the executor was in error, in absence of agreement or direc-
tion in the will, to charge the entire inheritance tax paid to
the estate. The proper procedure is to deduct the tax pay-
able by each beneficiary from his distributive share, or where
32. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §6-2407.
33. 219 Ind. 200, 37 and 36 N.E. (2d) 681 and 933 (1941).
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tangible property is received to collect the tax from the bene-
ficiary.
The Attorney General in 194334 made an important
ruling as to the liability of the personal representative in case
of transfers in contemplation of death. In the situation put
to him the decedent left one heir and prior to his death he
gave, in contemplation of death, sums of money to various
residents and non-residents. The question was whether the
administrator of the estate was liable to account for any of
the transfer taxes on the transfers in contemplation of death.
The attorney general ruled that unless the donee has paid
the tax to the administrator he does not need to account for
the tax. The attorney general, citing New York and other
cases, ruled that the extent of the executor's personal lia-
bility is that imposed by bad faith or lack of diligence. He
ruled therefore that the representative was not liable for
payment of the tax where nothing came into his hands out
of which the tax could be made. No receipt is therefore re-
quired for payment of a tax which the executor was never
in a position to collect.
There is apparently therefore no way in which the State
can collect the inheritance tax on inter vivos transactions
falling within the scope of the inheritance tax, if the donee
is a non-resident and the executor has in his hands, no ad-
ditional funds to distribute to that donee.
In 194335 the Attorney General handed down an opinion
involving the construction of the phrase "in contemplation
of death" and that of "intended to take effect in possession
or enjoyment at or after death." The fact situation put to
him was as follows:
On September 10, 1938, A executed a warranty deed
conveying to her son B a life estate, subject to a reserved
life estate in the grantor, A, and gave a contingent remainder
in fee to her 4 children subject to defeasance by B dying
survived by a child or children in which cases the fee went
to B's survivors. Grantor died December 24, 1941 and the
deed was recorded on Jan. 2, 1942.
In order to determine whether the twy year presumption
was applicable it was necessary to determine when delivery
of the deed occurred. The Attorney General ruled that the
deed was presumed to have been delivered upon the date
34. Ops. Ind. Att'y Gen. (1943), p. 156.
35. Ops. bid. Att'y Gen. (1943) p. 380.
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it bears which in this case was more than two years prior
to death and therefore no presumption arose that the transfer
was made in contemplation of death. Since the question then
depended on the evidence, no answer could be given to
whether it was made in contemplation of death. The At-
torney General quoted with approval the definition of the
phrase "in contemplation of death" in U.S. v. Wells, 283
U.S. 102 which definition generally is followed in both Fed-
eral estate and state inheritance tax controversies.
As to the meaning of the phrase "intended to take ef-
fect in possession or enjoyment at or after death," the at-
torney general ruled that the great weight of authority in
the states was that the reservation of a life estate postpones
possession and enjoyment until death of grantor and is there-
fore subject to tax. The test approved is "whether the donor
reserved to himself any beneficial or economic interest, or
any right thereafter to otherwise dispose of any such inter-
est." There are apparently no Indiana cases on this point.
INTANGIBLES TAX LAWS
Chapters 81,36 8237 and 8338 of the Acts of 1933 contained
a comprehensive program for taxation of intangible property
classifying it separately from other. property and taxing it at
a different and lower rate.
Chapters 82 and 83 dealt specifically with the shares of
stock and deposits of financial institutions imposing a tax
on the shares of stock and the deposits in the financial in-
stitutions to the owners thereof but providing that the bank
or trust company may elect to pay the taxes imposed and
assessed against its shares of stock or its depositors.
Chapter 81 was a general intangible tax act providing
for a tax at a specified rate for the right to exercise certain
privileges enumerated in Sec. 2 of the Act,39 such as the
privilege of signing, selling, transferring, receiving the in-
come from and possessing intangibles. Sec. 140 of the Act
contains a comprehensive definition of the intangibles in-
cludeded within the act such as the more obvious intangibles:
36. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1943 Replacement) §64-901 to 64-941.
37. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1943 Replacement) §§64-822 to 64-835.
38. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1943 Replacement) §64-801 to 64-821.
39. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1943 Replacement) §64-902.
40. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1943 Replacement) §64-901.
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promissory notes, stocks, bonds, judgments and defining the
intangibles excluded from the act, among which were the
intangibles taxed under Chapter 82 and 83. The act pro-
vided that the intangibles tax should be in lieu of all other
taxes except estate, inheritance and gross income taxes which
might be imposed upon the intangibles within the state. Prior
to the passage of these acts in 1933 it was common knowl-
edge and practice that intangibles, such as stocks and bonds,
were not reported to the assessor for the general property tax
and a substantial amount of property was thus escaping
taxation in the state and thereby throwing a greater tax
burden on chattels and real property. The purpose of the
intangibles tax act was to provide means whereby the state
could secure revenue from the intangibles held by citizens
of the state. The General Assembly in 1935, 1937, 1939,
1943 and 1945 has amended the act, generally to lessen the
rigors of the intangibles tax on certain classes of individuals
and classes of intangible property. As a result of these
amendments and numerous others proposed but not passed
in each session of the Assembly, the 1943 General Assembly,
in a concurrent resolution,41 called for the creation of a com-
mission to inquire whether the provisions of the intangible
tax law, its administration and methods of collection were as
well adapted as may be to the ends intended. The legislature
directed the commission to pay particular attention to the
effect of the intangible tax laws and their administration on
the necessity of the negotiation and transfer of intangibles
by owners thereof and on transacting of business in intangles.
This concurrent resolution of the 1943 General Assembly un-
doubtedly reflects considerable dissatisfaction with the in-
tangibles tax laws and their administration and may fore-
shadow comprehensive revision. The developments in this
field since 1940 have been almost entirely in connection with
the general intangible tax, Ch. 81, and only few changes
have occurred in the application of the tax to financial in-
stitutions under Chapters 82 and 83.
Taxable and Non-Taxable Intangibles
Written instruments. The principal terms requiring in-
terpretation have been those in Subsection 1(a) 42 of Ch. 81,
41. Ind. Acts 1943, Ch. 319, p. 1065.
42. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1943 Replacement) §64-901(a).
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Acts of 1933 including in the list of intangibles subject to
tax "written instruments evidencing and/or securing a debt
not otherwise evidenced" and "written contracts for the pay-
ment of money" except contracts for personal services or for
manufacturing or processing merchandise.
The Attorney General in an opinion in 194343 interpreted
these terms rather narrowly and limited them by the illustra-
tions which follow in the Act. He was asked to rule whether
the intangible tax was payable by an electric company on a
written agreement in the following terms.
The electric company in a written contract with its customers
agreed to furnish, erect, make and maintain at its own cost
signs which were to remain the property of the electric com-
pany. The customer agreed to keep thd sign for a period of
36 months and to pay a specified sum for this 36 months month-
ly in advance during the life of the agreement. The customer
further agreed to pay a specific sum on the signing of the
agreement which was an advance payment for the last three
months of the agreement.
The Attorney General considered that if the intangibles
tax was at all applicable it was under one or the other of
the provisions quoted above. He ruled that the phrase "writ-
ten instrument evidencing and/or securing the debt not other-
wise evidenced," when considered in connection with the
statutory illustrations that are declared to be within the class
(mortgages, bills of sale, etc.), was intended to tax contracts
as to the payment of debt which might very well have been
evidenced by a promissory note or on contracts where goods
or property are sold and part of the purchase price remains
unpaid. Applying this definition to the contract in question
he ruled that it was not within the class covered by the stat-
ute. He likewise ruled that, while the contract in question was
a written contract for the payment of money, since here the
sign remained the property of the electric company there
was no sale and that the consideration for the payment in the
contract was the rendering of certain personal services in
connection with the erection and maintenance of the sign
and that therefore the contract of the electric company was
a contract for personal services and excepted under Subdi-
vision 1 (a) of the Act for the intangible tax.
Mechanics Liens. Construing the same provisions in
43. Ops. Ind. Att'y Gen.( 1943) p. 422.
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1940 the attorney general ruled" that a mechanics lien was
not a written instrument evidencing a debt as contemplated
by the Act and that it was based upon an account and was
a right given by statute. He construed the language "writ-
ten instrument" to contemplate a written instrument signed
by one to be bound by the instrument.
Loans Made by Pawnbrokers. Prior to 1940 many pawn-
brokers apparently misinterpreted the law and paid no in-
tangibles tax upon their loans. In 1940 the Attorney General
ruled45 that assuming a paper is executed by the borrower
from the pawnbroker whereby the borrower agrees to repay
the amount borrowed, an intangible under the definition in
Section 1(a) is created. Since pawnbrokers are not of the
type of finance companies such as building and loan asso-
ciations, banks and trust companies specifically taxed un-
der the financial institutions tax laws, the intangibles of
pawnbrokers are taxable under the general intangible act.
In view of this misunderstanding the state tax board ten-
tatively agreed in 1941 not to attempt to collect the tax for
the period prior to the Attorney General's opinion.46
Insurance Contracts. In situations where a policy of
insurance becomes a claim and the beneficiary elects to leave
the proceeds with the company under one of the options of
the policy and the beneficiary retains possession of the orig-
inal contract, does the law require that this policy have an
intangible tax stamp affixed or is the claim for the proceeds
still to be excluded as an insurance policy under Section lb
of the act? A further question arises if the policy becomes
a claim and the beneficiary elects to leave the proceeds with
the company and the company takes up the original policy
and issues a supplementary contract to the beneficiary, does
the law require the stamp on this contract? The attorney
general considered 47 that where the beneficiary elected under
the option in the insurance contract itself his election is un-
der the terms of the original insurance contract and there-
fore would not be taxable because Section 1 (b) provides
that life insurance policies shall not be considered intangibles.
However in the situation where the insurance policy does not
44. Ops. Ind. Att'y Gen. (1940) p. 110.
45. Ops. Ind. Att'y Gen. (1940) p. 203.
46. Indiana Year Book (1941) p. 778.
47. Ops. Ind. Att'y Gen. (1941) p. 404.
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provide for installment payments and the company contracts
with the beneficiary to pay in installments, that is an entirely
new contract in the nature of an investment contract and
as such would constitute an intangible taxable under the act.
Judgments. In construing Subsection 1 (a) which in-
cludes, as taxable intangibles, "final judgments from their
date of finality" the attorney general ruled48 that a judgment
setting up the value of the property rendered in a condem-
nation proceeding was not such a judgment as is referred
to in the Intangibles Act. "Final judgment" is restricted to
those final judgments which entitle the holder thereof to an
ascertained and express amount of money or to designated
property. In the case in question the judgment was in the
nature of a judicial ascertainment of the value of the utility
property which valuation is available to the municipality if
action is taken within the period designated by the statute.
It is not a judgment against the city for money.
While Subsection 1 (b) excludes obligations of the State
of Indiana and its political subdivisions, the tax has been
construed to apply to judgments on Barrett law bonds and
judgments procured in the enforcement and collection of
any tax exempt intangibles. 49 The legislature was excepting
obligations "issued" by the state or its political subdivisions
and a judgment obtained in the enforcement of those obli-
gations is not to be considered as an obligation "issued" by
the state or its political subdivisions.
In 1942 the question arose whether a written instrument
evidencing a debt was to be excluded because the conditions
imposed in the written instrument were such that the instru-
mnt had only a problematical value. In the situation in
question a rural electric membership corporation had is-
sued certificates of indebtedness in which the corporation
agreed to pay subject to certain conditions. 0  The attorney
48. Ops. Ind. Att'y Gen. (1941) p. 323.
49. Ops. Ind. Att'y Gen. (1940) p. 151.
50. (1) that the corporation is not obligated to pay principal or
interest unless the corporation has established and maintained
reserves required by the provisions of mortgages to the U.S.
government; (2) that no part of the principal or interest is
payable at any time when the corporation is in default under
the provisions of the mortgage; (3) that there is no obligation
to pay if the board of directors believe payment would cause
a default in the mortgage or reduce the reserves required by
the mortgage or reduce the working capital of the corporation,
all of which decisions were in the sole discretion of the board
of directors.
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general ruled51 that these eonditions did not go to the ques-
tion whether the property was or was not covered by the act
but rather to the question of the computation of the tax and
the fixing of the value. He ruled that while the value is prob-
lematical the instrument does meet the requirements of the
statute and that therefore the instrument is a taxable in-
tangible.
Bank Stocks. While Section 1 (b) specifically excludes
"the shares of stock in any national bank" and "the shares
of stock in any bank," the Act also provides that the term
"bank" shall mean any bank organized under the laws of
this state or under the law of the United States. The Attorney
General therefore ruled in 194252 that the shares of stock
held by Indiana citizens in non-Indiana state banks are tax-
able but as to shares of stock of national banks located out-
side of the State of Indiana the Intangibles Tax Act does not
apply. Section 548 of Title 12, U. S. Code, shows that Con-
gress has approved the taxation of national bank stock only
at the domicile of the bank.
Compensating Balances. As a result of the ruling of the
attorney general in 194253 that "compensating balances" re-
tained in connection with loans made by banks were taxable
as intangibles to the owners of such deposit, the Assembly
in 1943, Ch. 134,11 provided that the term "intangible" should
not include such compensating balances.
Accounts Receivable. The Attorney General ruled in
194455 that accounts receivable, evidenced by a book of ac-
counts was not subject to the intangibles tax. He pointed out
that Section 1 (a) of the act expressly covers two types of
accounts-brokerage accounts and accounts arising out of
transactions involving depositis or loan of money. This is
some weight in concluding that the great mass of accounts
receivable of merchants are not covered. The term "written
instrument evidencing . . . a debt" does cover accounts
51. Ops. Ind. Att'y Gen. (1942) p. 227.
52. Ops. Ind. Att'y Gen. (1942) p. 223.
53. Ops. Ind. Att'y Gem. (1942) p. 154.
54. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns 1943 Replacement) 64-901(b).
55. Op]s. Ind. Att'y Gen. 1944 (p. 41). The State Board of Tax Com-
nssioners has recommended that the term "intangibles" in the
definition of property covered by the act should be amended
to include all intangible personal property. See Indiana Year
Book (1944) p. 699. Presumably such a definition would include
accounts receivable.
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receivable. While accounts receivable do evidence a debt,
they are not "written instruments" within meaning of Section
1 (a). The examples following the term in the statute limit
it to the type of written instruments. This ruling leaves a
sizeable amount of intangible property in Indiana tax free.
On Whom the Tax Falls
Transactions or privileges taxed. The Supreme Count in
Zoercher v. The Indiana Associated Telephone Corporation,;6
in 1937 held the intangibles tax to be a tax against the own-
ers of an intangible as distinguished from. the issuer although
Section 2 (a) of the Act of 1933 provides that the tax is on
the right to "sign, execute and issue intangibles." Judge
Fansler concurred on the ground that Sec. 2 provides for a
tax to be paid by every person residing or domiciled in the
state who signs, executies and issues an intangible but the
amount of the tax to be paid by such person must be measured
by such intangibles owned or controlled within the state.
In 1943 the Attorney General was called upon to further
interpret Sec. 2 in considering whether the tax may be im-
posed upon the "issuer" of an intangible where the intangible
was issued to non-residents of Indiana. In the situation put
to the Attorney General a corporation organized in and dom-
iciled in Indiana had authorized the issuance of bonds in
exchange for preferred stock of the corporation had been
deposited with it under a re-organization plan. The transfer
agent, the trustees under the mortgage, and the property
mortgaged were all located in Indiana. The mortgagor was
required by the agreement to deposit annually with the trus-
tees the amount of the intangibles tax which was due from
the holders of the bonds and the trustee was required to file
a report and pay the tax. Of the one hundred thousand
dollars worth of bonds issued sixteen thousand three hundred
dollars were to be issued to non-residents of Indiana and the
question was whether these bonds were subject to the in-
tangibles tax. It was ruled that the bonds to be issued to
non-residents were not subject to the tax either under the
theory of the majority in the Indiana Associated Telephone
Company case or that of Judge Fansler in the concurring
opinion unless such bonds had a business situs within the
56. 211 Ind. 447 (1937) 7 N.E. (2d) 282.
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state. 7 The Attorney General ruled that the registering
of the bonds on the books of the registrar in Indiana and
mortgaging of real estate in Indiana to a trustee resident of
Indiana as security for the bonds would not bring these bonds
within the clause of Sec. 2 of Ch. 81 which taxed intangibles
"controlled by any person andor fiduciary and having a
business situs in this state and in the possession of or under
the control andlor management of any such person and/or
fiduciary." This ruling raises again the question left un-
answered in the Associated Telephone Company case and
mentioned by Judge Fansler in his concurring opinion that
the effect of the above interpretation of Section 2 is that
persons signing, executing and issuing intangibles to owners
or holders within Indiana are taxed and those signing, exe-
cuting and issuing intangibles to owners or holders outside
of the state are not taxed, resulting in a "discrimination"
in favor of the latter group. Judge Fansler reserved con-
sideration of whether this discrimination was constitutional
but commented that it "may well be doubted" whether there
is a reasonable basis for the discrimination.5
8
A question involving securities issued under a plan of
reorganization under Ch. 10 of the Bankruptcy Act 9 was
presented to the Attorney General in the light of Sec. 667
of Title 11 U.S. Code which excepts the issuance, transfer
or exchange of securities or making or delivering of instru-
ments of transfer under any reorganization plan under Ch.
10 of the Bankruptcy Act from state and U. S. stamp tax
laws. The Attorney General ruled60 that the intangibles tax
could not be imposed on the securities delivered to creditors
or stockholders under the plan, as that was prohibited by
Sec. 667 of Title 11 U.S. Code. He said however that this
section of the U.S. Code did not affect the taxability after
issuance under the plan: nor does it purport to affect an ex-
cise tax which otherwise may be legally assessed. He ruled
therefore that if the person to whomi the instrument is issued
is a resident of Indiana such person is required to pay an
57. Ops. Ind. Att'y Gen. (1943) p. 462.
58. 211 Ind. 447, 463, 7 N.E. (2d) 282, 289. See recommendation
of State Board of Tax Commissioners, infra note 65.
59. 11 U.S.C. § 501 et seq.
60. Ops. Ind. Att'y Gen. (1943) p. 287.
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intangibles tax on the particular security after it has been
issued to him.
A question of interest to banks and insurance companies
was considered by the Attorney General as to the taxability
of an intangible to i mortgage loan correspondent of a num-
ber of life insurance companies who made loans in the follow-
ing manner:
When the mortgage loan correspondent makes the loan the loan
and mortgage is taken payable to it and so recorded. Imme-
diately thereafter the mortgage loan correspondent assigns the
mortgage to a local bank which advances an amount equal to
the principal of the mortgage to a title company in escrow
and the title company disburses the amount for the bank when
the title is approved. After the title's approval all mortgage
papers together with an assignment were sent at the discretion
of the mortgage loan correspondent to a life insurance com-
pany which paid to the bank the proceeds of the mortgage.
The mortgage loan correspondent obtained a commission out
of the transaction.
The Attorney General ruled 1 that Sec. 1 (a) was applicable
prior to the assignment and that therefore the tax for the
current year in which the note and mortgage were executed
must be paid by the mortgage loan correspondent. After as-
signment however the mortgage and notes are exempt under
the provisions of Sec. 1 (b) if they have been assigned to a
bank or life insurance company. The Attorney General point-
ed out that this ruling was based on the supposition that
the mortgage was recorded prior to its assignment to any
bank or life insurance company.
Situs of Property Subject to Tax. The Attorney General
has been called upon several times 2 to pass upon the term
"actual business situs" outside of the state of Indiana in which
case the intangible is not taxable to a resident owner, and the
provision taxing an intangible "having a business situs in this
state" when controlled by a person and/or fiduciary. The test
applied in a 1941 ruling 3 is that for an intangible to have a
61. Ops. Ind. Att'y Gen. (1943) p. 123.
62. See Ops. Ind. Atty. Gen. 1940, page 203; 1941, pp. 241, 301, 395;
1944, p. 453.
63. Ops. Ind. Atty. Gen. (1941) p. 395. In 1944, the Attorney Gen-
eral ruled (Ops. Ind. Atty. Gen. (1944) page 453), that an
Illinois corporation with its home office in Chicago but with
its manufacturing plant in Indiana and its corporate ledgers
kept in Indiana might be taxable in Indiana on its notes and
trade acceptances taken in sales transactions from its customers.
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business situs away from the owner's domicile it must be
shown that possession and control of the property has been
localized in some independent business or investment so that
its substantial use and value primarily attach to and become
an asset of the out-of-state business.
The extent of the use in an out-of-state business or in-
vestment required to exclude the property from the intang-
ibles tax in Indiana may be seen by the Attorney General's
answers to the fact situation put to him:
(1) Would an Indiana corporation having its principal
place of business within the state be liable for taxes on deposits
in an out-of-state bank of a branch of the corporation operating
outside of Indiana as a semi-independent unit where such de-
posits were composed of funds received and utilized by the out-
of-state branch in its operations?
Answer: No.
(2) Would an Indiana corporation having its home office
outside of Indiana and its principal place of business outside
be liable for deposits in out-of-state banks where such deposits
represented funds received and utilized as an integral part of
its outside business?
Answer: No.
(3) Would an Indiana corporation having its principal
place of business in Indiana be liable for a tax on deposits
in an out-of-state bank when such deposits represent receipts
of an established sales outlet from sales of commodities outside
of Indiana and which deposits were periodically placed to the
credit of the Indiana corporation?
The Attorney General answered that these facts were in-
sufficient to give the deposits an out-of-state situs as there was
no utilization of the deposits in the out-of-state transactions
and the deposits were merely for safe-keeping.
(4) Would the determination of taxability of the situation
in Question (3) be affected by whether or not the operating ex-
penses were met by checks drawn against the deposits and the
subsequent periodical transfers represented net receipts?
The Attorney General ruled that the fact that the deposits
were used in part to pay operating expenses of the out-of-state
office would not necessarily affect the question so long as the
deposits were under the control of the Indiana corporation and
The intangibles generally came to its Indiana office where they
were recorded in the company banks and then forwarded to an
Illinois bank for collection. More than one-half of the intan-
gibles are from Illinois customers.
The Attorney General held that the mere fact that the
intangibles were not physically located in the state was not
material. Insufficient facts were available to establish whether
the intangibles had a business situs in the state. The company
in its argument relied entirely on physical location as the test.
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the checks upon the deposits were drawn by such a corporation.
In such a case possession or control has not been localized in
an independent business or investment away from the domicil of
the owner.
(5) Would an Indiana corporation be taxable on deposits
in out-of-state banks when such deposits represented funds of the
corporation deposited by the home office in the out-of-state
banks to be utilized by the corporation in purchasing materials
and meeting out of state payrolls?
The Attorney General stated that the mere establishing of
deposits in out-of-state banks upon which checks could be drawn
by the home office to pay salesman or to pay for material which
was bought in such out-of-state community would not be suffici-
ent to meet the requirement that possession and control must be
localized in some dependent business or investment.
(6) A foreign corporation authorized to do business in In-
diana and having itb offices and principal place of business in-
cluding factories located within Indiana makes out-of-state de-
posits. Is it taxable on this deposit?
The Attorney General stated that upon the bare statements
of facts presented the deposit would be taxable.
Since under the Associated Telephone Company case, the
tax is imposed on the owner of the intangible and not on the
issuer, the attorney general has ruled that it is immaterial
that finance contracts for sale of good were made outside of
the state, or that the contract is made to finance a purchase
by a non-resident from a non-resident dealer.64 If the finance
company does business in the state and holds and controls the
intangible in its Indiana office, the intangible is taxable in
Indiana. Likewise the finance contract is not taxable if held
outside of Indiana by a non-resident firm even though it
finances sales of goods in Indiana and the conditional sales
contract is entered into in Indiana. 65 At time of execution the
64. Ops. Ind. Atty. Gen. (1940) p. 203.
65. Ops. Ind. Atty. Gen. (1941) p. 301, 241 In 1944 the State Board
of Tax Commissioners recommended that the provision of the
statute that excludes intangibles having an actual business situs
outside of Indiana be deleted. The Board argues that if mort-
gages, conditional sale contracts and other forns of intagible
property are actually executed within Indiana and secured by
Indiana property, there is no good reason why the intangible
tax should not be collected on such transactions although the
instruments are kept at some business situs located outside of
Indiana. See, Indiana Year Book (1944) p. 699. It is also rec-
ommended that Section 2 (Ind. Stat. Ann. § 64-902 (Burns, 1943
Replacement Volume)), defining the transactions covered by the
Act, be amended to cover all transactions that take place in
the State. The provision making the tax payable only by persons
residing in or domiciled in the state would be eliminated by
this proposal.
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proper stamps must be fixed but after shipment of contract
to office of non-resident, the intangibles tax stamps are not
due on the contract on the anniversary date.
Exemption of Charitable Owners. Chapter 170 of the
Acts of 1945, effective March 6, 1945, provides that the in-
tangible tax shall not be imposed or collected on any intang-
ibles after February 27, 1944 owned or held for the use and
benefit of any corporation, institution, trust or association
operating exclusively for religious, charitable, educational,
hospital, scientific, fraternal, civic or cemetery, purposes and
not for private profit. Chapter 170 further sets up a pro-
cedure for refund to these institutions for any tax paid since
February 27, 1944.66 The statute provides that no interest
shall be paid upon these refunds.
Computation of the Tax
Chapter 51, the Acts of 1945, an emergency act effective
February 26, 1945 sets up a new method of valuing judg-
ments subject to the intangibles tax. The act provides that
except where specifically valued by the commission at its
instance and upon notice and hearing no judgment or balance
due upon a judgment shall be considered to be of any value
whatsoever unless and until a payment is received in dis-
charge or partial discharge. The effect of this provision is
to provide that the intangible tax will generally not apply
to judgments except on each payment of money on the judg-
ment and that the value will be therefore equal only to the
amount of the payment.
Administration and Enforcement
In 1943 the attorney general interpreted the intangibles
tax acts to contain no effective procedure for a refund of
the intangibles tax erroneously paid. The Attorney General
ruled67 that Sections 5, 6 and 7, of the Intangibles Tax Law
66. Under Regulation 16 adopted by the State Board of Tax Com-
missioners on June 30, 1937, intangibles held by religious, chari-
table, fraternal or educational organizations as owners were not
taxable. This rule continued until an opinion of the attorney
general on Jan. 29, 1944 (1944 Op. Ind. Att'y Gen. p. 27) stated
that the board had no power to make this rule. The rule was
changed and the 1945 act permits refund of taxes paid after
Feb. 27, 1944.
67. Op. Ind. Att'y Gen. (1943) p. 519. The State Board of Tax
Commissioners has recommended that the intangible tax act be
changed so as to provide that the State Board of Tax Commis-
sioners can order refunds for taxes erroneously paid or stamps
erroneously purchased. See Indiana Year Book (1944) p. 700.
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providing a procedure for fixing the valuation by the commis-
sion and providing that after payment of the tax on the value
so fixed an aggrieved person had a right of appeal to the courts
were the only provisions authorizing a refund in the intang-
ible tax act and that therefore in order for the state tax board
to authorize a refund under Sec. 7, the procedure prescribed
in the two preceding sections must be strictly followed and a
judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction order-
ing the refund. He therefore ruled that where a charitable
organization erroneously paid the intangible tax without pro-
test there was no provision in the statute providing for re-
fund. Since the statute as interpreted contains no provision
for refund except in the very limited situation where the
value of the intangible is contested the question arises whether
the common law doctrine permitting recovery of payments
made under duress is available to taxpayers who do not con-
test the value of the intangible but contest its taxability.68 In
any event taxpayers under the Intangibles Act are given no
effective refund procedure as they have been in the Gross
Income Tax Act."'
Penalties. Chapter 51 of the Act of 1945, an emengency
act effective February 26, 1945, changes substantially the
penalty for failing to pay the tax imposed by the act. As
originally provided the penalty was equal to four times the
amount of the tax and the unpaid tax and penalty should
draw interest at the rate of 10%.7 The 1945 amendment
provides that the penalty for. non-payment of the tax shall be
10 % of the amount of the tax with interest upon the tax at a
rate of 6% per year except where failure to pay was due to
fraudulent intent to evade the tax, in which case the taxpayer
shall pay in addition to the penalty a further penalty of four
times the amount of the tax.
Recording of Instruments. The original intangible tax
act of 1933 provided that no instrument securing the payment
of any debt evidenced by any intangible subject to the tax
68. Cf. Board of County Commissioners v. Millikan, 207 Ind. 142,
* 190 N.E. 185 (1934), Culbertson v. Board of County Commis-
* sioners, 208 Ind. 22, 194 N.E. 638 (1935) suggesting §64-2819(Burns 1943 Replacement), a very limited refund provision for
property taxes, is the exclusive refund procedure and eliminates
any right to the common law remedy.
69. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns 1943 Replacement) §64-2614.
70. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns 1943 Replacement) §64-916.
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should be admitted to record until all the tax then due had
been paid. 1 Section 3 of Chapter 51, an emergency act of
1945 amends this provision to provide that not only should
the instrument securing the payment of any debt evidenced
by any intangible subject to the tax not be recorded until the
tax had been paid but also that any judgment defined as an
intangible and any release satisfaction or assignment of such
instrument or judgment should not be recorded until the tax
had been paid unless satisfactory proof is made in accordance
with the rules established by the commission that no tax is
due upon the intangible or judgment.
The 1933 Act originally provided that no intangible sub-
ject to tax should be valid or enforceable until all taxes had
been paid.7 2 There was considerable uncertainty as to whether
this made the instrument invalid in the sense that a sub-
sequent payment of the tax could not restore the validity or
enforceability of the instrument. In Gradeless v. Gradeless, 3
in an action on a promissory note, defendant answered the
complaint in bar, pleading, inter alia, illegal consideration in
that no intangible tax had been paid and that such tax with
penalty was unpaid. The notes not bearing the intangible
tax stamps were admitted as evidence over the defendant's
objection. Both notes were executed prior to the passage of
the 1933 act and were valid and existing obligations at that
time. The Appellate Court held that there was no error in
admitting the un-stamped notes as evidence as the act pro-
vided several methods of payment, enforcement and collection
so that the absence of stamps was not prima facie proof that
the tax had not been paid. The court further held that the
legislature did not intend to impair the validity of existing
obligations but to suspend their effectiveness until the tax
was paid and that no right of action existed on an intangible
until the requirements of the act are satisfied. The Appellate
Court said that a document on which the tax had not been
paid is not rendered for ever unenforceable and that an action.
on such intangible was an action prematurely brought. The
court said that from the record of the case it could not as-
certain whether the tax had been paid or not and that such
71. Ind. Acts, 1933 Ch. 81, §29, p. 523, Ind. Stat. Ann (Buims
1943, Replacement) §64-929.
72. Ind. Acts, 1933, Ch. 81, p. 523.
73. 114 Ind. App. 10, 49 N.E. (2d) 398 (1943).
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matters go to the abatement of the action and not to the
defense and that by failing to plead in abatement instead of
in bar defendant waived his right to raise the question. The
court concluded that if a tax was due the state, the plaintiff,
would be required to pay it.
In 1943 the Assembly clarified this provision of the in-
tangible tax by providing74 that a valid judgment may be
rendered in any action on any such intangible if at the trial
of said action it is shown that all such taxes and penalties are
then paid in full.
Ch. 51, of the 1945 emergency Acts, gave further powers
to the tax commission in the enforcement and collection of
the taxes by providing that the commission should have
powers to make rules and regulations as may be necessary
for its interpretation and proper enforcement.
Financial Institutions. Chapter 83, The Acts of 1933,
imposing an intangible tax on banks determined the value of
deposits in any bank or trust company by deducting the
amount of any public and non-resident deposits, and deposits
of other banks from the total deposits in such bank.7 5 Chapter
32 of the Acts of 1943,76 the only amendment to the acts re-
lating to financial institutions, provided an additional de-
duction from the total deposits by authorizing a deduction of
an amount equalling the sum total of obligations of the U.S.
government and its instrumentalities and of the State of In-
diana and its instrumentalities and political subdivisions
owned by the bank if the principal of such obligations were
excepted from property taxes by any law of the U.S. or of
the State of Indiana. It provided, however, that such de-
duction should not exceed an amount equal to 50% of the
difference between the total deposits and the aggregate of
public deposits, non-resident deposits and deposits of other
banks.
In 1944 the Attorney General gave an opinion- on the
74. Ind. Acts 1943 Ch. 63, §1, p. 161, Inc Stat. Ann. (Burns
1943 Replacement) §64-930.
75. Ind. Acts 1933 Ch. 83 §6, p. 545 as amended 1935, Ch. 298,
§2, p. 1459.
76. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns 1943 Replacement) §64-805.
77. Op. Ind. Att'y Gen. (1944) p. 390.
The State Board of Tax Commissioners has recommended
that Industrial Loan and Investment Companies be made sub-ject to the tax. The Board points out that small loan com-
panies pay the tax upon their loans and there is no reason why
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liability of industrial loan and investment companies or-
ganized under the Indiana Industrial Loan and Investment
Act for the payment of the intangible tax upon their loans.
He ruled that the companies were not liable for the payment
of the intangible tax upon loans made by the companies. It
was pointed out that under section 18-3123 Burns, Ann. Stat.
1933 industrial loan and investment companies are to be taxed
the same as banks and trust companies pursuant to Ch. 83,
Acts of 1933.78 The attorney general pointed out that it was
not necessary to decide whether certificates of indebtedness
issued by such institutions were to be considered deposits
under Ch. 83. If they are deposits then they are taxed to the
owner with the company given the option to elect to pay the
tax. If they are not deposits, they are investments on which
the owner would be required to place intangible stamps.79 In
either event the state would get its money. Since Ch. 83 pro-
vides that taxes imposed on banks and trust companies are in
lieu of other taxes and since these industrial loan and in-
vestment companies must be taxed as banks, they are not
liable for the intangible tax under Ch. 81.
GROSS INCOME TAX
The Indiana Gross Income Tax was first enacted in
193380 and it has been periodically amended in each session
of the general Assembly since 1937.
Legislation
1941 Amendments. Subsection (p) of Section 1, of the
Gross Income Tax Act, was amended to make it clear that
companies organized under the Industrial Loan Act should not
also pay the tax. This ruling, the State Board pointed out,
gives a special privilege to these companies over that enjoyed
by individual lenders and small loan companies who must pay
the tax. See Indiana Year Book (1944) p. 699.
78. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns 1943 Replacement) §§64-801-64-821.
79. Cf. Erwin v. Erwin, 111 Ind. App. 448, 41 N.E. (2d) 644 (1942)
stating that a certificate of deposit executed by a private bank
in 1883 was not a taxable intangible under section 64-901(b) in
the absence of a showing that the bank no longer existed or
any other fact which might remove the instrument from the
class specifically exempted by law. P filed his claim on the
deposit against the administrator who answered alleging that
the intangible tax had never been affixed to the instrument.
Held demurrer to answer properly sustained.
80. Ind. Acts 1933, Cl. 50 p. 388.
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domestic casualty and fire insurance carriers must compute
and report as part of their gross income each tax year the
gross earnings from the sale during that year of assets in
the business conducted by such carrier.81 These insurance
carriers need consider as gross income only so much of their
gross earnings as does not become or is not used to maintain
a reserve or other policy liability required by the laws of
Indiana. The taxable portion of the gross income according
to the new amendment is to be determined by dividing the
year's average of all admitted assets and multiplying the per-
centage figure thus obtained times the gross income. This
provision presumably also applies to domestic mutual insur-
ance companies since they are included in Sec. 1(o) 2 and
by inference may be considered included in the related Sec.
1(p).
A substantial relief was given to retail merchants in
1941 by reduction from the flat levy of 1% of their gross
income over $3000.00 to of 1%.88 This special rate is
limited to that portion of the retail merchant's income re-
ceived from "selling at retail" as defined in Section 1 (k) of
the Act.84
The 1941 amendments abolished the ruling in Charles
Laundry and Dry Cleaning Co. v. Department of Treasury
that laundries and dry cleaning companies were taxable at
1% on the ground that they were selling service and there-
fore under Section 3 (g) ; the amendment" imposed a special
rate of of 1% for gross income received from the busi-
ness of dry cleaning and laundering. However, since these
establishments do not receive income derived by a "retail
merchant" from "selling at retail," laundries and dry cleaners
are entitled to only $1000.00 deduction under Section 5(b) 86
as compared with the $3000.00 deduction for retail merchants.
The Circuit Court of Appeals had ruled in 1940 in In-
gram-Richardson Mfg. Co. v. Department of Treasury 7 that
81. Ind. Acts 1941, Ch. 140, Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns 1943 Replace-
ment) §64-2601(p).
82. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns 1943 Replacement) §64-2601(o).
83. Ind. Acts 1941, Ch. 140, Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns 1943 Replace-
ment) §64-2603(c).
84. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns 1943 Replacement) §64-2601(k).
85. Ind. Acts 1941, Ch. 140, Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns 1943 Replace-
ment) §64-2603(d).
86. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns 1943 Replacement) §64-2606(b).
87. (CCA 7th) 114 F. (2d) 889 1940.
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servicing by enameling stove and refrigerator parts belong-
ing to taxpayer's customers was'not a sale within clause
3(a) of the 1937 Act 88 but that as title did not pass, the
transaction was a bailment and therefore within the "catch-
all" claus& and subject to the 1% rate. In 1941 the general
assembly amended the provision to include among the items
taxable at 1,/ of 1%, income from the business of industrial
processing, enameling, plating or the servicing of goods
which are to be sold by the person for whom the work is
done.", The Supreme Court intimated in 1942 in Oster v.
Department of Treasury-° that this amendment was merely
declaratory of the original act and it sustained a claim for
refund for taxes paid from 1933 to 1935 under the 1933 act
on transactions clearly under this provision of the 1941 act.
The 1941 General Assembly further clarified the Act
by providing that all sales not covered by the definition of
"wholesale sales" in Section 3 (a) of the Act or selling "at
retail" under Section 1 (k) of the Act are to be defined as
"retail sales."'- The 1941 amendments specifically included
receipts from outdoor poster and painting display advertising
with the meaning of "display advertising" under the provi-
sion in Section 3 (b) of the Act and therefore taxable at 1,
of 11%2 Previously the gross income tax division had con-
sidered the term as including only the gross receipts derived
from advertising in a newspaper, magazine or periodical. 93
Of general interest to taxpayers is the 1941 amendment
to Section 10 of the Act deleting the requirement of verifi-
cation of gross income tax returns by oath.94
1943 Amendments. The only changes of importance
enacted by the 1943 General Assembly were: a rearrange-
ment of the provisions concerning gross income of fraternal
benefit societies, order, unions, hospitals, and religious and
educational institutions, deleting Section 1 (q) and insertion
of provision for such societies in Section 6 (i) as to exemp-
88. Ind. Acts 1937, Ch. 117.
89. -Ind. Acts 1941, Ch. 140, Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns 1943 Replace-
ment) §64-2603(a) (4).
90. 219 Ind. 313, 37 N.E. (2d) 528 (1941).
91. Ind. Acts 1941, Ch. 140, Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns 1943 Replace-
ment) *§64-2603(g).
92. Ind. Acts 1941, Ch. 140, Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns 1943 Replace-
ment) §64-2603(b).
93. Gross Income Tax Regulations, Series IV, (1940), Reg. 3400.
94. Ind. Acts 1941, Ch. 22, Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns 1943 Replacement)
§64-2610(a).
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tions" ; and an amendment of Section 10 to grant certain
exemptions to members of the armed forces.98
1945 Amendments. Chapter 143 of the Emergency Acts
of 1945, effective March 5, 1945, amended Section 1(m) T
of the Act by providing that the face amount of promissory
notes on retail installment contracts except so much as rep-
resents insurance premiums or finance charges as defined
in Section 1 of the Retail Installment Sales Act98 of Indiana
derived from certain enumerated types of sales shall be in-
cluded in gross income and returned under the applicable
classification of Section 3. It further provides that amounts
received in payment of or from the sale of such promissory
notes or retail installment contracts shall not be included in
gross income except as that part of the receipts which rep-
resents a finance charge which shall then be included in gross
income when collected. This provision makes clear that
notes or retail installment contracts accepted in payment for
sale of personal property are taxable as gross income at the
time of the acceptance of the notes or the contracts but that
amounts received subsequently in payment on such contracts
are not to be included as gross income.
Section 3 classifying gross income for the rate of tax
was amended by 1945 legislation99 to tax persons purchasing
and selling grain and soy beans in a capacity of a public
terminal grain handler at 1% of their gross earnings which
is construed to mean gross receipts from the sales of such
grain and soy beans less the cost of the grain and soy beans
sold during the period. The Act further provides that if
the income is received from the purchase and sale of whole
grain or soy beans when the U. S. Government has prescribed
both a purchase price and a sales price the tax shall then
be equal to 1% of the specific margin.
95. Ind. Acts 1943, Ch. 144 §1, 2 Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns 1943
Replacement) §64-2606(i).
96. Ind. Acts 1943, Ch. 282, Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns 1943 Replace-
ment) §64-2610. For discussion of this change see supra, page 118.
97. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns 1943 Replacement) §64-2601(m). Pre-
viously under the Regulations conditional sales notes were not
reported for taxation but payments on the notes were. Gross
Income Tax Regulations, series VI (1943) Reg. 1207.
98. Ind. Acts 1935, Ch. 231, Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns 1943 Replace-
ment) §§58-901-58-934.
99. Ind. Acts, 1945, Ch. 310, p. 1380.
[Vol. 21
TAXATION
A 1945 Act °o adds two additional exemption provisions
to Section 6 of the Act. A new section 6(1) provides that
certain amounts received as benefits, allotsments and allow-
ances by members of the armed forces and their dependents
are excepted from taxable gross income.101 A new Section
6(m) exempts from the taxable gross income the amounts
of retailers excise taxes imposed by the United States from
the sale at retail of tangible personal property and collected
by a retail merchant from the buyer as a separate item in
addition to the price of the property sold and which the
retail merchant remits to the taxing authority.
The 1945 Acto2 amended Section 12 as to the procedure
iA, the case of an improper return. The new provision pro-
vides that if the department discovers that the tax has not
been properly assessed it may within three years after filing
of a return issue to the taxpayer a notice of proposed assess-
ment by registered mail. If no protest is made by the tax-
payer within thirty days or if after hearing, his protest and
objections are denied, the department shall assess the gross
income tax on the taxpayer and shall make demand for the
amount of the tax and interest and penalties if any. The
provision further provides that the amount shall be due
within ten days from the date of mailing of the demand.
The provision as to the three year statute of limitations is
clarified by making clear that the statute begins to run from
the last day for filing returns and not from the day on which
it was filed. It provides that annual returns filed on or
before the last day for filing shall be considered as having
been filed on the last day. This amendment clarifies the
assessment procedure as to notice and distinguishes between
a notice of proposed assessment, to which the taxpayer may
file objections within thirty days, and the "assessment and
demand for payment" after which no further hearing is
provided for the taxpayer and the amount is due -within ten
days.
The 1945 Act'03 amends Section 13 providing for reme-
dies for failure to pay the tax, by adding the remedy of
"proceedings supplementary" to that by garnishment. It
100. Ind. Acts, 1945, Ch. 143, p. 311.
101. See supra p. 118.
102. Ind. Acts, 1945, Ch. 143, sec. 4.
103. Ind. Acts, 1945, Ch. 143, sec. 5.
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further specifies a method of levy by the sheriff on choses
in action by providing that the sheriff shall serve notice of
such levy upon the debtor of such taxpayer and that any
payment made by the debtor to the sheriff shall constitute
a discharge of the chose in action to the extent of payment.
The provision assures the debtor of indemnification against
claims and damages of any taxpayer for amounts so paid
to the sheriff or for damages arising from such payment.
The 1945 amendments clarify the provision of suits for
refund.10 Previously, refund suits could be brought in "any
court of competent jurisdiction" and the circuit or superior
court of the county in which the taxpayer resides or is lo-
cated was given original jurisdiction of the action to recover
any amount improperly collected.10 5 The 1945 amendment
provides that the suit must be brought in the circuit or su-
perior court of the county of residence or business location
and if the taxpayer has no such residence or business location
then in the Marion Circuit or Superior Court. This amend-
ment makes clear the result in Ford Motor Company v. De-
partment of Treasury0 " in which the United States Supreme
Court held in 1945 that the previous provisions of the Act
did not authorize suit in the federal courts. The 1945 amend-
ment provides that the State consents to suit in the courts
of the county of residence or business location or in the
Marion Circuit or Superior Court and in no other courts and
that these courts have exclusive jurisdiction.
The previous Acts have provided that it was the duty
of the attorney general to represent the department andfor
State of Indiana in all legal matters arising under the Act
"upon the order and under the direction of the Depart-
ment."10 7 The 1945 amendments eliminate the quoted phrase,
thus giving the attorney general complete and final power on
matters of litigation enforcement, construction, application
and administration of the Act. 0 8
104. Ind. Acts, 1945, Ch. 143, sec. 6.
105. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns 1943 Replacement) §64-2614.
106. 323 U.S. 459, 65 Sup. Ct. Rep. 347, 89 L. Ed. 372 (1945).
107. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns 1943 Replacement) §64-2614(c). Other
provisions of the Act made it mandatory on the attorney general
to act. See e.g. §64-2630 where in case a witness fails to
obey a subpoena to appear before the department, the attorney
general "shall" institute proceedings. A 1945 amendment pro-
vides that the attorney general "may" institute proceedings.
108. Ind. Acts 1945, Ch. 143, Sec. 6.
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Of interest to taxpayers who keep their books upon an
accrual basis is an amendment in 1945 to Section 18 of the
Act authorizing the department to grant the taxpayer the
privilege of reporting his receipts upon an accrual basis.109
Court Decisions
The court decisions involving the gross income tax act
since 1940 have generally fallen under the following head-
ings: the applicability of the tax to receipts from transac-
tions involving interstate commerce; items includable within
taxable gross receipts; and the applicable rate of tax.
Gross Receipts from Transactions Involving Interstate
Commerce. By providing for an exemption from gross in-
come of income derived from business conducted in commerce
between Indiana and other states or foreign countries only
to the extent to which Indiana is prohibited from taxing
such gross income,11 the Gross Income Tax Act has thrown
into the state and federal courts the question of what in-
come from interstate commerce transactions may be includ-
ed in the taxable gross income.
The general trend in recent years has been toward re-
quiring interstate commerce to bear a greater portion of
the tax burden of supporting state governments. Since not
all state taxes on interstate commerce are now considered as
prohibited by the commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution,
the United States Supreme Court has been forced to con-
sider state taxes on transactions in interstate commerce on a
109. Ind. Acts, 1945, Ch. 143, sec. 7. Previous to the passage of this
amendment the Regulations provided that the taxpayer could
be granted the privilege of reporting on the accrual basis. This
amendment merely confirms the gross income tax division's au-
thority for its regulation. See Gross Income Tax Regulations,
Series VI, (1943) Reg. No. 901.
110. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns 1943 Replacement) §64-2606(a). §64-
2602 provides that the tax is imposed on the receipt of gross
income of all persons resident and domiciled in the state, ex-
cept as otherwise provided and upon the receipt of gross in-
come "derived from activities or business or any other source
with the state of Indiana," of non-residents. The Regulations
have likewise not attempted to define what receipts from busi-
ness conducted in interstate commerce are taxable. Regulations,
Series VI, (1943) Reg. 32_00. The regulations provide that each
question involving interstate commerce must be submitted to
the Department and will be considered on its individual merits.
The Regulations provide that all taxpayers who are re-
quired to file gross income tax return must include thereon all
receipts derived from interstate transactions and then claim
deductions for the non-taxable receipts.
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case to case basis. After the Indiana gross income tax was
held in J. D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen'11 in 1938 to be in-
applicable to gross receipts from an interstate sale by an
Indiana manufacturer, the Supreme Court in a series of cases
culminating in McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining
Co.1"2 in 1940 upheld sales".3 and use 114 taxes when im-
posed by the state where the product was marketed. These
opinions all emphasized the question whether the transaction
could be subjected to multiple taxation, although in many
of them the court did not indicate why the seller state could
not also impose the tax. Some writers have suggested that
the results of the cases indicated that the Supreme Court
was favoring taxes by the consuming state rather than those
imposed by the producing state."5  The cases involving the
Indiana gross income tax on transactions involving inter-
state commerce will therefore be divided into consideration
of the taxability of gross receipts from sales made in the
Indiana market by non-resident sellers and the taxability of
gross receipts from transactions by an Indiana seller in an
out-of-state market.
Gross Receipts from Transactions in the Indiana Market
by Non-Resident Sellers. In Holland Furnace Co. v. Depart-
ment of Treasury the Circuit Court of Appeals (7th) held"16
in cases involving corporations qualified to do business in
Indiana that receipts from the sale and installation of fur-
naces in Indiana, from the sale and installation of asphalt
shingles and from furnishing materials for harbors and light-
111. 304 U.S. 307 (1938).
112. 309 U.S. 33 (1940).
113. Cf. Graybar Electric Co. v. Curry, 308 U.S. 513 (1939); Mc-
Goldrick v. Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co., 309 U.S. 70 (1940).
114. Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 62 (1939);
J. Bacon & Sons v. Martin, 305 U.S. 380 (1939); Nelson v. Mont-
gomery Ward & Co., 312 U.S. 373 (1941).
115. Cf. Powell, New Light on Gross Receipts Taxes (1940) 53 Harv.
L; Rev. 909; Lockhart, The Sales Tax in Interstate Commerce(1939) 52 Harv. L. Rev. 617.
116. 133 F. (2d) 212, cert. denied sub nom: Holland Furance Co. v.
Department of Treasury, 320 U.S. 746; Interstate Roofing Sup-
ply Co. v. Department of Treasury, 320 U.S. 746; Great Lakes
Dredge & Dock Co. v. Department of Treasury, 320 U.S. 747.
In view of Ford Motor Company v. Department of Treasury,
323 U.S. 459, 65 S. Ct. 347, (1945) holding that the Circuit
Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to entertain suits for re-fund of Indiana gross income taxes, the question arises whether
these decisions are res judicata so as to preclude suit in the
state courts on the same claim for refund.
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houses were taxable under the gross income tax act even
though payment was to be made outside of Indiana and the
materials and employees to install them were -sent into In-
diana for the purpose of the installation. This result seems
to be in accord with the Supreme Court decisions upholding
sales and use taxes by the state of the market of products,
particularly in the situation where the seller is qualified to
do business in the state, solicits orders for contracts in the
state and performs the work and delivers the materials in
the State.
In Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasuy' 17 (1944)
the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld
the gross receipts tax on transactions having on the facts
even less relation with Indiana. The tax imposed on receipts
from sales where car, trucks or parts were shipped direct
from plaintiff's factories at Dearborn or other out-of-state
plants to dealers in Indiana and (1) where products were
paid for by Indiana dealers in cash on delivery to employees
of the convoy companies bringing the cars into Indiana and
(2) where the products were paid for by Indiana dealers
with finance papers or a combination of finance papers and
cash at the dealer's place of business in Indiana, payment
being made to the convoy companies who in both instances
delivered the receipts to the respective out-of-state branches
of the Ford Motor Co. where they were there deposited in
their regular depository. It did not appear that the seller
was qualified to do business in the State or solicited orders
in the State. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the district court that the receipts were received
by the plaintiff while engaged in business in Indiana and
derived from sources therein.
The court distinguished the Adams case on the ground
that the tax was on receipts of an Indiana corporation on sales
outside of Indiana and that here the income was derived
from sales in which all transactions excepting placing of
some orders and the shipment of the goods took place in
Indiana. The court emphasized that the sales were completed
117. 141 F. (2d) 24. Reversed on other grounds, Ford Motor Co. v.
Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459 (1945) see n. 116 supra.
By raising the jurisdictional question in the Supreme Court for
the first time, the State "won" the particular refund suit in
question but left open the question whether it can tax this
type of transaction.
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in Indiana and that therefore the fact that merchandise ar-
rived in Indiana in interstate commerce was immaterial.
It concluded that the transaction was so identified with In-
diana that the possibility of multiple taxation was eliminated.
This latter conclusion would seem correct only if the United
States Supreme Court compels it to be so. The state in
which the receipts are received is physically able to impose
a tax upon them if it so desires. Perhaps J. D. Adams Co.
v. Storen, if followed, would hold that the selling state could
not impose the tax on the gross receipts from situations
similar to those involved in tho Ford Motor Co. case. If so
then the court correctly concluded that the possibility of
multiple taxation was eliminated.
In Department of Treasury v. International Harvester
Co., the Supreme Court of Indiana- 8 and the United States
Supreme Court11 upheld the gross income tax on receipts
from the following type of transactions:
Class C: sales by branches of International Harvester
located outside of Indiana to dealers and users in Indiana
where the orders were solicited in Indiana but accepted out-
side of Indiana, the customers took delivery of the goods at
factories in Indiana, but made payments to branches outside
of Indiana
Class E: sales by branches of International Harvester lo-
cated in Indiana where the orders or contracts were accepted
and payments were made to dealers and users residing in In-
118. 221 Ind. 416, 47 N.E. (2d) 150 (1943). The Indiana Supreme
Court held the gross income tax could not be imposed on the
Class A sales. Class A sales were sales by branches located
outside of Indiana to dealers and users located in Indiana. The
sales were made on orders solicited in Indiana by representatives
of out-of-state branches or upon mail orders. The orders were
accepted by the out-of-state branches and the money paid there.
The imposition of the tax on this type of transaction was
refused by the Supreme Court on the ground that it was not
Income "derived from sources within the State of Indiana" within
the meaning of Section 2, Ch. 50, Acts of 1933. The court pointed
out that the wording had been changed in 1937 (Acts of 1937,
Ch. 117, sec. 2 p. 604). Perhaps the court was suggesting that
the tax could be imposed on this type of transaction under
the 1937 and present act (Burns 1943 Replacement §64-2602).
At any event because the decision was put on a state statutory
ground the decision as to this type of sale could not be taken
to the U.S. Supreme Court for decision.
If the tax can be imposed on this type of transaction it
would seem that the gross income tax is co-extensive with a
"use" tax. Cf. Department of Treasury v. Allied Mills, Inc.,
220 Ind. 340 (1942), 42 N.E. (2d) 34, aff'd per curiam, 318
U.S. 740 (1943).
119. 322 U.S. 340 (1944).
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diana, in which the goods were manufactured and shipped from
points outside of Indiana to customers in Indiana pursuant to
the contract.
International Harvester was qualified to do business in
Indiana and had manufacturing establishments at Richmond
and Fort Wayne and selling agencies at Indianapolis, Terre
Haute, Fort Wayne and Evansville. The company also had
manufacturing plants and sales branches in adjoining states.
Each branch had an assigned territory and in some instances
parts of Indiana were within the exclusive jurisdiction of
branch offices which were located outside the state. It ap-
peared that shipments to Indiana dealers or users from the
out-of-state factories rather than from the factories within
the state at least as to the Class E sales arose where the
quantities could not be economically carried in stock within
Indiana or where there was a cheaper freight rate which
could be obtained from outside of Indiana.
The Supreme Court said that the fact that the sales in
Class C are made by an out-of-state seller and that the con-
tracts were made outside of the state was not controlling.
Delivery of the goods in Indiana was an adequate taxable
event. It further emphasized that the Class C sales were
sales of Indiana goods to Indiana purchasers.
The validity of the tax on receipts from the Class E
sales would seem to follow a fortiori, the court said, from
Department of Treasury v. Allied Mills 2o where in 1942 the
Indiana gross income tax act was upheld as applied to re-
ceipts from sales by a corporation qualified to do business
in Indiana to resident customers in Indiana to whom deliver-
ies were made from the plants in Illinois pursuant to orders
taken in Indiana and accepted in Illinois.
Valid taxation of both Class C and E would seem to
follow a fortiori from MeGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal
120. 220 Ind. 340, 42 N.E. (2d) 34 (1942). Allied Mills, an Indiana
corporation had one factory in Indiana and two in Illinois, all
three of which served designated territory in Indiana. The
gross income in question was derived from sales to Indiana
buyers to whom deliveries were made from the plants in Illinois
pursuant to orders taken in Indiana and accepted in Illinois.
The Indiana Supreme Court upheld the imposition of the tax
and the decision was affirmed per curiam by the U.S. Supreme
Court, 318 U.S. 740 (1943) citing McGoldrick v. Felt & T. Co.,
309 U.S. 70 (1940) (N.Y. City sales tax) and Felt & T. Co.
v. Gallegher, 306 U.S. 62 (1939) (California use tax).
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Mining Co.121 (1940) involving the constitutionality of a New
York City sales tax as applied to purchases from out of state
sellers. In their effect on interstate commerce there appears
to be no difference between a sales tax or use tax and a gross
receipts tax.
In McCleod v. Dilworth Co.12 2 decided the same day as the
International Harvester case, however, the majority23 of
the Supreme Court seemed to recede somewhat from the
position taken in the Berirind-White case and held that an
Arkansas sales tax was not applicable in the following
situation:
A Tennessee corporation not qualified to do business in
Arkansas and not having a sales office, branch or any other
place of business in that state, solicited orders for goods in
Arkansas to be shipped from the Tennessee plant. The orders
solicited were in a form that acceptance by the Tennessee office
was required before the contracts were approved. The title
passed to the Arkansas purchaser upon delivery of the goods
to the carrier in Tennessee. Payment was made in Tennessee.
A majority of the Supreme Court distinguished the Ber-
wind-White case pointing out that in that case the corpora-
tion maintained a sales office in New York City took its
contracts in New York City and made actual delivery there.
This decision seems to emphasize the law of sales in deter-
mining the taxability of the transaction under a sales tax act.
If under the law of sales title passes in the buyer state the
buyer state can impose a sales tax; if title passes in another
state it cannot as it is then taxing an out-of-state sale. This
analysis by Mr. Justice Frankfurter would seem to be di-
rected more to "jurisdiction" to tax under due process clause
than to interstate commerce clause. The court seems to im-
ply in the Dilworth case that if the "sale" is completed in
the state of the seller that that state can impose a sales tax.
It would seem that the gross receipts tax or the sales tax
by the consuming state affects interstate commerce no more
if the goods come in after the sale is completed than if they
come in before. The Dilworth case, it is believed, is a very
121. 309 U.S. 33 (1940).
122. 322 U.S. 327 (1944).
123. Opinion by Frankfurter, J. Stone, C. J. Roberts, J. Reed, J.
Jackson, J. concurring. Dissenting opinion with Douglas, J. with
Black, J. and Murphy, J. concurring. Rutledge, J. dissented in
separate opinion.
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narrow holding as far as the state of market is concerned.
It is undoubtedly applicable only to "sales" tax cases and in
its narrowest sense it is only a decision approving the de-
cision of the Arkansas Supreme Court that the Arkansas
"sales" tax statute is not applicable to an out-of-state sale.
This distinction as to the place of making the sale is quite
unimportant to states that have a use tax as the Supreme
Court in General Trading Co. v. State Tax Commission of
Iowa24 decided on the same day as the Arkansas sales tax
case and the Indiana gross income tax case, upheld the im-
position of the use tax in a situation almost identical with the
Dilworth case. The "use" tax case also casts doubt on the
"multiple burden" test used by some states and courts, for
the implication of the Dilworth case is that the state of seller
can impose a sales tax if the "sale" is completed in the State,
yet it is clear the state of buyer can impose a "use" tax thus
subjecting the transaction to two taxes.
The important question still undecided is whether a
gross income tax is so like a use tax that it can be imposed
in the state of the buyer on all transactions in which the
goods come to rest in the state. While the cases referred to
above involving the Indiana gross income tax seem to follow
logically from prior decisions of the United States Supreme
Court, the emphasis in these more recent sales tax cases on
the law of sales and on the numbe 4 of contacts the state has
with the transaction in deciding whether the buyer state may
tax has important implications on the question whether In-
diana can impose its gross receipts tax on transactions by
an Indiana seller in an out-of-state market if the "sale" is
consummated within Indiana or if sufficient elements of the
transaction occur in Indiana. While a decision by the Su-
preme Court that the state of market may tax, does not nec-
essarily imply that the state of origin cannot, a decision that
the state of market may not impose a sales tax, implies that
the state where the sale was consummated can, unless of
course the court reverts to the outmoded theory that neither
state can tax interstate commerce.
Gross Receipts Derived from Transactions by Indiana Sellers
in the Out-of-State Market.
The touchstone of Indiana sellers in resisting the gross
124. 322 U.S. 335 (1944), Justices Jackson and Roberts dissenting.
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income tax on receipts from transactions in interstate com-
merce has been J. D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen125 which
held invalid the tax on receipts derived from sales in other
states of goods manufactured in Indiana. The touchstone
of the taxing authorities in both the buyer state and the
seller state has been Western Livestock Co. v. Bureau of Rev-
enue126 in which Mr. Justice Stone stated that state taxes
measured by gross receipts from interstate commerce have
been and should be sustained when not involving danger of
"cumulative burdens not imposed on local commerce." We
will consider whether the Adams case has been limited or
extended as the risk of a double tax burden is or is not
found in the transaction.
A case of far-reaching application for sellers who sell
to transportation companies even though for ultimate use
by those companies outside of Indiana is Department of
Treasury v. Wood Preserving Co. in the United States
Supreme Court in 1941.127 The facts were as follows:
The taxpayer, a foreign corporation with its principal place of
business in Pennsylvania, was qualified to do business in Indiana but
had only an agent within the state. The taxpayer was engaged in the
business of treating railroad ties by creosoting them and also in the
business of purchasing and selling ties to those with whom it has a
contract for treatment. The taxpayer itself produced no ties in Indiana.
On requisition for ties by the railroad company from its out-of-state
office and acceptance by the taxpayer in its out-of-state office the
taxpayer then procured ties from local producers in Indiana
through communications by telephone or mail from its out-of-state
office. The Indiana vendors delivered the ties at loading points on
the railroad in Indiana. Here an inspector for the railroad and the
taxpayer's agent met and inspected the ties. On acceptance by the
railroad inspector the ties were loaded on freight-cars furnished by
the railroad company and were shipped with the railroad company's
Chief Engineer of Maintenance at Finney, Ohio, as consignee. The
taxpayer paid the Indiana producers only for ties which were thus
acceptable and mailed weekly from its Ohio office invoices to the
125. 304 U.S. 307 (1938).
126. 303 U.S. 250 (1938). In 1940 the Indiana Supreme Court upheld
the gross income tax as applied to an almost identical transaction
with that involved in the Western Livestock case. See Indiana
Farmers Guide Publishing Co. v. Department of Treasury, 217
Ind. 627, 29 N.E. (2d) 781 (1940). The tax was imposed on
receipts by an Indiana publiher from non-resident advertisers.
As in the Western Livestock case, the Department of Treasury
did not attempt to tax the receipts from subscriptions to the
magazine by non-resident subscribers.
127. 313 U.S. 62 (1940).
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railroad company office in Maryland for the ties sold and delivered
to the railroad company. Payments were made to the taxpayer's Pitts-
burg office and were there deposited in a bank. The taxes in question
were laid by the Indiana authorities on the receipts which the tax-
payer derived from the sales to the railroad company of the untreated
ties.
The court unanimously upheld the tax. Chief Justice
Hughes in his opinion emphasized the following Indiana
"dealings": receipt by the taxpayer in Indiana of the ties as
purchased from local producers; sale and delivery of these
ties in Indiana to the railroad company; the presence of the
taxpayer in Indiana acting through its agent at the delivery
point on the railroad line. The Chief Justice concluded that
these were local, transactions of sales and delivery of partic-
ular ties by the taxpayers to the railroad company in Indiana.
He pointed out that the tax could not be escaped on these
"intrastate" transactions by the taxpayer arranging to have
the proceeds paid to it in another state. He likewise said
that the fact that the ties thus sold and delivered were loaded
on railroad cars to go to Ohio for treatment was not material.
However, the out of state "dealings" were also considerable:
non-resident seller and buyer; negotiations for the contract;
negotiations for the purchase of ties by the taxpayer; fur-
ther processing of the ties by the taxpayer in another state;
office and accounting work concerning the transactions done
in taxpayer's out-of-state offices; payment and deposit from
the office of the out-of-state buyer to the out-of-state seller.
It is difficult to see how there was any greater "burden" on
interstate commerce in the Adams case. Chief Justice Hughes
apparently considered that delivery to the buyer and com-
pletion of the sale in Indiana were the most significant factors
in the entire transaction and warranted the imposition by
Indiana of the tax on the gross receipts from this transaction.
This decision is of particular importance to Indiana coal
producers who deliver coal to railroad companies in Indiana
for use in their out-of-state yards. It may also be important
to manufacturers of parts for railroad equipment where de-
livery is made to the railroad in Indiana and subsequently
shipped by the railroad for use in its out of state yards. In
this opinion by Chief Justice Hughes no mention was made of
the possibility that Ohio or any other state where the ties ul-
timately came to rest could impose a use tax on the same
transaction.1
2
128. Cf. So. Pac. Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 167 (1939).
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A case of significance for Indiana processors of products
manufactured and sold in out-of-state markets is Department
of Treasury v. Ingram-Richardson Manufacturing Co. 129 also
decided by unanimous court in 1941. The facts were as fol-
lows:
The taxpayer, an Indiana corporation with a factory at Frank-
fort, Indiana, manufactured enamel for fusing with metal articles.
The enamel was fused with metal parts used in stoves and re-
frigerators manufactured by the taxpayer's customers in various
states. The taxpayer's traveling salesmen solicited orders from
such customers pursuant to which the taxpayer transported by its
trucks the stove and refrigerator parts belonging to its customers
from their plants to its own plants for enamelling. After the
enamelling process was completed the taxpayer hauled the enam-
elled parts back to its customer's factories whereupon the custom-
ers were billed for the enamelling and remittances were made to
taxpayer in Indiana by mail. The, gross income tax was imposed
on the receipts from this type of transaction.
Chief Justice Hughes citing the Wood Preserving case,
supra, said that the enamelling process was an activity per-
formed at the taxpayer's plant in Indiana and that the gross
receipts therefrom were taxable by Indiana. He stated that
the fact that the orders were solicited and the contracts ex-
ecuted outside of Indiana would not make the enamelling
process other than an "intrastate transaction." He refused
to pass on the question whether the taxpayer could claim a
deduction for the receipts from the transportation to and
from taxpayer's plant, pointing out that the taxpayer had
made no claim for a refund on this part of its gross receipts
and that since the state authorities had not passed on this
question the Supreme Court was not called upon to decide
the case. No substantial difference is perceived between an
enameling process such as this and manufacturing process
in Adams case as far as interstate commerce is concerned.
Here a service was performed in Indiana for which payment
was received in Indiana. There sales were made out-of-state
of products manufactured in the state.
A third case of major significance is Department of
Treasury v. International Harvester Company, supra, as
to the Class D sales which were as follows:
Sales by branches of the taxpayer located in Indiana to dealers and
users residing outside of Indiana in which the customers came to Indiana
129. 313 U.S. 252 (1941).
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and accepted delivery to themselves in this state. The orders or con-
tracts were accepted and the proceeds were received by taxpayer's
branches located in Indiana.
The court speaking through Mr. Justice Douglas upheld
the tax on gross receipts upon these Class D sales. In his
opinion he emphasized the following Indiana "dealings": sales
by an Indiana seller of Indiana goods to an out-of-state buyer
who comes to Indiana, takes delivery there and transports
the goods to another state; agreement to sell and deliver
goods in Indiana. In this case the taxpayer argued that it
would in all probability be subjected to the Illinois retailers
occupation tax for some of these sales since the tax was said
to be exacted from those doing a retail business in Illinois
even though the orders for the sales are accepted outside of
Illinois and the property is transferred in another state.
The Supreme Court dodged this question by stating that "it
will be time to cross that bridge when we come to it." This
decision on the same day as the Dilworth case supra seems
to support the contention that if the sale is consummated in
seller state, whether by F.O.B. shipment or delivery to buyer
in person, the seller state can impose the tax.
A point possibly foreshadowing an even more severe
limitation on the Adams Mfg. case is the distinction of
that case made by Justice Douglas where he said in the
International Harvester case "nor is the problem like that
of an attempted tax on the gross proceeds of an interstate
sale by both the state of the buyer and the state of the seller.
Cf. J. D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen.' ' 130 If this statement is
the view of the Adams case now taken by the majority'13
130. 322 U.S. 340, 348. In McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Co.,
309 U.S. 33, 57, 58 Mr. Chief Justice Stone (then Mr. Justice)
distinguished the Adams case by pointing out that the tax was
held invalid because "the court found the receipts derived from
activities in interstate commerce, as distinguished from the re-
ceipts from activities wholly intrastate, were included in the
measure of the tax, the sales price, without segregation or ap-
portionment." (italics supplied) Mr. Justice Stone went on
to reaffirm American Mfg. Co. v. St. Louis, 250 U.S. 459 (1919)
by pointing out that if the tax in the Adams case had been con-
ditioned upon the exercise of the taxpayer's privilege of manu-
facturing in the state the tax could have been measured by the
sales price of the goods.
131. Including Mr. Chief Justice Stone who was with the majority in
the Adams case. See Mr. Chief Justice Stone's comments on the
Adams case in McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Co., 309 U.S.
33, 57 (1940), supra note 130.
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of the court it would appear that the Adams case is now
authority only in the situation where on the record it ap-
pears that two states have attempted to tax the gross pro-
ceeds of the same "sale" and that in the absence of a showing
that the same type of tax has been imposed on the same
transaction the case is not an authority for restricting the
seller state from imposing a tax. The Wood Preserving
case and the International Harvester case limited the Adams
case to receipts from sales in which delivery took place out
of Indiana. The Ingram-Richardson case seems to limit the
Adams case even further in the situation where there is no
sale.
A case of no new constitutional significance but of in-
terest in showing the extent to which Indiana may impose
a tax on Indiana businesses who sell in the out-of-state
market is Department of Treasury v. Globe-Bosse-World
Furniture Co. 132 decided in 1943 by the Indiana Supreme
Court. The court upheld the tax where the taxpayer man-
ufactured furniture in Indiana for a mail-order house out-
side of Indiana, billed the mail-order house for the furniture;
but held the furniture in the taxpayer's warehouses subject
to orders of the mail-order house. On receipt of such orders
in proper form the taxpayer shipped the furniture to the
customers of the mail-order house both within and without
Indiana. The court pointed out that there was a completed
sale, delivery, transfer of title and payment in Indiana and
that the mere fact that the owner subsequently chose to re-
sell the furniture outside of Indiana would not make the
transaction a sale in interstate commerce.
While these decisions of the United States Supreme
Court in both the case involving the state of market and that
involving the state of origin may seem confusing, the Su-
preme Court in Western Livestock v. Bureau of Revenue in
1938 served notice on taxpayers, tax-collectors and readers
of the Supreme Court opinions that it was prepared to re-
examine the entire question of taxing interstate commerce
by intimating that it was seeking to require interstate com-
merce to pay its way when this can be accomplished without
danger of unequal or discriminatory burders upon interstate
commerce.
132. 221 Ind. 201, 46 N.E. (2d) 830 (1943).
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In the absence of a showing that the tax discriminates
against interstate commerce the Supreme Court seems to
be prepared to uphold either a gross receipts tax, sales tax
or.a use tax on transactions involving interstate commerce
either in the state of the market or in the state of the seller,
providing a local transaction is made the taxable event
and the type of tax imposed can be applied to that event.
What is a sufficiently significant local transaction? In
the state of market, apparently delivery must be taken in
the state, if the seller has no place of business in the state
and the tax is a sales tax;133 if a "use tax" receipt and use
is sufficient.1' Delivery of the goods plus either payment
or solicitation of contract 3 5 or place of business$ seems to
be sufficient if the tax is a gross receipts tax although the
circuit court of appeals opinion in the Ford Motor case if
it is accepted would seem to permit a state with a gross in-
come tax to impose the tax if the goods come to rest in the
state regardless of the fact whether any other incidents of
sale occur in the state.137
The tax has been upheld in the state of the seller where
delivery was made to the buyer in the seller state and the
orders and contracts were made there ;138 where the delivery
was made and the contract consummated in the seller state'39
even though all the negotiations for the contract and the
delivery of the products were made in the buyer state. 40
Where the tax is levied on the privilege of doing businss in
the state, the seller state may measure the tax by the gross
income from sales in the out-of-state market, even though
the sale itself will be subjected to a sales tax in that state
133. Compare McGoldrick v. Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co., 309 U.S. 70
with McLeod v. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327 (1944).
134. Cf. Nelson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 312 U.S. 373 (1941);
Nelson v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359 (1941); General
Trading Co. v. State Tax Commission, 322 U.S. 335 (1944).
135. International Harvester Co. v. Department of Treasury, 322
U.S. 340 (1944) (Class C and E sales).
136. Allied Mills v. Department of Treasury, 318 U.S. 740 (1943).
137. See Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 141 F. (2d) 24(1944). If the Class A sales in the International Harvester case
221 Ind. 416, 419 are taxable the same result will be reached.
138. International Harvester Co. v. Department of Treasury, 322 U.S.
340 (1944) (Class D sales).
139. Department of Treasury v. Wood Preserving Co., 313 U.S. 62
(1941).
140. Department of Treasury v. Ingram-Richardson Mfg. Co., 313
U.S. 252 (1941).
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and even though all the incidents of the sale except shipment
and acceptance of orders took place out of the state of the
seller. 14, These cases would seem to leave very little left of
the J.D. Adams case, particularly in the light of the inter-
pretation of ib given by Justice Douglas in the International
Harvester case.
A case which will further define the limits of the Adams
case is now pending in the United States Supreme Court,
is Hewitt v. Freeman.42 In 1943 in that case the Indiana
Supreme Court upheld the imposition of the gross income tax
on the receipts from the following transaction:
The taxpayer, a trustee, under the will and of the estate of decedent,
sold during the year 1940 certain corporate stocks and bonds. The tax-
payer placed the orders to sell with a broker of Richmond, Indiana,
who was not a member of the New York Stock Exchange. The broker
had a telegraphic wire service with a brokerage office in New York
who was a member of the New York Stock exchange. The broker wired
the sales orders to the New York brokerage who offered the stocks ac-
cording to the sales orders on the N.Y. Stock Exchange, at the prices
specified by the taxpayer. Upon acceptance of the stocks offered, by
some other broker representing the purchaser, the N.Y. brokerage noti-
fied the Richmond, Indiana, broker over the telegraphic wire service
who in turn notified the taxpayer of the sale. Thereupon the taxpayer
delivered the stock certificates and bonds to the Richmond broker who
mailed them to the N.Y. brokerage. Upon receipt the New York broker-
age delivered the stock certificates and bonds to the broker represent-
ing the purchaser who in turn paid the purchase price. The N.Y.
brokerage transmitted the proceeds by check less their commission, cost
of revenue stamps, postage and other expenses of sale by mail to the
Richmond broker who delivered the proceeds to the taxpayer less the
deduction of his own broker's commission. It was stipulated that neither
broker acted as principal in any of the sales and neither of them took
any title in or to the stocks and bonds. It was further stipulated that
141. Aponaug Mfg. Co. v. Stone, 190 Miss. 805, 1 So. (2d) 763 (1941),
affirmed per curiam, 314 U.S. 577 (1941) on authority of
American Mfg. Co. v. St. Louis, 250 U.S. 459 and Department
of Treasury v. Ingram-Richardson Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 252 (1941)
(Indiana gross income tax).
The taxpayer operated cotton mills in Mississippi and sold
its cotton goods in other states, about two-thirds of which are
shipped to and sold in New York City where it was said to
be subject to the sales tax. The State Supreme Court upheld
the tax as a privilege tax levied on the privilege of manufactur-
ing and measured by the volume of business done as determined
by "values, or gross income, or gross proceeds of sales . . .
relying on American Mfg. Co. v. St. Louis supra.
In sustaining the tax the U.S. Supreme Court cited an
Indiana Gross Income tax case subsequent to the J. D. Adams case.
142. 221 Ind. 675 (1943), 51 N.E. (2d) 6.
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all purchasers of these intangibles were not residents of Indiana al-
though this was not a condition of the sale.
Judge Shake, writing for the unanimous court, upheld
the gross income tax on the receipts from this transaction. He
said that the situs of the securities was at the place of the tax-
payer's domicil in Indiana and ownership passed to the pur-
chaser and that the activities of the taxpayer's agent in making
the sale did not change the situs of the securities or the tax-
payer's domicil. He concluded that the facts disclosed a suf-
ficient basis for imposing upon the taxpayer a tax measured
by the gross income from the sales described above.
The opinion of the Indiana Supreme Court is interesting
from the standpoint that the Court appeared to treat the case
as if this were a property or transfer tax. Emphasis was
placed on the situs of the stocks and the domicil of the tax-
payer and reference was made to several United States
Supreme Court decisions sustaining property or transfer
taxes by the state of the domicile on owners of intangibles.
Since the gross income tax is a tax on receipts from trans-
actions it would appear that the situs of the property was
immaterial and that the major question is whether the tax
may be imposed on receipts from the "transaction" of this
type in interstate commerce.
An appeal was taken to the United States Supreme Court
and the case was argued November 8, 1944.14 Apparently the
Supreme Court was unable to reach an agreement on the case
during the 1944 term and it ordered re-argument in the 1945
term.144 On October 8, 1945, the Supreme Court directed
counsel in the case to address themselves in their brief and in
oral argument to three questions :145
"1. Were the sales of securities as made in the circumstances of this
case, including the transactions on the New York Stock Ex-
change, interstate sales within the meaning and application of
Adams Mfg. Go. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307; cf. McGoldrick V.
Berwin-White Coal Mining Co. 309 U.S. 33, 58"
"2. Does the commerce clause forbid Indiana to levy a gross re-
ceipts tax upon the transactions in question, in the absence of
any showing that a similar or substantial tax is, or may be, in
fact laid upon them by .any other state?"
143. Probable jurisdiction noted April 3, 1943, 12 U.S. L. Week 3324,
3326.
144. 325 U.S. -, 89 L.Ed. 1549 (1945), 13 U.S. L. Week 3485.
145. 14 U.S. L. Week 3125. (No. 4, 1945 term).
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"3. To what extent, if any, is Indiana's power to tax the gross re-
ceipts from these transactions affected, under the commerce
clause, by the facts that domicil of the seller or situs of the
securities prior to conclusion of the sales was in Indiana?"
These questions may indicate that the court is not cer-
tain whether the transactions involved in this case, which are
isolated and not, part of a regular business in dealing in
securities, are comparable to the transactions involved in the
Adams Mfg. Co. case where a corporation was regularly en-
gaged in manufacturing and selling its products in interstate
commerce. The second question to which the court asked the
counsel to address itself appears to be addressed to a problem
similar to that not considered in the International Harvester
case by Mr. Justice Douglas.146 It should be noted that Mr.
Justice Douglas treated the Adams case as if it were a case in
which a gross receipts tax upon the same sales was in fact laid
by both the state of the buyer and the state of the seller. The
court therefore appears to be considering the question whether
a gross receipts tax is to be struck down on the mere possi-
bility of the other state or states involved in the transaction
imposing a similar tax or whether in fact the other state or
states must be shown to have imposed a similar tax upon this
same transaction. It is not clear from the question whether
the words "similar or substantial tax" laid upon gross receipts
means that the court will ignore a tax by the other state that
purports to be a stamp tax, sales tax or use tax even though
measured by the gross proceeds if the tax is not labeled a
gross receipts tax.
The third question appears to direct counsel's attention
to the fact that this is not a property or transfer tax and
that the situs of the securities and domicil of the owner is
immaterial unless counsel can show that these factors are
significant to a commerce clause question.
This case is to be argued sometime during the 1945 term.
Since most of the cases in the United States Supreme
Court have been sales or use tax cases the scope of the gross
income tax and its relation to interstate commerce has not
yet been defined. The following are only a few of the major
questions which may require a decision:
If Indiana is the state of 'market:
May Indiana impose a gross receipts tax if the product pur-
146. 322 U.S. 340; 348 (1944).
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chased is received in fact by an Indiana buyer and used in Indiana
regardless of the fact that the seller has or has not a place of
business in Indiana, is or is not a domestic corporation and has
or has not a sales office in the state, or regardless of the fact that
order is made on an out-of-state seller and payment made there.147
If Indiana is state of the seller:
May the gross receipts tax be imposed if a domestic or foreign
corporation sells goods for an out-of-state delivery if the sale is
made F.O.B. an Indiana point or otherwise so that sale is substan-
tially completed to buyer in Indiana.14.
Tax Liability of Non-Residents on income derived from
sources in Indiana.
The 1940 regulations issued by the Gross Income Tax
Division provided that non-resident officers of corporations
located in Indiana were to be considered to have received
their "income" from sources within Indiana. 14 The 1942
Regulations clarified this provision by making it clear that
it is only applicable to salaries received as corporate officers.
147. e.g. Corporation A does business in Indiana but has factories
in other states, may Indiana impose the gross income tax on
the following type of transactions:
a. An Indiana buyer orders merchandise from Corporation A,
which the corporation directs for its own purposes to be
shipped direct to the buyer from the factory in state X.
b. Agents of the Indiana factory solicit orders from Indiana
buyers which are accepted at the Indiana factory but the
goods are shipped from the factory in state X.
c. An Indiana buyer orders merchandise from the factory in
State X where the orders are accepted but are shipped from
Indiana factory to the buyer. Payment is made to factory
in state X.
d. same as c except the goods are shipped from the factory in
state X.
e. same as d except agents from the factory in state X solicit
orders in Indiana from the Indiana buyer.
Is it a material fact that the corporation is or is not a
domestic corporation?
148. e.g. Corporation B with its only manufacturing plant in Indiana.
May Indiana impose a gross income tax on the following trans-
actions:
a. Sales to buyers in State Y but priced FOB factory in Indiana?
b. Sales to a RR Co., consigned to the RR Co. office in state Y
but shipped without freight charges by the RR Co. on its
own lines to its office in state Y.
c. Sales to buyers in state Y pursuant to orders received from
the buyer but accepted in Indiana by corporation B?
d. Sales to a buyer in State Y under a total output contract
in which buyer buys entire output of factory in Indiana?
e. Same as d except the goods are held at factory subject to
further order of buyer and then shipped to buyer's customers?
149. Gross Income Tax Regulations, Series IV (1940) Reg. 3603(3).
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The Regulation now provides (Reg. 3603(3)) "o that non-
residents who are officers of domestic corporations which
maintain their principal place of business in Indiana, and
non-residents who are officers of foreign corporations with
their principal place of business in Indiana will be considered
to have received their salaries as corporate officers from a
source within Indiana. The salaries are therefore subject
to tax.
So a corporation whose main office is in Indiana but
whose directors and officers live in New Jersey, will be
required, under this regulation to withhold the gross income
tax from payments of salaries to the directors. Questions
may arise as to a corporation maintaining branches in other
states but with its principal place of business in Indiana,
whether any salaries paid to the corporate officials may be
allocated to the non-Indiana branches so that they will not
be taxable in Indiana.
What Constitutes Gross Income.
In 1941 the Supreme Court overruled the Department
of Treasury v. Crowder15' decided in 1938 in which it said
that, under the Act as it read prior to 1937, the receipt of
invested capital by a final distribution to shareholders was
taxable. In 1941 case of Dept. of Treasury of Indiana v.
Muessel,52 the Supreme Court held that the term in section
1(f) of the then Act "receipts by reason of investment of
capital including . . ." should be construed, contrary to
the decision in the Crowder case, to be limited by the word
"including." It attached significance to the amendment of
1937 inserting after the word "including" "but not in lim-
itation thereof." It would appear therefore that since the
1937 amendment return of invested capital by a distribution
to the shareholders was taxable if not before 1937.153
Two cases in 1940 and in 1943 in the Appellate Court
involved the question whether the receipts by wholesalers or
manufacturers from their customers, representing the amount
of state and federal liquor taxes passed on to their customers
150. Gross Income Tax Regulations, Series VI (1943) Reg. 3603(3).
151. 214 Ind. 252, 15 N.E. (2d) 89 (1938).
152. 218 Ind. 250, 32 N.E. (2d) 596 (1941).
153. See Gross Income Tax Regulations, Series VI (1943), Reg. 1505.
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were receipts by the wholesaler or manufacturer or whether
the receipts were obtained as agents of the state or federal
government. In both cases the Appellate Court held that
there was no evidence to show that the taxpayers were
agents required by law or contract to collect the tax from
their purchasers and that therefore the receipts represented
by the tax so passed on where includable in reporting gross
income. 4
In Dept. of Treasury v. Ice Service Inc.155 the Supreme
Court in 1942 decided no significant point of law but the
case turned on the evidence of whether the taxpayer was
an agent and so received his receipts or whether he should
include those receipts as income received by him. 156
In 1941 in Dept. of Treasury v. Jackson,5 7 the Appellate
Court held that in determining the "gross earnings" of a
building and loan association in liquidation it was proper
to look beyond the bookkeeping entries and to consider the
substance of the transaction. In this case during the pro-
cess of liquidation the trustees of the building and loan as-
sociation, with the approval of the Dept. of Financial In-
stitutions, compromised many loans secured by mortgages in
which the securing property had depreciated in value below
the principal sum, owing. Debtors had, in lieu of cash, sur-
rendered stock which they held in the association and which
the liquidating association accepted at par value in full set-
tlement and satisfaction of the indebtedness including prin-
cipal and interest. The Treasury demanded that the tax-
payer pay the gross income tax on the entire amounts cred-
ited on their books to interest as a result of these transactions.
During the years in question the market value of the stock
averaged 63c on the dollar in 1935 and 50c in 1936. The
court held that the actual value of the stocks and certificates
was controlling and that there was ample evidence that no
income in the form of interest on the loans was actually
received by the trustees and that the crediting of part of
154. Gross Income Tax Division v. Indianapolis Brewing Co., 108 Ind.
App. 259, 25 N.E. (2d) 653 (1940)); Department of Treasury v.
Midwest Liquor Dealers, 113 Ind. App. 569, 48 N.E. (2d) 71
(1943), 19 Ind. L.J. 204.
155. 220 Ind. 64, 41 N.E. (2d) 201 (1942).
156. See Gross Income Tax Regulations, Series VI, (1943) Reg. 1612.
157. 110 Ind. App. 36, 37 N.E. (2d) 31 (1941).
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the par value of the stock to interest was a pure book-keep-
ing entry.
Department of Treasury v. Advance Paint Co.158 decided
by the Supreme Court in 1944 is of interest to taxpayers
who accept negotiable paper in payment for their products
and then assign the paper to banks under an arrangement
which is in effect a loan by the bank to the company. In
this case the taxpayer accepted as payment for its products
its customers' negotiable promissory notes which it reported
upon its gross income tax return as though cash had been
received. On taking of the notes the taxpayer endorsed the
notes to the bank which immediately credited the company's
checking account with principal and accrued interest under
an oral agreement that the company would be liable for the
payment. The amount of the credits to the checking account
by reason of the endorsement and delivery of these notes
formed the basis of the assessment of the tax. The Treas-
ury contended that the notes were sold to the bank and that
the amounts credited were income received from the sale.
The Supreme Court held that there was in fact no sale of
the notes, that the transaction was simply a delivery to the
bank under an agreement by which the proceeds when and
if paid to the bank at maturity were to be applied to the
extinguishment of the company's obligation to the bank aris-
ing out of the extention of credit upon its checking account.
The court therefore held that the credit to the checking ac-
count was income arising out of receipts of borrowed money
which is not taxable under Subsection (m) of Burns 64-2601.
In Department of Treasury v. Spindler,15 decided by the
Supreme Court in 1943 the taxpayer had paid the tax on
commissions it had received for acting as agent of Sears Roe-
buck in sale of merchandise at retail in stores owned and
operated in the state by the taxpayer. The merchandise han-
dled for Sears was delivered to the taxpayer for sale under
a written contract which provided that the merchandise was
delivered "on consignment for sale . . . in the name and
on the account" of Sears. The purchase price was to be depos-
ited to the account of Sears and the contract provided that
Sears was to pay a commission on the sales made. Sears paid a
tax on the gross receipts on the sales of the merchandise
158. 222 Ind. 294, 53 N.E. (2d) 59 (1944).
159. 222 Ind. 53, 51 N.E. (2d) 363 (1943).
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and pursuant to a provision in the contract the taxpayer
reimbursed Sears for the amount of the gross income tax
paid by the latter "through a reduction in net proceeds."
The taxpayer contended that because of the provision in
Subsection 1 (m)16o of the Act of 1937 which defines gross
income to include the gross receipts from the sale of goods
on consignment and that the tax should be paid by the con-
signee it was therefore exempt from the payment of the gross
income tax upon its own income consisting of commissions.
The Supreme Court rejected this contention pointing out that
whether under the contract the taxpayer was bound to re-
imburse Sears Roebuck & Co. for its gross income taxes was
immaterial and that nothing in the law showed that the
legislature intended to exempt receipts received from sales
commissions when the goods are consigned to them But not
to exempt the income when there is no consignment; it con-
strued the provision in Subsection (m) of Section 1 of the
Act to be a convenient means of insuring the collection of
the tax from income from the sale of the goods within the
state by a non-resident consignor. It therefore concluded
that the consignee, as the taxpayer was in this case, was
chargeable with the gross income tax upon its own income
from sales conmuissions even though under the gross income
tax act and the contract with Sears it also paid a tax on the
receipts from the sales themselves.
Applicable Rate of Tax.
The Gross Income Tax Act since January 1, 1942 pro-
vides for three rates of tax, 14 of 1%, 2 of 1% and 1%.61
In applying the rates of 1/4 of 1% and 1% the source of the
income determines the rate and not the occupation of the
taxpayer. This is not true of the rate of of 1% which
was added in 1941 in which case the occupation of the tax-
payer as well as the nature of the income is controlling. 162
While indicating a desirable purpose to avoid unnecces-
sary pyramiding of the tax, Sec. 3(a)163 defining the whole-
160. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Buns 1943 Replacement) § 64-2601(m).
See Gross Income Tax Regulations, Series VI (1943) Reg. 3404.
161. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns 1943 Replacement) § 64-2603. Gross
Income Tax Regulations, Series VI (1943) Article 2.
162. The taxpayer must be a retail merchant. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns
1943 Replacement, §64-2603(c).
163. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns 1943 Replacement) § 64-2603(a).
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sale sales to which the rate of 1/4 of 1% is applicable has
created perplexing problems because the definition of whole-
sale sales there used disregards the meaning commonly given
in business usage. In commerce wholesale generally means
sales of large quantities in unbroken packages or at a price
less than usually charged by retailers. Sec. 3(a) disregards
the price and the quantity and places the emphasis on whether
the purchaser contemplates a direct and immediate resale
of the tangible property in its unchanged or original form;
or on whether the product is ultimately resold as a part of or
as a contributing factor in a completed article; or on whether
the receipts are from industrial processing of tangible prop-
erty owned by another person in the business of manufactur-
ing, assembling or constructing such product; or on whether
the sales are of specifically enumerated products to certain
enumerated classes of purchasers. Considerable difficulty
has been experienced in applying the terms of the statute,
mainly on the question whether the purchaser from the tax-
payer "contemplated a direct and immediate resale" and on
the term "directly consumed" in "direct production" by
the purchaser in the business of producing tangible property.
In Gross Income Tax Department v. Harbison-Walcer
Refractories Co.'6 ' (1943) the Appellate Court had the ques-
tion whether the sale of silica refractory material to steel
manufacturers, who used the material for lining open-hearth
furnaces devoted to the refining of steel was taxable at the
rate of 1% or at the rate of 1/4 of 1%. The material involved
was exposed to terrific heat and its usefulness was limited
frequently to a period of less than two weeks but in no case
more than four to six months. The only use to which the
material was devoted was that for lining the open hearth
furnaces and after being exposed to the heat for the time
indicated above it was completely useless. The tax division
contended that the refractory material was not "consumed"
within the meaning of the statute and further asserted that
the material constituted "equipment" within the meaning of
the fifth proviso of Sec. 3 (a), and that therefore its destruc-
tion was by obsolescence, depreciation or wearing out and
not by consuming. The tax division did not contend that
the material was not directly used in direct production by
164. 113 Ind. App. 695, 48 N.E. (2d) 834 (1943).
[Vol. 21
TAXATION
the steel manufacturer but contended that it was not "con-
sumed."
The Appellate Court ruled that in the situation involved
there was "dissipation or expenditure by use" within the
definition of consumed in the statute, and that if the sale
did not come within the definition of the statute it was be-
cause of the requirement that it be "immediately" dissipated
or expended. The Appellate Court pointed out that the tax
division by its own regulations classified coal and lubricating
oils as materials "immediately dissipated or expended" even
though there is an appreciable lapse of time between the
purchase and the consumption. The test of the term "im-
mediate" might be both temporal and causal. The Court said
that the test as to time was whether the consumption was
accomplished within such convenient time as is reasonably
requisite. It therefore ruled that the "consumption" here
was immediate as within a reasonable time. The test as
to "immediate" when considered as "causation" is whether
the process of dissipation followed as a part of the act of
use not after use had been completed. Here the process of
dissipation was set in motion by the first step in the manu-
facturing process and that from thence forward its dissipa-
tion continues until it is useless for all purposes.
The Appellate Court then considered the fifth proviso of
Sec. 3(a) which stated that consumption should not mean
obsolescence, discarding, depreciation, damage of tools, dies
and equipment. The court conceded that it might be possible
to classify this material as equipment and that its disinte-
gration might be attributed to damage or wear. Adopting
the rule that tax statutes should be construed most favorable
to the taxpayer it concluded that the product here involved
should be considered as consumed by dissipation or expen-
diture and that the receipts from its sale should be taxable
at 1/4 of I%.
In Department of Treasury v. Fairmont Glass Works65
(1943) the Appellate Court considered whether receipts from
the sale of glass bottles to persons engaged in the production
of beer were receipts from a purchase in which the purchaser
contemplated a direct and immediate resale. The facts of
the case were as follows:
165. 113 Ind. App. 684, 48 N.E. (2d) 841 (1943).
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The taxpayer's customers, the breweries, sold the bottled beer
to wholesalers for a price which included a stipulated amount which the
breweries in accordance with the trade practice would refund to the
wholesalers upon return of the bottles. It was stipulated that most
of the wholesalers returned the bottles to taxpayer's customers an
average of 17 times. The wholesalers passed the bottles on to the
retailers and the retailers to the consumers, under substantially sim-
ilar arrangements. The question turned on whether the breweries
purchased the bottles for resale within the meaning of Sec. 3(a) or
whether the brewers bought the bottles for use by themselves.
The tax division contended that the brewer did not pur-
chase the bottles for resale and that in fact it does not sell
the bottles to its customers because there is no mutual agree-
ment between the parties and no transfer of title. The tax
division further argued that the brewer's principal business
is that of making and selling beer and that it refills the bot-
tles an average of 17 times and that it makes no profit on
the bottles. It was argued that this demonstrated that the
brewers purchased the bottles for use and not for resale.
The Appellate Court concluded that the ultimate purchasers
of the bottled beverages under the arrangements mentioned
universally feel that they are the owners of the bottles and can
keep or dispose of them unless they choose to return them
to the vendor. The court relied on a New York case involving
the violation of a criminal statute prohibiting the refilling
and use of certain marked containers without written consent
of the person in whose name they were registered. It also
relied on two federal income tax cases in which the taxpayer
sought to claim deductions for depreciation on items dis-
posed of under similar arrangements on the ground that
they still owned the items. In the cases cited it was held
that the transactions between manufacturer and ultimate
consumer constituted a sale of the bottles and that, there-
fore, the criminal prosecution could not be maintained nor
the depreciation claimed. The Appellate Court ruled that
the taxpayer was entitled to the rate of 1/4 of 1% in this case
on the ground that the brewer "sold" the bottles to the
ultimate consumers.
This case is of considerable importance to manufacturers
of packaging materials such as milk bottles, cement bags,
biscuit and cracker cans in which the purchaser passes the
packaging items on to its customers under an arrangement
to return them at a stated sum. It would seem also to fol-
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low that the manufacturers of other packaging materials
such as paper cartons and wooden boxes, under the theory
of the Appellate Court, could claim the 1/4 of 1% rate either
on the theory that the purchaser contemplated an immediate
resale or on the theory that it was ultimately resold as a
part of or as a contributing factor in the items contained
therein.
A further perplexing problem was before the Appellate
Court in Department of Treasury v. Ranger-Cook, Inc.-,,
(1943) involving a trade practice in the printing -trade. The
facts of the case were as follows:
The taxpayer was engaged in the business of type-setting. After
receiving manuscripts the taxpayei' set the type either by hand or
with a typesetting machine, resulting in a single slug of type com-
position. After corrections the slug was delivered to the printer
who used it in his presses to run off the required impressions.
After its use it has no value except its salvage value as lead. The
type composition was sold to the printer as a completed article,
the price including the cost of materials and the labor performed.
The tax division contended that these "slugs of type"
were tools and equipment and that they were not sold as a
material which is directly consumed in direct production.
Using Webster's definition of a "tool" as an instrument of
manual operation, the Appellate Court held that these slugs
did not come within the commonly understood meaning of
the word "tool." This definition of the word "tool" seems
to be too narrow even within the "commonly understood
meaning of the word" as in modern industry large presses
and dies are considered as "machine tools." It is probably
true, however, that receipts from sales of machine tools such
as lathes, presses, drills, etc. would be classified as receipts
from the sale of equipment and would not be, therefore,
entitled to the 1/ of 1 % rate.
The Appellate Court in the instant case concluded that
these slugs were not equipment but were more readily identi-
fiable as material. It concluded that the taxpayer was en-
titled to the rate of 1/, of 1% because the slugs were consumed
by use or application in the preparation of a completed ar-
ticle for sale.
Oster v. Department of Treasury,167 decided by the Su-
166. 114 Ind. App. 107, 49 N.E. (2d) 548 (1943).
167. 219 Ind. 313, 37 N.E. (2d) 528 (1941).
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preme Court in 1941, is clearly within the 1941 amendment
inserting Sec. 3(a) (4), covering receipts from industrial
processing, enamelling, plating and servicing. The facts of
the case were as follows:
The taxpayer manufactured, from cloth furnished by Hirsch
Brothers of Chicago, pursuant to a contract, the cloth into ladies'
coats. The question was whether the rate was applicable at 1%
or M, of 1%.
The tax division contended that the 1% rate was ap-
plicable as the receipts in question (prior to 1941 amend-
ment) were gross income from personal services or from the
performance of contracts. The Supreme Court upheld the
taxpayer's contention that the 1/4 of 1% rate was applicable.
The court stated that looking at the Act as a whole the
lower rate was applicable to income from business activities
which result in making available for use in the first instance
articles, substances or, commodities and that the higher rate
was applicable to ultimate sales to consumers. The court
stated that while Ingram-Richardson Mfg. Co. v. Department
of Treasury, decided by the Circuit Court of Appeals of the
7th Circuit in 1940,168 held that the servicing was not a
sale so as to come within Clause 3 of the 1937 Act, the court
was of the opinion that the original act, even prior to the
1941 amendment to cover the situation involved in the In-
gram-Richardson case, showed an intent to tax the type of
transaction here involved at the lower rate. The significance
of this case is the intimation by the court that the Ingram-
Richardson case was not a correct interpretation of the act
prior to the 1941 amendment and that the 1941 amendment
was merely declaratory of the original act.
In 1941 the attorney general ruled that a regulation of
the gross income tax division which assessed subcontractors
at a rate of 1/4 of 1% was not legal as the income was de-
rived from the performance of a contract. Thus both con-
tractors and sub-contractors are taxable at the rate of 1 %169
Exemptions
The decisions on exemptions are not of particular sig-
168. 141 F. (2d) 24 (1940).
169. Op. Ind. Atty Gen. (1941) p. 431. See Gross Income Tax Reg-
ulations, Series VI, Reg. 2502. Previous to this opinion the
Gross Income Tax Division had applied the Y of 1% rate, Gross
Income Tax Regulations, Series IV (1940) Reg. 302, 2501.
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nificance as they have largely turned on the facts of a
particular case.170 Two; cases in 1945, Department of Treas-
ury v. City of Linton171 and Department of Treasury v. City
of Evansville,172 illustrate the problem of determining when
a municipal corporation or any other political subdivision
of this state is engaged in private or proprietary activities
or businessY.17 While the two cases largely turned on the
facts they appear to be an attempt on the part of the Su-
preme Court to consider the entire problem of taxable pro-
prietary activities of political subdivisions. In the City of
Linton case the question was the imposition of the tax upon
revenue of the city from its sales of water, gas and electricity.
The Supreme Court held that the operation of water, electric
and gas utilities by the city with service to its citizens was
a private proprietary activity. The court pointed out that
while it is true that the police power, the power of eminent
domain and the taxing power may be only exercised for
public uses it does not follow that such use is not in the
exercise of a private and proprietary function for other pur-
poses. The Evansville case should be examined for a rather
complete list of the different types of receipts of a munici-
pality which are subject to the gross income tax. In that
case the court held that receipts from the operation of city
markets, public wharfs, leases of city land and equipment
for farming and other purposes, fees from the municipal
golf course, concession fees from concessions in the city park,
sale and lease of park and airport land; sale of miscellaneous,
obsolete or worn-out equipment; receipts from granting per-
mits to persons desiring to cut into the city streets for utility
connections; receipts from sales of gas and oil and rental
of facilities at the municipal airport, receipts from the sale
of lots and graves in the municipally-owned cemetery and
receipts from the sale of by-products of a rendering plant
170. See e.g. Diekmann, Sheriff et al v. Evansville Producers Com-
mission Association, 219 Ind. 636, 40 N.E. (2d) 327 (1942) in-
volving an agricultural marketing cooperative.
171. Dept. of Treasury v. City of Linton, - Ind. - , 60 N.E. (2d)
948 (1945).
172. Dept. of Treasury v. City of Evansville, - Ind. - , 60 N.E.
(2d) 952 (1945).
173. Section 1(a) of the Act (§ 64-2601(a) Burns 1943 Replacement)
includes within definition of persons subject to tax, the political
subdivisions of the state "engaged in private or proprietary
activities."
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were all taxable. Some of the property used in these ac-
tivities was given to the city and some was purchased by
money raised by taxation or the sale of bonds. Some of the
activities had resulted in a net loss which had been paid from
funds derived from taxation. The court, speaking through
Judge Young, set up several tests in determining whether
the receipts were from a proprietary activity. One test was
whether the activity is primarily for the advantage of the
state as a whole or for the special local benefit of the com-
pact community. Another test used was whether the activity
is of a business nature which is generally engaged in by
private persons or corporations. Another consideration is
whether the activity is in performance of a duty imposed
upon the municipality by the sovereign power or is in the
exercise of a permissive privilege given by the sovereign
power. The court conceded that there is a great deal of
confusion and lack of uniformity in the application of these
rules. The court concluded in the instant case that receipts
from all of the activities mentioned above were proprietary
in nature and therefore taxable.
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the decision was
that part, holding receipts from persons obtaining permits to
cut the city streets as taxable. The court relied on tort cases
which have used this concept of proprietary activity in order
to hold municipalities liable for torts as a basis for its deci-
sion that the receipts from granting a permit to cut the city
streets were taxable. The court also stressed that the revenue
came from citizens desiring for their own personal benefit to
cut the streets and pavement and since the permits were grant-
ed for this private personal purpose the receipts were of a pri-
vate and proprietary activity rather than the exercise of a
public or governmental function. This decision seems rather
startling since the stipulated facts show that the purpose of
the charge was to receive a sum sufficient to pay the cost
of replacing the cut pavement in the streets. If anything is
a governmental purpose as distinguished from a proprietary
activity, it would seem that maintenance of the city streets
is such a purpose. Since in modern society most of the util-
ities are placed under the streets and the only way that a
citizen can have the necessary utilities is to hook onto the
street connections, it is difficult to see how the granting
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of these permits was to satisfy a "private, personal desire"
of certain individuals.
The effect of the Evansville decision, particularly as to
the receipts last discussed would seem to indicate that with
the exception of receipts from taxes all receipts of a munici-
pality are now taxable under the gross income tax act. The
decision of the Attorney General in 1940174 that municipal
corporations did not have to pay the gross income tax on
receipts derived as fees from the operation of a sewage dis-
posal plant and from the use of parking meters would seem
to be in question in view of the Evansville decision. It could
be argued with equal plausibility that the operation of the
sewage disposal plants was to gratify the personal desire of
certain individuals and that the receipts from use of the
parking meters were receipts from the desire of individuals to
park in the streets. A decision of the attorney general in
1942175 which appears in accord with the expressed legisla-
tive policy but which conflicts with some of the tests set
forth in the Evansville case is, the decision that income
received from public housing authorities established pursuant
to Ch. 207 of the Acts of 1937176 were not taxable as they
were receipts from the execution of an "essential and public
governmental function." The attorney general placed par-
ticular reliance on the terms of the statute which declared
that these authorities were exercising public and essential
governmental functions.
Administration.
The most important decision in the administration of
the gross income tax act is that of Ford Motor Co. v. Depart-
ment of Treasury,17 7 now confirmed by express statute 78
that the refund provisions of the gross income tax act do not
authorize suit in the federal courts.
The Indiana Appellate Court in Department of Treasury
v. Reinking,1 70 in interpreting Subsection (h) of Sec 8,180
held that the clause giving a preferred status to claims for
174. Op. Ind. Att'y Gen. (1940) p. 50.
175. Op. Ind. Att'y Gen. (1942) p. 15.
176. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns 1943 Supp.) § 48-8101 et seq.
177. 323 U.S. 459, 89 L.Ed. 372 (1945) See n. 116 supra.
178. See'page 142 supra.
179. 109 Ind. App. 63, 32 N.E. (2d) 741 (1941).
180. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Bums 1943 Replacement) § 64-2608(h).
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the gross income tax include taxes received from the debtor
prior to the receivership as well as to taxes imposed subse-
quent to the appointment of the receiver.
The attorney general ruled in 1943181 that the sheriff
in acting under a warrant issued pursuant to Sec. 13(a) 18
of the gross income tax act may levy upon intangible items
such as open accounts, judgments, rents and wages in the
same manner as levy on those items may be had under the
general execution laws of the state providing for sales of
personal property and certain choses of action upon execution.
The 1942 Regulations (Regulations 4100 to 4110) of the
Gross Income Tax Division set forth for the first time the
procedure and rules for a hearing on a refund or an objec-
tion to an assessment by the division. The regulations pro-
vide that a request for a hearing must be in the nature of a
petition presenting the tax matters for determination, a con-
cise statement of the facts, a specification of the relief sought
and a memorandum of legal authorities in support of the
taxpayer's contentions.
The regulations provide that hearings shall be conducted
in a manner combatible with usual and ordinary rules of
procedure and as far as practical in an informal manner.
The regulations provide that the mailing of any notices
orders and decisions with respect to any hearings under the
Act shall be held sufficient serving of such orders, notices
or decisions.
PROPERTY TAXES
The basic property tax structure is contained in Chapter
59 of the Acts of 1919.183 In 1931 the inheritance tax
provisions were revised.184 In 1933 five major tax laws
were added to the Indiana tax structure: the general in-
tangibles tax,18 taxation of banks and trust companies, 8"
181. Op. Ind. Att'y Gen. (1943) p. 743.
182. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns 1943 Replacement) § 64-2613(a).
183. Ind. Stat. Ann. §64-101 et seq. (Burns 1943 Replacement Volume).
184. Ind. Acts 1931, Ch. 75, Ind. Stat. Ann. §6-2401 et seq. (Burns
1933).
185. Ind. Acts 1933, Ch. 81 p. 523, Ind. Stat. Ann. §64-901 et seq.
Burns 1943 Replacement).
186. Ind. Acts 1933, Ch. 83 p. 545, Ind. Stat. Ann. §64-801 et seq.(Burns 1943 Replacement).
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taxation of building and loan associations,'11 the gross in-
come tax,1 88 and the act limiting levies imposed on tangible
property.8" Before 1933 and in an accelerated manner
since 1933 the General Assembly has amended and changed
various provisions of the property tax law of 1919. Some of
these amendments have expressly repealed provisions of the
1919 act, others have been superimposed on the 1919 act
without ostensibly amending that act. Many of these later
changes have been interpreted and will be interpreted to
have been substitutions for provisions of the 1919 act. A
quick reading therefore of the Annotated Statutes will not
necessarily reveal the omissions and changes that have been
made in the 1919 act. Even comparing the laws of' each
session of the Assembly against the basic 1919 law cannot
with certainty show that a section of the 1919 act has or
has not been changed or superceded. 190 Many of the changes
which have not specifically repealed provisions of the 1919
act are in fact inconsistent with the provisions of the original
act and will undoubtedly be interpreted to repeal the older
provisions. The material that follows will consider some of
these problems resulting from amendments to the property
tax structure since 1940.
Assessment Procedure and Problems
Basis And Rate of Assessment. Prior to 1943, Section
64-103 (Burns 1943 Replacement), the general provisions of
the property tax act as to basis and rate of assessment,
provided that all property should be assessed and valued at
"true cash value" and it was provided that the rate should be
"equal". An amendment in 19431s' set up three require-
187. Ind. Acts 1933, Ch. 82, p. 541, Ind. Stat. Ann. §64-822 et seq.(Burns 1943 Replacement).
188. Ind. Acts 1933, Ch. 50, p. 388, Ind. Stat. Ann. §64-2601 et seq.
189. Ind. Acts 1933, Ch. 120, p. 727, repealed by Acts of 1937, Ch.
119, page 646, Ind. Stat. Ann. §64-307 et seq.
190. Compare, for example, Acts of 1933, Ch. 81, 731, p. 523, Ind.
Stat. Ann. §64-931 (Burns 1943 Replacement) providing that the
intangible tax shall be in lieu of all other taxes with, Acts of
1919, Oh. 59, §63, Ind. Stat. Ann. §64-603 (Burns 1943 Replace-
ment) requiring intangibles to be listed for personal property
taxation. This latter provision was not expressly repealed by
Ch. 81 of Acts of 1933. See Op. Atty. Gen. (1944) p. 41. See
discussion infra page 178. See also discussion of 1941 Tax
Sale Act, 224, Acts of 1941, infra page 201.
191. Ind. Acts 1943, Ch. 111 §1, p. 353.
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ments by providing that property should be assessed and
valued:
(1) At a rate which is uniform and equal, (2) on a
just valuation basis and (3) at the true cash value as
determined by cost price; book value; the earning capacity
of such property; replacement cost; depreciation, if any,
and all other facts and circumstances giving informa-
tion concerning value as of the first day of March
of the assessment year. 1 2
While the amendment to Section 64-103 (Burns 1943
Replacement) expresses the general policy of assessment
for all property it is not completely in accord with other
sections of the tax act relating to assessment of particular
kinds of property. As indicated above all property under
this act is to be assessed at a "true cash value" as determined
by certain factors. Section 64-601 (Burns 1943 Replace-
ment), relating to personal property, also amended in 1943193
does not mention "true cash value" but speaks only of a
"just, uniform and equal valuation" as determined by cer-
tain factors, which are the same as those in Section 64-103
except that "replacement cost" is not specifically included
as a factor in the assessment of personal property while it
is a factor to be considered in Section 64-103.
Section 64-1009 (Burns 1943 Replacement), on the other
hand, dealing with assessment of real property unlike Sections
64-103 and 64-601 has not been amended since 1919194 and
this section requires assessment of real property at "full
true cash value" as determined by market price. But Sec-
tion 64-1019b (Burns 1943 Replacement) inserted in 1937191
192. In the report of the State Board of Tax Commissioners for 1944,
the Board recommended that the date of assessment of real and
personal property be changed from March 1 to January 1. One
of the reasons assigned for this recommendation was that in-
dividuals and corporations engaged in business make their in-
ventories and computations for federal net income and state
gross income taxes on the calendar year basis and it would,
therefore, be advantageous to such corporations and individuals
if they could use their annual inventories and their annual sale
sheets in listing their property for taxes. See Indiana Year Book,(1944) p. 696.
193. Ind. Acts 1943, Ch. 111 §2, p. 353.
194. Ind. Acts 1919, Ch. 59 §142, p. 198.
195. Ind. Acts 1937, Ch. 19 §3, p. 58. While §3 of Ch. 19 is
part of an act providing for a reassessment procedure, it is not
in its terms limited to reassessments. Thus it provides that all
property shall be assessed at a "just valuation" and directs all
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as a part of an act concerning reassessment procedure pro-
vides for a basis of reassessment of real property, when
ordered, different from any of the sections mentioned above.
Like Section 64-601 (Burns 1943 Replacement) as to the
original assessment of personal property it requires "just
valuation" but the elements in determining the just valuation
are different from the general provision in Section 64-103
and the specific provisions as to the original assessment of
personal property under section 64-601 or the provision as to
original assessment of real property in Section 64-1009.
Thus if a reassessment is ordered under Section 64-1019
different factors can be considered than are considered in
an original assessment of the same property.
There has been no general assessment of real property
since 1932 and this apparent lack of consistency in basis of
assessment is probably due to the fact that the general
assembly has amended only sections applicable to current
problems-annual assessment of personal property and re-
assessment of real property. It would seem probable that the
general provision in Section 64-103 as amended in 1943,
has in effect modified the provision as to the original assess-
ment of real property in Section 64-1009 or its reassessment
under Section 64-1019b.
The Attorney General ruled in 1943116 that in determin-
ing valuation of liquors owned by wholesaler or retailer on
March 1 of the year of assessment, the amount of the Federal
and State excise taxes paid prior to purchase should not be
deducted from the cost in making an assessment. He pointed
out that nothing in the above sections appeared to admit
such taxes as a deductible item. This ruling would appear
to be applicable to assessment of all property in which an
excise tax is included in the cost and has been passed on to the
taxpayer even as a separate item except perhaps where the
taxpayer is legally the collection agent of the State or the
United States.
Section 64-103 further provides that all property within
officials whose duty it is to "assess or review assessments" of
property to take certain factors into consideration insofar as they
shall be applicable. It is arguable, therefore that §3, Ch.
19, Acts of 1937, §64-1019b, (Burns 1943 Replacement) repealed
§142, Ch. 59, Acts of 1919 (§64-1009, Burns 1943 Replace-
ment) and has itself been modified by §1 of Ch. 111, Acts of 1943
(§64-103, Burns 1943 Replacement).
196. Ops. Ind. Atty. Gen. (1943) p. 486. -
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the jurisdiction of the state not expressly exempted shall be
subject to taxation. A problem has arisen with respect to
personal property of individuals living on U. S. government
owned property in government houses and who work for the
U. S. government. The Attorney General ruled in opinions
in 1945 1 and 1943198 with reference to the Wabash Ordin-
ance Works at Newport and certain war housing projects
that the question turns on whether the property had been so
ceded to the United States under 40 USC §255 and Section
62-1001 (Burns 1943 Replacement) that the property had
passed "out of the jurisdiction of the state". In the two
cases in question he ruled that the United State government
had not given notice as required by the Federal statutes and
that therefore jurisdiction had not been ceded and that per-
sonal property of the individuals residing on the government
land was within the jurisdiction of the state and subject to
tax.199
Assessment Procedure. Valuation by the assessor and
person reporting the tax. As indicated above, Section 64-601
was amended in 1943 to provide that the owner of personal
property shall fix what he deems a "just value" instead of
"true cash value" for the guidance of the assessor who shall
determine the just valuation for taxation of each item after
examination. The 1943 amendment directs the assesor to
be governed by what is a "just, uniform, and equal valuation."
The term "market or usual selling price" was deleted as a
factor in determining such values by the 1943 amendment and
"cost price," "book value" and "depreciation" may now be
considered.
The tax form for reporting property was amended in
1943200 by providing an additional interrogatory to those
described in Section 64-602 which should be answered by the
person reporting the tax. This new interrogatory requires
197. Ops. Ind. Atty. Gen. (1945) p. - (March 1, 1945).
198. Ops. Ind. Atty. Gem (1943) p. 609.
199. Assessors might, however, be faced with certain practical diffi-
culties in obtaining access to the U.S. Government reservations.
If so the personal property might be assessed as omitted property§§64-1025, 64-1103, 64-1201, 64-1402, 64-2102) and placed on the
tax duplicate in this manner. Additional difficulties might be
faced in enforcing the tax. Quaere could a personal action for
collection of the tax be brought in the Federal Courts. See Ops.
Atty. Gen. (1944) p. 313 and see discussion infra p. 198.
200. Ind. Acts. 1943, Ch. 275 §1, p. 777.
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information with respect to members of his household in the
armed forces.
Assessors. Chapter 291 of the Acts of 1943201 authorized
employment by the township assessors of deputies and clerks
and fixed their compensation. It was also provided in 1943
for additional compensation for the township trustee while
performing the duty of township assessor of townships of
5,000 population or less in amount as determined by the
advisory board of townshiAh and to be paid from the township
fund.20 2  A 1945 amendment 203 extended this provision for
additional compensation for the township trustee while acting
as assessor until 1947 but provided that the amount of com-
pensation was to be determined by the Board of County
Commissioners and paid out of county funds.
A 1943 amendment 204 makes it the duty of the township
assessor to make a list of veterans which shall be filed with
the county auditor and made available to local chapters of
certain national veterans organizations and to state and
county historical societies. It is made unlawful for the
county officials to furnish this list to anyone else and for
the veterans organizations to give the. list to other persons or
associations.
Rules As To Assessment of Property: As to Quantity.
Chapter 91 of Acts of 1941205 added real estate occupied by
public drainage ditches to the list of rights of way such as
railways, highways, and levees which are not to be assessed
against the adjacent property holder. The 1941 act further
transferred the duty of making a survey, in case disagree-
ment between the land owner and the assessor as to the
201. Ind. Stat. Ann. §64-1005b (Burns 1943 Replacement).
202. Ind. Acts 1943, Ch. 157, p. 468, Ind. Stat. Ann. § 64-1031 (Burns
1943 Replacement). Section 2 of the Act provided that it was to
expire at midnight on March 31, 1945.
Section 64-1003 and § 64-1006 control compensations of
assessors in townships of larger populations. The latter section
classifies salaries as to population of the township, the former as
to population and the assessed valuation of the township. The
attorney general has ruled that the population requirement con-
trols unless the township has an assessed valuation that meets
the requirement in § 64-1003 in which case the assessed
valuation classification controls. See Ops. Ind. Atty. Gen. (1943)
p. 546, 582.
203. Ind. Acts 1945 Ch. 266 p. 1199.
204. Ind. Acts 1943 Ch. 276 p. 778, Ind. Stat. Ann. §64-1023 (Burns 1943.
Replacement).
205. Ind. Stat. Ann. §64-1010 (Burns 1943 Replacement).
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quantity of the right of way, from the property holder to the
assessor and county surveyor and provides that the costs of
the survey are to be paid by the county rather than the tax
payer as formerly. The Attorney General has ruled that
the duty to make the additional deductions is on the asses-
sor.20 6  Since no general reassessment has been had since
1932 the question arose under what conditions should deduc-
tions for this additional class of rights of way be made.
The Attorney General has further stated that the provision
as to the duty of the assessors apply only when reassessments
are ordered except as to the categories of rights of way
which were added since the 1932 assessment.20 7 A form208
has been prescribed by the State Board to enable property
owners to take advantage of the deductions permitted by the
1941 amendment.
As to Kinds of Property. Leaseholds. Section 64-513
(Burns 1943 Replacement) provides that when exempt real
estate is leased to a tax payer whose property is not exempt
the "leasehold estate and the appurtenances shall be listed"
as property of the lessee as real estate. Since the rules for
assessment of omitted property are different for real estate
and personal property, the question sometimes arises whether
the property to be taxed is real estate or personal property.
The question arose in 1941 when the Marion County Board
of Review sought to assess as omitted personal property the
value of improvements made by the Indianapolis Coliseum
Corporation, under a ten year lease with option to renew,
to the coliseum owned by the State Board of Agriculture.
The Attorney General ruled that these improvements con-
stituted real property and that the property of the corpora-
tion must be placed on the tax duplicate as real estate
under Section 64-513. The Attorney General said the val-
uation is the value of the leasehold interest, although the
value of the improvements may be considered in arriving at
the value of the leasehold.209
Intangibles. In 1933 the Assembly provided for a specific
method of taxing intangibles and provided that the tax there
206. Ops. Ind. Atty. Gen. (1941) p. 400.
207. Ops. Ind. Atty. Gen. (1942) p. 41.
208. Form 91, Indiana State Board of Tax Commissioners.
209. Ops. Ind. Atty. Gen. (1941) p. 170; Ops. Ind. Atty. Gen. (1942)
p. 63.
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imposed was to be in lieu of all other taxes.210  At the same
time, however, the Assembly did not specifically repeal from
the 1919 property tax law, provisions requiring the listing
intangibles under the personal property tax.2 11  The 1933
Intangibles Tax Law defines intangibles in Section 64-
901(a) and expressly excludes in Section 64-901(b) certain
types of property from the intangibles tax. Although the
State Board of Tax Commissioners beginning in 1933 omitted
from the form for the schedules of personal property to be
reported by taxpayers all provisions in the schedules for
listing intangibles it was not completely clear that "intang-
ibles" excluded from taxation under the Intangibles Tax Law
were not thereby subject to taxation under the general pro-
visions dealing with all personal property.22
In 1944 the Attorney General was asked to rule whether
accounts receivable were taxable under the Intangibles Tax
Law and if not, whether they were subject to assessment and
taxation as personal property. As indicated elsewhere, the At-
torney General ruled they were not taxable under the Intang-
ibles Tax Law.213 He, therefore, came to the question whether
accounts receivable were taxable under the property tax
laws. Section 63 of Chaptee, 59 of the Acts of 1919 (Burns
64-603) provides that all taxpayers are to make a list of
their credits due among which are listed "bonds, notes,
mortgages, accounts, demands" and "claims." In 1921 the
Assembly without purporting to amend this section provided
that accounts due or to become due and other forms of in-
tangibles enumerated therein were to be considered as credits
and reportable for taxation by the taxpayer.21' It was further
provided in the 1921 act that bona fide indebtedness could be
210. Ind. Acts, 1933, Ch. 81 §31 p. 523.
211. Ind. Acts, 1919 Ch. 59 §63 p. 198, Ind. Stat. Ann. §64-603 (Burns
1943 Replacement).
212. See e.g. § 64-104 (Burns 1943 Replacement) providing that
all property of any nature or kind except that defined as real
estate "shall be deemed personal property" and shall be listed and
taxed as such; § 64-103 providing all property "not express-
ly exempted shall be subject to taxation". Section 31 of the In-
tangibles Tax Law § 64-931 (Burns 1943 Replacement) pro-
vides that the tax there "imposed shall be in lieu of all other
taxes" imposed upon intangibles by any law, except gross income
and inheritance taxes.
213. Ops. Ind. Atty. Gen. (1944) p. 41, See page 127 supra.
214. Ind. Acts 1921, Ch. 260, p. 771; Ind. Stat. Ann. §14-103 (Burns
1926).
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deducted -from the credits listed. By Section 40 of The In-
tangibles, Tax Law, this 1921 act was expressly repealed but
Section 63 of the 1919 act was not repealed. The situation
facing the Attorney General was thus as follows: The 1919
act, not expressly amended by the 1921 act nor expressly
repealed by the Intangibles Tax Law of 1933, probably in-
cluded accounts receivable within its terms as subject to
taxation; the 1921 act, expressly repealed by the Intan-
gibles Tax Law of 1933 clearly included accounts receivable
as taxable personal property. The Attorney General ruled
that the 1921 act must have been intended as a substitution
for the 1919 act and that the provisions in the 1919 act pro-
viding for the scheduling and taxation of intangible personal
property were repealed by the 1921 act. He therefore ruled
that the repeal of the 1921 act by the 1933 act left no pro-
vision in the property tax laws for taxing credits. As a
persuasive aid in this construction the Attorney General re-
lied on the administrative interpretation of the State Board of
Tax Commissioners who since 1933 have made no provisions
for listing intangibles on the personal property tax form.
Section 4215 of the Property Tax Law provides that all
property of any nature or kind other than that described as
real property shall be deemed personal property and shall
be listed and taxed as such. Relying on State Board of Tax
'Commissioners v. Holliday,216 the Attorney General ruled that
since this general provisions was not self-executory and since
the statute provided no methods for taxing intangible prop-
erty, 'intangible property was not taxable under this section
of the general property tax act. This ruling, confirming
as it does the administrative practices since 1933, should
make it clear that intangibles not subject to the Intangibles
Tax Law are not thereby made taxable under the property
tax laws.217
Reassessment Procedure. An emergency act of 1945
removed a weakness ir the power of the State Board of Tax
Commissioners to order a reassessment which had appeared
as a result of chapter 291 of the Acts of 1943. The Attorney
215. Ind. Acts 1919, Ch. 59, Ind. Stat. Ann. §64-104 (Burns 1943 Re-
placement).
216. 150 Ind. 216, 49 N.E. 14, 42 L.R.A. 826 (1898).
217. See note 55 supra for a recommendation of the State Board of
Tax Commissioners to clarify the coverage of the Intangibles Tax
Law.
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General had ruled 218 that while under Section 64-1019a the
expenses of a reassessment were to borne by the county and
that an appropriation was not necessary, chapter 291 of the
Acts of 1943219 authorizing employment of deputy assessors
and clerks by the township assessors, provided that the salary
and per diems were to be fixed by the county council. It was
ruled that this power was in the county council, and that if
they failed to fix the per diems for a reassessment, the state
board could do nothing about it except that the individual
assessor performing the duty could make claim for compen-
sation and compel payment for the services. Under this
ruling if the county in which a reassessment had been ordered
refused to fix the per diems and salaries of deputy assessors
and clerks, the reassessment could not take place as the state
board could not find any one willing to perform the duties
when the only method of payment was a law suit against
the county.220
The 1945 Act 221 which does not purport to amend the
1943 act, authorizes the appointment of deputy and assistant
township assessors and makes it obligatory upon the county
council to make the necessary appropriations to enable the
township assessors to secure qualified deputies in the event
of a general reassessment of real estate in such county.
A further defect in the power of the state board was
corrected in 1943 by an amendment authorizing the state
board to approve petitions for extending the session of the
County Board of Review.2 2 2 This weakness was seen in a
decision of the Indiana Appellate Court in 1945, McCreery v.
Ijams 223 in which previous to this amendment, the state
board had ordered a reassessment and then ordered the
county board to adjourn and reconvene after completion of
the reassessment. The court held that the order of adjourn-
ment by the state board was void and that therefore the
assessment by the county board of review was invalid. Thus,
218. Ops. Ind. Att'y Gen. (1943) p. 261.
219. Ind. Stat. Ann. §64-1005b (Burns 1943 Replacement).
220. This weakness was illustrated at one time in the refusal of the
County Council of Marion County to appropriate funds necessary
for carrying out a reassessment ordered by the State Board of
Tax Commissioners. See Indiana Year Book (1944) p. 697.
221. Ind. Acts 1945, Ch. 187, p. 577.
222. Ind. Acts 1943 Ch. 103, p. 331, Ind. Stat. Ann. §64-1205 (Burns
1943 Replacement).
223. - Ind. App. - , 59 N.E. (2d) 133 (1945).
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previous to the 1943 amendment, if the ordered reassessment
could not be completed during the regular session of the
county board of review there was no provision for convening
the county board of review to equalize the reassessment.
Assessment of Omitted Property. Prior to 1943, the
township assessor's power to assess omitted property was
limited to the time "prior to the filing of his return with the
county auditor."224 A 1943 amendment 2 5 eliminated the
quoted phrase thus giving the township assessor power to
assess omitted property at any time.
County Board of Review. Section 64-1201 (Burns 1943
Replacement) establishing the County Board of Review of
assessments and defining its powers was amended in 1943 to
provide that it should assess according to "uniform and just
values" rather than according to "true cash value," thus
making the section in accord with Sections 64-103 and 64-601
also amended in 1943 as to the basis of assessment.2 2 6 The
time of meeting provided for the County Board of Review was
amended, to correspond to the 1943 amendment to the powers
of the state board, authorizing the county board to petition
for an extension of time.22 7 However, the 1943 amendment
limited the power of the county board to review assessments
on complaint of taxpayers to complaints by owners of "per-
sonal property" instead of owners of "property and taxables"
under the former section.2 2
8
The Attorney General ruled in 1942229 that under section
64-1201 the County Board of Review has power to make
original assessmentg of any property omitted on the asssess-
ment list.
State Board of Tax Commissionrs. While the powers
of the County Board of Review were changed in 1943, as in-
dicated above22 0 to correspond to other changes in the tax
act making a "just, equitable and uniform valuation" the
basis of assessment rather than "true cash value," the powers
224. Ind. Acts 1919, Ch. 59 §156 p. 198.
225. Ind. Acts 1943, Ch. 159 p. 476, Ind. Stat. Ann. §64-1025 (Burns
1943 Replacement).
226. Ind. Acts 1943, Ch. 103, p. 311, Ind. Stat. Ann. §§64-1201, 64-1205
(Burns 1943 Replacement).
227. See n. 222 supra.
228. Ind. Stat. Ann. §64-1201 (Burns 1943 Replacement).
229. Ops. Ind. Atty. Gen. (1942) p. 63.
230. See pages 182, 173 supra.
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of the state board were not so changed. Thus in Section
64-1303 (Burns 1943 Replacement) the state board is directed
to assess all property23' at its "true cash value" and in 64-1313
it is prohibited from reducing the assessed valuation below
"true cash value." This omission, if, omission it was, is not
too significant however as the factors to be considered in
arriving at a true cash value under 64-103 are approximately
the same as those to be considered in arriving at a "just
value" under the other sections of the Act.
Correction of Errors in Assessment. An amendment in
1941 made substantial changes in the powers of the State
Board of Tax Commissioners to correct erroneous assess-
ments. 23 2 Previous to the 1941 amendment the state board
was empowered at any time prior to the first Monday in
November of the year following the assessment 2 3 to correct
any assessments upon application if it should appear that the
taxpayer was wrongfully charged with the taxes. The state
board was given power to issue orders of refund and direct
concellation of unpaid taxes erroneously charged.
The 1941 amendment restricted the power of the state
board to the situation where the assessment complained of
was made by the assessor or County Board of Review without
notice to the taxpayer and without opportunity for the tax-
payer to be heard.234 It further provided that no assessment
is to be considered wrongful unless the taxpayer after being
notified of the assessment filed a petition for re-hearing or
appeal on the assessment. An amendment in 1943235 made
231. Under the present law the state board assesses telephone com-
panies, railroads, sleeping car companies, pullman companies and
other utilities and transportation companies. See Burns Ann.
Stat. §§64-1303, 64-703, 64-748. No power is at.present given to
the board to assess airplane companies and the board has recom-
mended that it be given that power and also power to tax trans-
portation companies that operate motor vehicles the same as other
public utility companies are assessed. See Indiana Year Book(1944) p. 698, For recent development in power of the states to
tax interstate airlines, see Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota, 322
U.S. 292 (1944); 67 Harv. L. Rev. 1097 (1944).
232. Ind. Acts 1941, Ch. 224 §1 p. 714, Ind. Stat. Ann. §64-1407 (Burns
1943 Replacement).
233. The Attorney General has ruled that this phrase does not refer
to the year of the assessment but to the first Monday in November
of the year subsequent to the year in which the assessment is
made. See Ops. Atty. Gen. (1943) p. 254.
234. See Ops. Atty. Gen. (1943) p. 310.
235. Ind. Acts 1943, Ch. 241 p. 681. Ind. Stat. Ann. §64-1407 (Burns
1943 Replacement).
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further substantial changes, this time adding to the power of
the state board to correct assessments in certain specifically
enumerated situations.2 3 6 The amendment provided that upon
petition which has been approved by the county auditor,
county treasurer and assessor filed "at any time" with the
state board by an affected taxpayer, the state board may
correct assessments or order cancellation if the assessed
improvements have been destroyed by disaster or removed
from the real estate by the first day of March of the year
in which the petition was filed.23 7  The 1943 amendment
further provides that where identical property has been
assessed in more than one county the state board may de-
termine which county is entitled to charge the taxes and the
Board may direct the county. not entitled to the tax to refund
it. A further provision of the 1943 act authorizes the state
board to cancel taxes against real estate acquired by any
county, township, city, or town. The 1941 amendments had
limited this provision to land acquired by the county.
Previous to the 1941 act the state board under its pre-
vious general power cancelled back taxes on land purchased
by any government agencies.. The 1941 and 1943 acts limit
236. In this act of 1943 the state board was empowered, until the first
day of May, 1943, (that act became effective on March 10, 1943)
to cancel taxes delinquent prior to December 1, 1941 where in the
opinion of the state board it would be advantageous to the taxing
unit to have the accumulated delinquency cancelled either in whole
or in part. The Attorney General in 1945 ruled that under this
authority the state board did not have power to condition the can-
cellation ordered on payment within 90 days of the balance of all
taxes that at date of payment are unpaid. The Attorney General
thereupon held the order of cancellation valid with this condition
deleted. See Ops. Ind. Atty Gen. (1945) p. - (April 5, 1945).
The State Board of Tax Commissioners has recommended
that § 64-1407 be further amended to continue some pro-
cedure similar to the 1943 act for the cancellation of delinquent
taxes in extreme cases. The board pointed out that the limitation
in the 1945 act did not give them adequate time to consider prop-
erly the large number of petitions presented. The reasons assigned
for requesting such authority were that there are many situations
where delinquent taxes have accumulated on property in an amount
greater than the sale value thereof and for the purpose of the
taxing unit it would be advantageous to cancel the same in whole
or in part. See Indiana Year Book (1944) p. 698.
237. The state board has pointed out that the local taxing authorities
have the knowledge necessary to intelligently pass on this matter
and it recommends that this section be amended so as to handle
the matter there and thereby decrease the burden of the state
board. See Indiana Year Book (1944), p. 698.
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this power and exclude cancellations of taxes on property ac-
quired by state and federal government agencies.2 38
Previous to the 1941 amendment, the state board had
power to order refunds when it cancelled taxes erroneously
assessed but which had been paid. As a result of the 1941
and 1943 amendments this power to order refunds is now
available only in the situation where the property has been
taxed in more than one county. Presumably, however, the
taxpayer who obtains an order of the state board correcting
an assessment may obtain a refund with little difficulty
under the refund provisions in Section 64-2819 (Burns 1943
Replacement) by applying to the Board of County Commis-
sioners.
Property Exempt From Taxation
With the exception of exemptions specifically applicable
to the members of the armed forces and veterans239 there has
been little development in the area of property exempt from
property taxes. The 1944 report of the State Tax Board,
however, has recommended that Section 64-201 (Burns 1943
Replacement) be completely re-written in order to clarify
the meaning of such terms as "owned and used or occupied
exclusively," or "owned and actually occupied" by the exempt
institution.240 In the near future the legislature may clarify
the exemption provisions as the judicial decisions are in con-
siderable confusion as to the meaning of these and other
terms.
The first exemption enumerated in Section 64-201, that as
to property of the United States and the State of Indiana, was
changed substantially in 1945 because of changing concep-
tions of tax immunity of instrumentalities of government.24'
238. See Ops. Ind. Atty. Gen. (1944) p. 9 ruling the state board does
not have power to cancel the taxes on real estate acquired by one
of the state colleges.
239. See p. 115 supra.
240. See Indiana Year Book (1944) p. 700. See Ops. Ind. Atty. Gen.
(1944) pp. 123, 262, 272 for discussion of the authorities on various
types of exemption. Particular reference was given to various
lodges and hospitals. In 1943 the Atty. General ruled that neither
local officials nor the state board could agree with property own-
ers to exempt their property when used for a governmental or
charitable purpose. See Ops. Ind. Atty. Gen. (1943) p. 310.
241. Also to clarify the tax status of manufacturing plants and real
estate of the Defense Plant Corporation, operated by private
manufacturers.
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The 1945 amendment242 provides that property of the State
of Indiana is exempt but that property of the United States,
its agencies and instrumentalities are exempt to the extent
that the State is prohibited by law from taxing it. The
amendment provides, further, that any right, title, interest,
lien, claim, or leasehold held in or on such property of the
United States shall be taxed to the extent not prohibited by the
Constitution. The 1945 amendments provide that if the
United States shall provide for payment of money in lieu
of taxes upon property exempt, such payment shall be to and
settled by the State Board of Tax Commissioners who are
given full power and authority to make agreements, appraise-
ments, and other necessary acts to ascertain the amount due.
Power is also given to the State Board to distribute the
money so received to appropriate governmental taxing units. 43
Mortgage Indebtedness. There have been several im-
portant rulings interpreting the mortgage deduction un-
der Section 64-209 (Burns 1943 Replacement). If mort-
gaged property is held by the entireties the Attorney Gen-
eral has ruled that the wife may take a $500 exemption
on the property and the husband may take a $1,000 exemption
on other property held by him alone.24 The Attorney General
pointed out that to hold otherwise would deprive the wife of
her right to claim an exemption on property of which she
is as much the owner as the husband. The Attorney General
has also ruled245 that only one deduction is allowed on any
one mortgage and that therefore only one $1,000 deduction
is permitted where there are two separate pieces of property
covered by the same mortgage but owned by the husband
and wife separately. This ruling may not be completely in
accord with the theory of the ruling as to property held by
the entirety and the act itself. In the ruling on property
held by the entirety the emphasis is on the fact that the
property held by entirety is a separate entity. The act allows
only a total of $1,000 in deductions even though several
mortgaged pieces of property are held by the person claiming
242. Ind. Acts 1945, Ch. 33.
243. See Indiana Year Book (1944) pp. 703-708 for list of U.S.
government property leased to private corporations, the assessed
valuation thereof and amounts paid to Indiana taxing units in
lieu of taxes by Federal Public Housing Authority.
244. Ops. Ind. Atty. Gen. (1942) p. 28.
245. Ops. Ind. Atty. Gen. (1941) p. 75.
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the exemption. This provision seems to imply therefore that
the exemption is personal. If so the fact that one mortgage
covers two pieces of property held by two separate individ-
uals should not prevent each individual from claiming his
"personal" exemption under that one mortgage.
The Attorney General has also ruled2 46 that a lessee in
possession under a 99 year lease is not entitled to file a claim
for a mortgage deduction on the ground that the leasehold
interest is not "real estate" in the terms of the statute.
Chapter 186 of the Acts of 1943247 provide that any blind
person, owning real estate used exclusively for his residence
who does not receive any income from the property in
question, and whose total net income is not in excess of the
exemption under the normal Federal Income Tax Act may
have a $1,000 deduction from the assessed value of his real
estate so used as a residence.
Special Assessments
In 1945 the General Assembly provided for the creation
of a commission to make a survey of the laws concerning
assessments for public improvements. 2 8 The act creating the
commission provides that the commission is to survey all the
laws of the state concerning the assessments for public im-
provements, the issuance of bonds therefor, the methods of
accounting for the funds derived from such assessments, and
the payment of such bonds.
The most important judicial development in the field of
special assessments occurred in 1943 in Board of Wells County
v. FcaZk. 249 Prior to that time it had been thought that In-
246. Ops. Ind. Atty. Gen. (1943) p. 468.
247. Ind. Stat. Ann. §64-226 (Burns 1943 Replacement).
248. Ind. Acts 1945, Ch. 345. Other legislative developments have been
of a minor nature as far as tax matters are concerned. See e.g.:
1941: Chapter 481 (§48-4401, Burns 1943 Replacement) (duties
of cities and towns relative to the collection of Barrett Law
Assessments fall on certain specified officers); Chapter 173
§§ 27-139 and 27-140, (Burns 1943 Supplement) (transfer of
unexpended balances in ditch fund to general fund; date of ex-
piration of liens for assessments for drainage ditches); Chapter
165 (§ 27-203, Burns 1943 Supplement) (drainage ditches).
1945: Chapter 221 (amendments to drainage ditch law); Chapter
309 (construction of sewers in platted additions outside corporate
limits of cities of first class).
249. 221 Ind. 376, 47 N.E. (2d) 320 145 A. L. R. 1190, (1943), 42 Mich.
L. Rev. 177 (1943). Other decisions and opinions of lesser im-
portance were: City of Hammond v. Melville, 114 Ind. App. 602,
52 N.E. (2d) 845, (1944) (city is liable to Barrett law bondholder
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diana required notice and hearing to property owners to
validate additional assessments against their property when
such additional assessments were made in accordance with
the original valuation of accrued benefit to their lands. In the
Wells County case plaintiff Falk brought action against the
Board of Commissioners to quiet his title to land and to en-
join enforcement of supplemental drainage assessments
upon his property. The plaintiff contended that the statute
creating drainage districts violated due process of law in that
it authorized supplemental assessments for repair without the
same notice and hearing which was required before the orig-
inal assessment could be made. In the case in question the
original drainage assessment had been made in 1918. In 1937
the surveyor was notified that the drain was out of repair and
after inspection he gave notice of letting a contract for repair.
After the drain had been repaired the cost of repair was
assessed against the lands originally assessed for the
construction of the drain in the same proportion as used in
the original assessment. The Supreme Court expressly over-
ruled Harmon v. Bolley (1918)250 in so far as it was in-
consistent with the opinion with the case at bar. The court
held that the lower court was in error in permitting evidence
that the plaintiff's land was not benefitted by the repair. The
legislature has provided means to determine that the land in-
cluded in the district benefitted by the construction of the
drain. Once having complied with this procedure and the
determination of the lands benefitted having been made
neither notice nor hearing of proceedings to repair is required.
This decision of the Indiana Supreme Court reversing Harmon
v. Bolley is clearly in accord with the general rule and removes
the uncertainty as to the Indiana requirement for notice and
hearing.
In Mee .v. Lafayette Loan and Trust Company2' 1 the In-
for assessments collected but erroneously applied to other bond
series even though bondholder is also proceeding by foreclosure
against the property)'; Ops. Ind. Atty. Gen. (1945) p. - (No.
59, June 28, 1945) (certificates of indebtedness issued to holders
of Barrett law bonds by cities which have become liable for pay-
ment need not be advertised and sold at public auction under Ch.
178 of Acts of 1943 (§§61-413, 61-419) (Burns 1943 Replacement);
Ops. Ind. Atty. Gen. (1945) p. - (No. 60, July 6, 1945) (ruling
as to applicability of any statute of limitations on actions against
city to recover amount of cities liability on Barrett law bonds).
250. 187 Ind. 511, 120 N.E. 83 (1918).
251. 112 Ind. App. 38, 41 N.E. (2d) 684 (1942).
[Vol. 21
TAXATION
diana Api~ellate Court held that the landowner's written
statutory waiver of irregularities and illegalities of a special
assessment filed in order to qualify for the election to pay in
ten installments, not only bound the land owner personally but
likewise established the assessments as liens against the tract
covered by the assessment. It was therefore ruled that the
waiver was binding on the land owners grantee and that the
grantee could not set up in defense that the board of trustees
exceeded its authority in levying on the land in question for
the construction of a sewer.
In 1940 in Hankins v. State ex rel Miller 252 the taxpayer
sought to mandate a board of trustees of a town to compel
them to file a list or roll of all owners of property affected
by the vacation of certain parts of certain streets. The Court
pointed out that the complaint fails to show a necessity for
making an assessment roll or any harm to the complainant
by reason of such failure. The court held therefore that in-
junctive relief could not be obtained against irregularities in
assessments or in the making of the assessment roll, nor would
mandamus lie where the statute has provided another adequate
remedy by appeal. The court said that this action of man-
damus constituted a collateral attack upon the action of the
board of trustees and does not lie to correct errors which
do not affect the jurisdiction of the board. Here the board
gave notice as required by law and the attack was upon one
of the procedural steps taken by the board after notice.
In Rosenbloom v. Hutchins2 3 the Supreme Court held
that school fund property, after purchase by the Auditor for
the benefit of the school fund, when sold, is sold free and clear
of the Barrett law liens. The Court held that Section 48-4406
(Burns 1943 Supplement) provides that in the event of de-
linquency of school fund mortgages and sale by the county
auditor, the sale shall be for an amount sufficient to pay the
Barrett law lien and that in the event the auditor purchases
the property for the benefit of the school fund the lien shall
be paid out of the school fund. The court therefore held that
if the sale does not bring enough to pay both the school fund
lien and the Barrett law lien the county is charged with the
deficiency in the school fund. In the action considered,
brought by a Barrett law lien holder to foreclose his lien, the
252. 217 Ind. 225, 27 N.E. (2d) 365 (1940).
253. 222 Ind. 590, 55 N.E. (2d) 315 (1944).
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court affirmed judgment in favor of the purchaser of the
school land from the county auditor and gave judgment to the
lien holder against the county commissioners for the amount
of his lien.
DETERMINING TAX RATE
General. While assessment principles and procedure are
generally involved in most questions of property taxation in
which a lawyer is called, the assessment-that is, the deter-
mination of the value of the taxable property in the taxing
district, is only the first step in determining the amount of
tax that a taxpayer has to pay. The budget and the levy based
on the assessed valuation are also sources of conflict between
taxpayer and tax collector.
After the State Board of Tax Commissioners has com-
pleted its assessments, equalization, and review of assessments
on petition of aggrieved taxpayers, it reports its actions to
the various county auditors 2 4 who then apportion the amount
of the assessed valuation of the taxable property that goes to
each taxing unit and notifies the taxing unit.255 The proper
local officials of each taxing unit then make tax levies author-
ized by law within certain restrictions and report the same to
the county auditor prior to the second Monday in Septem-
ber.25 6 On receipt of the proposed tax levy by the county audi-
tor from the taxing unit the County Board of Tax Adjustment
meets on the second Monday of September to consider the
budgets and the proposed levy.2 57 The County Board of Tax
Adjustment completes its work prior to the first of October.
Either the municipal corporation whose budget has been re-
duced by the county board or ten or more aggrieved taxpayers
may appeal to the state board258 on or before the 15th of
October. The state board holds hearings and completes its
action on the proposed tax levy by the 30th of November.5 9
254. Ind. Acts, 1919, Ch. 59 §196, Ind. Stat. Ann. §64-1328 (Burns 1943
Replacement).
255. Ind. Acts, 1919, Ch. 59 §197, Ind. Stat. Ann. §64-311 (Burns 1943
Replacement).
256. Ind. Acts, 1937, Ch. 119, §5, Ind. Stat. Ann. §64-311 (Burns 1943
Replacement).
257. Ind. Acts, 1937, Ch. 119, Ind. Stat. Ann. §§64-310, 64-311 (Burns
1943 Replacement).
258. Ind. Acts, 1937, Ch. 119 §8, Ind. Stat. Ann. §64-314 (Burns 1943
Replacement).
259. Ind. Acts, 1937, Ch. 119, §8, Ind. Stat. Ann. §64-314 (Burns 1943
Replacement).
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Then the county officials record on the tax duplicate the
amount of tax which becomes due and payable on January 1st.
Budget, Levy and Appropriation
Limitations on Levy. There are certain statutory limita-
tions on the rates which the various taxing units can levy on
each one hundred dollars of property.2 60 In addition to this
limitation most taxing units are units operating under
specifically delegated authority and from time to time the
General Assembly authorizes the imposition of an additional
levy by such unit for a particular purpose such as the main-
tenance of public parks and acquisition of fire-fighting equip-
ment.
26
1
In 1943262 the Attorney General was asked to rule on the
legality of an act of a city in expending public funds for the
purpose of constructing a building to be owned by the city
and then rented by the city to a particular manufacturing
firm at an attractive rental to be used for manufacturing pur-
poses. The Attorney General pointed out that Sec. 48-1407
(Burns 1943 Replacement) defines the powers of the common
260. E.g.: state tax rate, § 64-307 (Burns 1943 Replacement); cities
of first class, Acts of 1941, Ch. 213, Ind. Stat. Ann. § 48-6728
et. seq. (Burns 1943 Supp.); towns, Acts of 1941, Ch. 176, Ind.
Stat. Ann. §48-6806 (Burns 1943 Supp.); other municipal corpora-
tions, Section 64-309 (Burns 1943 Replacement); school taxing
districts, Ch. 39, Acts of 1945.
If the rate prescribed by statute is inadequate, the County
Tax Adjustment Board can recommend a higher rate to the State
Board of Tax Commissioners, § 64-311 (Burns 1943 Replacement);
the limitation on rate is not applicable to rates required by
municipal corporations to meet certain enumerated purposes,§ 64-312 (Burns 1943 Replacement).
261. E.g.: the General Assembly in 1945 authorized the following
levies: Ch. 169 amendment to act authorizing levy for township
fire-fighting equipment); Ch. 127 (levy by cities of fourth and
fifth class and towns and school townships for recreation centers);
Ch. 52 (amendment to act levying tax for state forestry fund);
Ch. 40 (amendment to act authorizing levy for public libraries);
Ch. 114 (authorizing certain counties to levy a tax for public aid
to colleges located in county); Ch. 190 §7% (special tax for avia-
tion purposes).
262. Ops. Ind. Atty. Gen. (1943) p. 325. The Attorney General has
made several rulings interpreting power of particular taxing units
to appropriate money or levy a tax for a particular purpose: Ops.
Ind. Atty. Gen. (1940) p. 103 (township levies for park purposes);
Ops. Ind. Atty. Gen. (1941) p. 376 (repair of bridges by counties);
Ops. Ind. Atty. Gen. (1942) p. 253 (appropriation of funds to de-
fend a law suit); Ops. Ind. Atty. Gen. (1943) p. 419 (appropria-
tions for kindergartens); Ops. Ind. Atty. Gen. (1943) (repair of
a county owned ferry).
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council of cities. In the absence of statutory delegation to the
common council the city has no power or authority to con-
struct this kind of a building or to expend its public funds
derived from taxes for such a purpose.
In Pavey v. Pavey263 the Supreme Court in 1942 consider-
ed one of the various statutory provisions making it manda-
tory to levy a tax for a particular purpose. The suit involved
the police pension fund of South Bend. The act in question
required the city to levy a tax to make up any deficiency in the
fund and the question turned on what revenue should be taken
into consideration before it is determined that a tax must be
levied to make up the deficiency. The Court ruled that pro-
ceeds from the sale of capital assets such as securities should
not be included in determining the amount available for cur-
rent expenses but that the policy of the law was to keep the
invested funds intact. The City Council contended that the
suit should be dismissed because the 1942 ordinance levying
taxes had already been passed. The Supreme Court ruled that
the question was not moot as the obligation of the city to levy
a tax cannot be avoided by a mere failure to levy in any
particular year.
Bond Procedure. In Murray v. State ex rel. King,24 the
Supreme Court in 1942 passed on the procedure involved
in issuing bonds under an emergency. The facts of the case
were as follows:
A fire had destroyed the airport facilities at the St. Joseph airfield
owned and operated by the county. The Board of Commissioners and the
county council determined that an extraordinary emergency existed re-
quiring improvements at the airfield and the county council appropri-
ated $215,000 and by ordinance authorized the issuance of bonds in that
amount, which issue after hearing was approved by the State Board of
Tax Commissioners. At the meeting of the county council a petition filed
by more than fifty taxpayers was presented requesting the bond issue
in accordance with Sec. 64-313. The council in its ordinance inserted a
clause to the effect that in the event of a remonstrance against the
issuance of the bonds being filed then no further steps would be taken
toward issuing the bonds until the council shall have determined the
sufficiency of the remonstrance. Without waiting for the council's con-
clusion as to the sufficiency of the remonstrance the relator brought
this action to compel the county auditor to issue the bonds.
The court held that under the circumstances of this case
263. 220 Ind. 276, 41 N.E. (2d) 622 (1942).
264. 220 Ind. 323, 42 N.E. (2d) 1019 (1942).
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there was no occasion for the compliance with any of the pro-
visions of Ch. 119 of the Acts of 1937 as to the issuance of
bonds, as Section 6265 of that Act expressly exempts bonds
issued to meet an emergency growing out of fire, war or other
disaster. The court further pointed out that if the proceed-
ings for this issuance of bonds are not based on the emergency
clause but are based solely upon a taxpayer's petition the only
duty of the county council is to determine whether the bonds
shall be issued and that it is the duty of the auditor to determ-
ine the sufficiency of the remonstrance, not the county council.
The important point of the case is that the 1937 Act as
to fixing tax rates and levies and the procedure prescribed
therein is held not to be applicable to all bond issues by
municipal corporations. The court stated that the procedure
in the Act does not apply to tax levies for the kinds of obliga-
tions specifically exempted in clauses a, b, c and e of Sec. 6.
The court stated that the procedure set up in Sec. 7266 of the
Act is not applicable to that type of obligation.
Budget And Levy Procedure
Budget Making. An opinion of the Attorney General in
194527 requires strict compliance with a notice issued pursu-
ant to the law calling a meeting of the county council to make
an appropriation. The notice called for a meeting at 10:00
a.m. on a specified day. Several days previously the members
of the council agreed informally to meet at 7:30 p.m. The
Attorney General ruled that the appropriating ordinance
passed at 7:30 p.m. was invalid as the purpose of the budget
statute was to procure a hearing for the taxpayers at which
they would be advised of the purposes for which the funds
were to be expended and if the county council can change the
time of meeting in this manner the door would be open to
fraud on the taxpayers and the general public.
Power of County Commissioners and County Council. In
two rulings in 1943268 the Attorney General interpreted the
power of the county commissioners and the county council in
265. Ind. Stat. Ann. §64-312 (Burns 1943 Replacement).
266. Ind. Stat. Ann. §64-313 (Burns 1943 Replacement).
267. Ops. Ind. Atty. Gen. (1945) p. - (Mar. 19, 1945).
268. Ops. Ind. Atty. Gen. (1943) pp. 512, 543.
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relation to budget making. In these opinions the Attorney
General ruled:
1. That the Board of County Commissioners has power to revise
the budget estimates of a county official before it becomes a part of the
published budget in order to eliminate proposed expenditures for de-
partments which have not been approved by the board, and which accord-
ing to statute must be approved by the board.
2. If county officials in submitting their budget exceed statutory
limitations or omit mandatory items the county commissioners have the
right and duty to revise such estimates before the budget is published.
3. Increases or additional appropriations after the publication of
the budget by the County Council must be made in conformity with the
provisions of the budget law. Therefore, the County Council can not
by % vote or otherwise increase any published item and make appro-
priations for any items that are in excess of the amounts ordered in
the budget.
4. The requirements and provisions of the budget law regulate and
control steps and procedures to be followed by the Common Council of
the city, the Board of Trustees of the town, the Advisory Board of
the township or any other appropriating body of any taxing unit in the
matter of making appropriations of greater amounts than those stated
or in making appropriations for items that have been omitted from the
published budget.
The Attorney General in 1945269 interpreted the power
of the County Council to cancel, reduce or change appropri-
ations as follows:
1. Section 26-507 (Burns 1938) does not give specific authority to
the county council to cancel, or annul in whole or in part an appropria-
tion previously made by such county council.
The ruling continued that Crouse v. Lehman270 indicated
that a change in appropriation could not be done by resolution
and the language of the opinion indicated that the court
doubted that it could be done by an ordinance repealing the
previous appropriation.
2. The county council is not authorized to transfer funds specific-
ally appropriated for one purpose in order to be used for another.
8. The county council does not have authority to provide a limit
on the use of the appropriation as to the quantity or number of items
to be purchased or to specify a maximum or minimum price. Burns
26-536 gives to the Board of County Commissioners the exclusive power
to purchase materials or supplies.
269. Ops. Ind. Atty. Gen. (1945) p. - (January 10, 1945).
270. 170 Ind. 408, 83 N.E. 714, 84 N.E. 769 (1908).
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In 1943 the Attorney General ruled271 that if a law pass-
ed at the previous session of the legislature authorizing an
appropriation or a tax levy had not been published and was
therefore not yet effective, the county council had no power
to include an appropriation for such an item in its budget.
He ruled that the procedure required by Burns 64-1331 must
be strictly followed.
Power of County Board of Adjustments and State Board
of Tax Commissioners. In 1941 and 1942 the Attorney Gen-
eral made rulings as to the power of the County Tax Adjust-
ment Board or Stats Board of Tax Commissioners to reduce
an appropriation below the amount contracted for between a
school board and a teacher. With reference to the contract
made by the board of school commissioners of Indianapolis,
the Attorney General pointed out 27 2 that the County Tax Ad-
justment Board and the State Board of Tax Commissioners
had no control over the salaries which are fixed by law and
that therefore these boards had no control over contracts
where the salary does not exceed the minimum salary as re-
quired by law. This lack of control also extended to contracts
renewed under Burns 28-4521 and also teacher tenure con-
tracts unless the salary was increased. Where the contracts
are made in excess of the minimum wage law or where re-
newals and tenure contracts are made with a salary increase
above that of the previous year, the Attorney General ruled
that since the school city of Indianapolis is operating under a
special law the county and state tax adjustment boards had
no control over the salaries of the teachers if the contract was
binding. In the second opinion the Attorney General pointed
out 273 that a contract by the township trustees to be valid must
be made on the basis of a prior appropriation. He pointed out,
however, that there was no similar provision affecting school
towns or school cities. He ruled that the appropriation by the
township advisory board is sufficient to meet the requirements
of a prior appropriation for a legal contract and if the con-
tract is executed after this appropriation but prior to the act
of the county or state board on the appropriation, the county
or state board can not make a reduction of these legal con-
tracts.
271. Ops. Ind. Atty. Gen. (1943) p. 497.
272. Ops. Ind. Atty. Gen. (1941) p. 379.
273. Ops. Ind. Atty. Gen. (1942) p. 131.
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The Attorney General ruled in 1943274 that ten or more
tax payers under Section 64-1331 (Burns 1943 Replacement)
did not have a right of appeal to the state tax board from the
action of the county council upon the budget of the County
Welfare Department. He pointed out that under Section 64-
316 (Burns 1943 Replacement) the budget of the County De-
partment of Public Welfare is expressly excluded from the
provisions of the tax limitation law and therefore there is no
right of appeal except as provided in the provisions of the
Public Welfare Act in Sections 52-1304 and 52-1308 (Burns
1943 Supplement). As a result of this ruling it was provided
in Ch. 5, Acts of 1945 that the County Tax Adjustment Board
had authority to review the budget of the County Welfare
Department and that the right of taxpayers to appeal the
budget and the tax rate of this department should be in the
same manner as provided for all other budgets and tax rates
of municipal corporations.
In this same opinion the Attorney General ruled that
Section 64-314 providing for an appeal to the State Tax Board
immediately following the action taken by the County Board
of Tax Adjustments had repealed and superceded Section 64-
1331 authorizing an appeal immediately upon completion of
the action of the County Council. Under this ruling ten or
more taxpayers may now appeal on or before the 15th day of
October to the State Tax Board rather than on or before the
1st Monday of September under Section 64-1331.
Conclusiveness of Determination by State Tax Board.
Section 64-1331 provides that the decision of the State Board
of Tax Commissioners upon additional appropriations over
and above the budget shall be "final and conclusive". In 1944
the question arose whether this provision meant that no ques-
tion could be raised concerning any irregularities or illegali-
ties in the proceedings of the local appropriation unit seeking
to make the additional appropriation. The Attorney General
ruled 27 5 that this determination of the state board was final
and conclusive only on two questions: (a) as to the existence
of the emergency for such additional appropriations and (b)
the amount of such appropriation. He therefore ruled that
the validity of the proceedings of the common council of a
274. Ops. Ind. Atty. Gen. (1943) p. 553; Ops. Ind. Atty. Gen. (1942) p.
233.
275. Ops. Ind. Atty. Gen. (1944) p. 191.
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city, or the advisory board of a township, or the board of
trustees of a town, or the county council authorized to make
additional appropriations could be challenged even: though the
State Board of Tax Commissioners had approved the addi-
tional appropriation.
COLLECTION AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE
PROPERTY TAX AND TAXPAYERS REMEDIES
Grouped in this section are the various statutory
provisions tending to coerce payment of the tax as well as
provisions giving the state a remedy in cases on non-payment.
The customary method of enforcing property taxes is the sale
of property for the delinquent taxes. The tax sale procedure
of Indiana was substantially amended in 1941 and is consider-
ed at length in the latter part of this section. Other methods
of securing payment are considered first.
Payment of Taxes Prerequisite to Obtaining Licenses.
Prior to 1941 it was a prerequisite to obtaining the various
licenses under Title 42 (Burns Ann. Stat.) that the applicant
submit evidence of payment of his poll tax if subject to such
taxation. An amendment in 1941 extended this requirement
to proof of payment of personal property taxes.27 6
Collection of Delinquent Taxes from Public Employees.
Ch. 170, The Acts of 1941, changed the provisions of the Tax
Act relating to tax delinquency of public employees.277 The
1941 Act provides that the city, town, school and township
officials shall furnish the County Treasurer a list of their
employees, and on receipt from the County Auditor of a list of
delinquent employees the disbursing officers of the employees
of these subdivisions are required to deduct a sum equal to
10% of the sums due from the delinquent employee but not
more than $15 a week until delinquent taxes are paid. The
previous act made no provision for a percentage deduction but
required withholding of all sums due the employee until the
entire tax was paid. A 1941 Act 27 8 also requires the County
Auditor to furnish state and state educational institution of-
276. Ind. Acts, 1941, Ch. 61, Ind. Acts, 1943, Ch. 124, Ind. Stat. Ann.
§42-102 et seq. (Burns 1943 Supp.).
277. Ind. Acts, 1941, Ch. 170, Ind. Stat. Ann. §§64-1505, 64-1506 (Burns
1943 Replacement).
278. Ind. Acts, 1941, Ch. 8, Ind. Stat. Ann. §§64-1505a, 64-1056a, (Burns
1943 Replacement).
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ficials a list of all persons who are delinquent in taxes and
who are believed to have money due from the state or the
state educational institutions. This Act requires that the state
or university officials are required to withhold from a person
who is named on the delinquent tax list a sum equal to the
amount of the tax and to pay this amount to the County
Treasurer.
Personal Action to Recover Delinquent Taxes. In 1944
the Attorney General made an important ruling as to collect-
ion of delinquent taxes by a personal action .2 7 The facts put
to the Attorney General were as follows:
On November 19, 1941 X corporation transferred the real estate and
the personal property of one of its factory sites located in Indiana to
Y Company, a firm of junk dealers residing in Pennsylvania. In the
deed of conveyance Y corporation assumed and agreed to pay all taxes
that were a lien on the property purchased. Taxes for the year 1941,
payable in 1942, in the amount of $15,871.42 are delinquent and unpaid.
Y corporation has refused or failed to pay these taxes and has removed
the equipment, machinery, and buildings from the discontinued factory
leaving only the real estate of approximately $4,000.00 or $5,000.00 value
in the state. It was doubtful whether the state could collect the taxes
from Y corporation since it was a non-resident. On these facts the State
Board of Tax Commissioners requested a ruling whether a personal
action would lie against X corporation for the collection of the 1941
taxes.
The Attorney General ruled that Prudential Casualty
Company v. State of Indiana28 controlled the question and
that under that ruling the state could bring a personal action
to recover delinquent taxes. The Attorney General continued
that the action should be brought by the State of Indiana as
plaintiff and that it was not necessary that the State Board
of Tax Commissioners be a relator nor should it be a plaintiff.
The Attorney General continued that in the action, taxes due
the state and its sub-divisions may be recovered. The Attorney
General quoted from the opinion in the Prudential case to the
effect that certain sections of Burns 1914 Revised Statutes
indicated that personal liability for taxes was in order.
Since the decision of the Prudential case on which the
Attorney General relied there have been substantial changes
in the provisions of the law relating to the collection of de-
linquent taxes. In the Prudential case the court relied on See-
279. Ops. Ind. Atty. Gen. (1944) p. 313.
280. 194 Ind. 542, 143 N.E. 631 (1924).
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tions 10-157 and 10-158 (Burns 1914), for its conclusion that
the person was liable for the taxes assessed. These provisions,
still in the tax act281 in substantially the same form, provide
that personal property shall be listed for taxation with refer-
ence to the quantity held or owned on the first day of March
of the assessment year and that persons purchasing or ac-
quiring property either real or personal on the first day of
March shall be considered as the owner on that day and be
"assessed and liable" for the taxes of that year. The court
also relied on Section 10-162 (Burns 1914), still in the tax
act,282 providing that "each partner shall be liable for the
whole tax". It also relied on Sections 10-343 and 10-344283
(Burns 1914) to the effect that the state shall have a lien for
all its taxes on all the property of the person in the state.
In addition to the provisions relied on by the court cer-
tain other sections of the tax act of 1914 might have indicated
the existence of personal liability. Section 10-32428,4 (Burns
1914) provided that if the county treasurer believed that the
delinquent tax payer has money or property in his possession
or on deposit that "can be reached by any remedy known to
law" he shall inform the prosecuting attorney who shall cause
"such proceedings to be brought as will secure the payment
of such delinquency." Section 10-361 (Burns 1914)285 pro-
vided that any tract or part of the tract shall be offered for
the whole sum due from such owner. Section 10-354 (Burns
1914)286 provides that the auditor shall list for purposes of
tax sale real property remaining delinquent for taxes includ-
ing the real property of those persons whose personalty as
assessed on the tax duplicate is less in value than the taxes
charged against the lands or lots.
At the time the Prudential case was decided, therefore, a
delinquent taxpayer even if the state did not proceed to get a
personal judgment was subject to having all his property,
real and personal, sold for all of his delinquent taxes. If the
state obtained a personal judgment the taxpayer was faced, in
effect with the same situation-that all his property might be
281. Now §§64-401, 64-402 (Burns 1943 Replacement).
282. Now §64-406 (Burns 1943 Replacement).
283. Now §§64-2825 and 64-2001 (Bums 1943 Replacement).
284. Compare § 64-1511 (Burns 1943 Replacement).
285. See §64-2207 (Burns 1943 Replacement).
286. See § 64-2201 (Burns 1943 Replacement).
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sold to satisfy the judgment. So it was not difficult to argue
at that time that subjecting a delinquent taxpayer to a per-
sonal action did not substantially increase his liabilities to the
State.
Since 1935, however, the Assembly has reversed the
policy as to subjecting all the property of a taxpayer for the
claims arising from all his delinquent taxes. While most of
the provisions referred to above existing in 1914 are still in
Burns Annotated Statutes, the Assembly has enacted two new
provisions which substantially change the law. The first of
these enacted in 1935, is a proviso to Section 64-2207 (Burns
1943 Replacement), which provides that in no event shall any
liability for delinquent taxes on any tract or lot be chargeable
to or be a lien against any other tract or lot belonging to the
same owner. In 1941 in Section 64-2203 (Burns 1943 Re-
placement) the Assembly provided that in order to sell real
estate for delinquent taxes it should not be necessary to first
levy upon the personal property or to collect such delinquent
taxes out of the personal property and it further provided that
in the sale of real estate for delinquent taxes no personal
property tax delinquency should be included in the sale. These
two provisions appear to establish the policy that taxes are
levied on the property and not on the individual and that the
state must look to the particular property on which it has
levied the tax in order to secure its payment. The alternative
facing a taxpayer now is not the same as that in 1914. If he
is delinquent in taxes on one piece of property only that
property can be sold for taxes.
If, therefore, the state may now bring a personal action
and obtain a judgment against the delinquent taxpayer and
then levy execution on the judgment as on any other judg-
ment, the state may still subject all the property of the de-
linquent taxpayer to payment of all the taxes. Furthermore,
if the provisions establishing priority for a tax lien were to
be construed to carry the priority into the judgment8 7 the
state would be in substantially the same position as it was
prior to the 1935 and 1941 amendments. The Attorney Gen-
eral's opinions relied on the Prudential case and did not con-
sider the implications of the 1935 and 1941 amendments on
that decision.2 88
287. Cf. § 64-1518 (Burns 1943 Replacement).
288. The fact situation put to the Attorney General is a persuasive
situation for imposing personal liability. See note 199 supra for
other possible uses.
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SALE OF REAL PROPERTY FOR UNPAID TAXES
The most significant development in tax collection pro-
cedure is the 1941 Tax Sale Act,289 and the 1943 and 1945
amendments, which considerably changes the tax sale pro-
cedure for the state. The act raises many new problems most
of which have not yet been considered either by judicial de-
cision or by attorney general opinions.
Sec. 5 of the Act 290 sets forth its purpose and a declara-
tion of legislative policy. The section points out that there
are many thousands of parcels of real estate upon which taxes
are delinquent and upon which no taxes are now being paid;
that many of these parcels are greatly needed to meet a hous-
ing shortage existing in the state. It provides therefore that
the act shall be given a liberal interpretation and application
in order that good titles to these parcels of real estate may be
speedily acquired and that the real estate may be brought into
useful ownership and bear the just share of the tax burden.
Taxes for Which Land May be Sold. Previous to the 1941
act delinquent personal property taxes were to be included in
the sale of real estate and before real estate could be sold it
was necessary to levy upon the personal property of the tax-
payer or to show that he had an insufficient amount. The
1941 act provides that the personal property tax that is de-
linquent shall not be included in the sale of real estate for
delinquent taxes and that it is not necessary for the purposes
of the sale to levy upon the personal property or to attempt
to collect the real estate taxes out of personal property. The
act provides that sale shall be for the purpose of collecting all
taxes then a lien against such real estate. Two questions have
arisen under this change. The first one pointed out by the
attorney general, that in computing the amount of the de-
linquent tax the computation should not include taxes on
which the lien has been lost under Sec. 64-2825 (Burns 1943
Replacement) which provides that the lien is extinguished for
taxes which have been due for more than ten years.
A second question arose as to whether the requirement
that the sale shall be for taxes then a lien against the real
289. Ind. Acts, 1941, Ch. 224 §2 p. 714. Ind. Stat. AWn. §64-2203 (Burns
1943 Replacement).
290. Ind. Stat. Ann. §64-2213 (Burns 1943 Replacement).
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estate, included personal property taxes which under Sec. 64-
2001 (Burns 1943 Replacement) were a lien on all property
of the taxpayer at the time of the passage of the act. In
Heekin Can Co. v. Porter (1943)291 the Supreme Court held
that Ch. 224 of the Acts of 1941 withdrew the right to sell
real estate to pay delinquent personal property taxes and that
its effect therefore in taking away the only statutory way of
enforcing the lien was to remove the lien from the real estate.
The court held that the intent of the section was to remove
the lien from the real estate in all cases in which the sale had
not been made.
A further question as to what taxes for which the land
may be sold arises as to whether Barrett law assessments and
special assessments shall be included when the land is first
offered for sale. The act is not clear on this point. In sub-
sequent provisions referring to purchase by the county when
no person has bid a sum equal to the delinquent taxes, the act
provides that the county shall bid in the land for a sum equal
to the amount of the delinquent taxes and cost thereon "but
not to include liens for any improvements assessment against
such real estate". It could be argued from this express reser-
vation of the improvement assessments in the situation where
the county bids in the land, that in offering the land to private
purchasers in the first tax sale, the improvement assessment
should be included. On the other hand Sec. 6 of the 1941
Act 292 repeals so much of See. 2 of Ch. 317 of the Acts of 1935
which requires a tax sale to be not only for the delinquent
taxes but also for delinquent municipal assessments.
2 3 It
would seem therefore that even on the first offering for sale
291. 221 Ind. 69, 46 N.E. (2d) 486 (1943).
292. Ind. Stat. Ann. §64-2214 (Burns 1943 Replacement).
293. Formerly § 48-4406 (Burns). §2, Chapter 317 of the Acts of
1935 was part of an act specifically applicable to Barrett Law
Assessments. Section 2 which required the inclusion of delin-
quent Barrett Law Assessments in a tax sale for delinquent
taxes was not specifically applicable only to Barrett Law assess-
ments. In 1940 the Attorney General ruled that §2 of Chap-
ter 317, Acts of 1935, was applicable to drainage law assess-
ments as well as Barrett Law assessments. See Ops. Atty. Gen.(1940) p. 40. Section 6 of Chapter 224, the Acts of 1941, repeals
so much of §2 of Chapter 317, Acts of 1935, as requires a
tax sale to be not only for delinquent taxes but also for delin-
quent "municipal assessments" of a city or town. Query: Does
this limited repeal leave effective the requirement under the
ruling of the Attorney General that sales for delinquent taxes
should include delinquent drainage law assessments?
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the offer need be only for the delinquent taxes and penalties
excluding Barrett law assessments.
Conditions Precedent to Sale. Sec. 2 of the 1941 Act pro-
vides that no real estate shall be sold for the purpose of col-
lecting delinquent taxes until fifteen months shall have elapsed
after any such installment shall have become delinquent.
Rules Governing the Sale. Sec. 2 of the Act provides for
three types of sale. Where the real estate is offered for the
first time the Act provides that it shall be sold by the County
Treasurer at public sale as now provided by law The act re-
peals the provisions in the old act that the smallest part of
the tract which would bring the entire amount of delinquent
taxes should be offered for sale and now provides that the
sale shall be for the entire description advertised.
The attorney general has interpreted the provision "as
now provided by law" to refer to the time of sale and the
general type of notice set forth in Sec. 64-2202 (Burns 1943),
and other applicable sections. Some question has arisen on
the manner of sale as the 1941 Act purports to amend a
section dealing with time and manner of sale but in effect
completely repeals these provisions as the 1941 Act makes no
mention at all of the manner of the sale.
A second class of sale is where the real estate has been
offered for sale for two years or more. Here the same pro-
cedure is followed as in the situation where it is offered for
the first time except that if neither in the first sale nor in the
second sale a bid is received equal to the delinquent taxes
thereon, then on the first Monday of December of the year of
the second sale the county auditor must bid the property in
for the county for a sum equal to all delinquent taxes and
costs, delinquent taxes and penalties accruing since first of-
fered for sale, but not including any improvement assess-
ments. Here again the Act makes no provision for type of
notice nor. for any designation in the notice of sale to inform
the taxpayer that this is the second sale and if it is not pur-
chased the county will bid it in. The attorney general has
ruled294 that while the law does not require a separate pub-
lication of notice of each class of sale the notice should be
drawn so as to identify property as being offered for sale for
the first time or the second time or whether it is of the third
294. Ops. Ind. Atty. Gen. (1941) p. 310.
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class. It is likewise not clear whether this reference to the
"second sale" is to the second "consecutive" sale of land or to
the second time land is sold for delinquent taxes irrespective
of whether the taxes had been paid in full for several years
after the first delinquency.
The third class of sale provided for in the act is that of
real estate which "at the time of the passage of this act" has
on it unpaid and delinquent taxes for five or more years. In
this class of sale the act provides that the property may be
offered immediately, after passage of the act, to the highest
bidder but for a sum not less than all taxes, penalities and
charges including the current taxes due in the year in which
the sale is held. The act provides that the sale is to be con-
tinued from day to day until the first Monday of December
when the county auditor must bid in the property. 'Unlike the
preceeding types of sale there is no second offer. The major
difference however in the class of sales is in the redemption
features.
The attorney general has ruled that there are certain
general rules governing the sale which are applicable to all
three types. Except where in conflict with the act the pro-
visions as to notice of sale, execution and delivery of certifi-
cates of sale and the deeds are applicable.
The act provides, and the attorney general has ruled,295
that this covers the third class of sale; that the notice shall be
sufficient if it contains the name of the fee simple owner or
the person shown on the tax duplicate as owner and if it con-
tains a description of the real estate from which the land may
be identified. The attorney general has ruled2 98 that this re-
quires that the description of the real estate sold in the tax
sale as shown in the notice of sale must be the same in the
certificate of sale and in the tax deed as on the tax duplicate
and that if the description of the land as now carried on the
tax duplicate is incorrect, correction should be made pursu-
ant to See. 1 of Ch. 224, prior to notice of sale. The attorney
general has ruled297 that this correction should be done pre-
ferably before the last tax-paying period preceding the sale.
Under Sec. 1 of Ch. 224, Acts of 1941, the auditor is author-
295. Ibid.
296. Ibid.
297. Ibid.
[Vol. 21
TAXATION
ized to correct the description of the real estate as it appears
on the tax duplicate at any time prior to notice of sale.298
Who May Purchase. The only provisions in the 1941 Act
as to who may purchase are those relating to purchase by the
county. As stated above the county must bid in the property
after it has been offered for sale twice. The act further pro-
vides that any county which has a tax lien or any other rights,
interest or ownership in any lot or land may purchase the
same at the sale and that it is not necessary in such a case
for the county to pay cash but only upon resale by the county
shall it pay the County Treasurer who shall distribute the
money received among the several subdivisions of the govern-
ment who have uncollected taxes on the tax duplicate.299
This provision authorizing the county to purchase at the pub-
lic sale is un-clear in that it does not set forth who may pur-
chase for the county. The attorney general has declared that
while it is not clear as to what officer may purchase the real
estate for the county if it is purchased prior to the first Mon-
day in December it would appear that the county auditor
should purchase the property but only on the authority of the
Board of Commissioners.- °° The act makes no provision as to
other purchasers. Presumably persons previously legally
bound to pay taxes cannot so purchase at the tax sale as to
acquire a clear title thereto.
An interesting case under the old act but probably applic-
able to the new act is Kelly, Glover and Vale Realty Co. v.
Bruck,3°1 decided by the Appellate Court in 1941, in which it
applied the principle that one who occupies a position of trust
and confidence with another person cannot acquire title to
the property of such other person which is the matter of re-
lationship.
Rules Governing Redemption. While the act does not
purport to amend Sec. 64-2301 (Burns 1943 Replacement)
setting forth the manner of redemption in tax sales, the 1941
Act does contain provisions as to redemption when the land is
bid in by the county and a proviso clause providing for a six
months' redemption. The proviso clause immediately follows
298. Ind. Stat. Ann. §64-1407 (Burns 1943 Replacement).
299. Ind. Acts, 1941, Ch. 224, Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns 1943 Replacement),§64-2203.
300. Ops. Ind. Atty. Gen. (1941) p. 310.
301. 109 Ind. App. 440, 33 N.E. (2d) 777 35 N.E. (2d) 120 (1941).
19461
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
the class of sales where taxes have been delinquent for five or
more years and presumably the redemption proviso is applic-
able only to that type of sale. The attorney general ruled
that the proviso in Sec. 2 applies only to the situation where
the purchaser under this act is anyone other than the county,
of land on which at the time of the passage of the act taxes
have been delinquent for five years or more.3 0 2 This proviso
authorizes redemption in this class of sales within six months
from the time of the sale by paying the treasurer for any pur-
chaser the full sum of the price named in the certificate plus
10% plus any tax which the purchaser may have paid since
the sale with interest at the rate of 6%. If there is no re-
demption within this six months period the act provides that
the purchaser is entitled to a deed.
The attorney general has ruled that when the purchaser
is anyone other than the county in a tax sale where the land
is offered for the first or second time, the provisions in Sec.
64-2301 are applicable. 3"
Sec. 3 of the 1941 Act 3 4 set forth the method of redemp-
tion where the purchaser is the county. It provides that the
original owner or occupant or any other person or persons
having an interest therein may after the county has acquired
title redeem the land in the following manner: (a) If re-
deemed within six months from the Monday on which the
county bought it the "owner or redemptioner" shall pay the
sum for which the land was bid in plus costs and 5%; (b) if
redeemed after six months and within one year the "owner or
redemptioner" shall pay the sum at which it was bid, together
with costs and 7% of the sum in addition, together with all
taxes subsequently accruing. The 1943 Assembly added to the
term "owner and redemptioner" who could redeem the land
within one year but not to those who could redeem in 6 months,
the term "or any lien-holder".305 A 1943 amendment also
added a proviso that owners or "any other person having an
interest in" the real estate bid in for the county on the first
Monday of December 1942 could redeem the land until April
15, 1945 by paying the full amount of the sum for which the
land was bid in together with costs and 10% of such sum in
302. Ops. Ind. Atty. Gem (1941) p. 310.
303. Ibid.
304. Ind. Stat. Ann. §64-2205 (Burns 1943 Replacement).
305. Ind. Acts, 1943, Ch. 137, Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns 1943 Replacement).
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addition.306 The 1941 act with its 1943 amendment raises
several questions. The act originally provided that the owner
or occupant or any other person or persons having an interest
in the land could redeem the land under certain terms if done
within six months and under certain other terms if done with-
in one year. The 1943 act purported to add "lien-holders" to
the persons who may redeem after six months. This would
seem to imply that lien-holders are not within the term "per-
sons having an interest therein" in the original act and it
therefore creates an anomalous situation that any person
having an interest in the land except a lien-holder may re-
deem it within six months but that a lien-holder can redeem
the land only after six months but within one year.
An emergency act of 1945, Ch. 222, effective March 8,
1945, further confuses the redemption picture. The 1945 act
does not purport to amend the 1941 or 1943 acts but provides
a procedure which in effect substantially amends the above
methods. It provides that where the county has bid in the
land and where the county has not subsequently disposed of
it the "original owner or occupant" or "any other person or
persons having an interest therein" may redeem from the
sale to the county "at any time during the next two years
ensuing, or April 15, 1946, whichever date is the later". The
redemption under this act is in the following manner: (a) If
within six months after the auditor has bid in the land by pay-
ment of the sum for which the land was bid in together with
costs plus 5% in addition; (b) If after the expiration of six
months then the redemptioner shall pay in addition to what he
must pay in the first six months after such bidding in, 1%
on the amount for which it was bid in for each sixty days or
fractional part thereof after the first six months. It further
provides that the redemptioner must also pay all taxes which
have accrued and become payable after the auditor's bid on
behalf of the county.
On first reading, it would appear that the intent of the
legislature was to allow owners to redeem, during the two
years following the passage of the act, land which the county
had previously bid in but not yet sold. The attorney general in
an opinion on July 23, 1945307 interpreted the term "next two
306. Ibid. This provision is not applicable to property bid in by the
county in December 1941. Ops. Atty. Gen. (1944) p. 38.
307. Ops. Ind. Atty. Gen. (1945) p - (No. 70, July 23, 1945).
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years ensuing" to refer back to the words at the beginning of
the section, that is the time at which the county bids in the
property and that therefore the owner under this act has two
years after the bid by the county auditor provided the county
has not otherwise disposed of the property, in which to re-
deem. This interpretation constitutes an amendment of the
1941 act in giving a redemption after the one year provided in
the original act and in effect restores the original two year
redemption period in 64-2301 to cases where the county bids
the land in. Since after the tax deed is taken by the county
the lands are exempt from taxation as county-owned land the
question arises as to how the redemptioner can pay and dis-
charge all taxes which have accrued since the auditor's bid as
presumably no taxes have accrued. The attorney general
ruled80 8 that construing the provisions of the 1941 act and the
1945 act together it is contemplated that the property shall
remain upon the tax duplicate even after it has been bid in
by the county and shall continue to be charged with taxes each
year. The attorney general ruled that if this has not been
done the property should be restored to the duplicate and the
taxes charged as omitted property.
If the county must now carry the property on the tax
duplicate even though the title is in the county the question
arises whether if there is no redemption and the county pro-
poses to sell the property the purchaser must pay not only the
price at which he offers to buy it at a sale conducted by the
county but also taxes put on the tax duplicate since the county
acquired the title. If so, it would seem that the legislature
has accomplished nothing in its purpose in getting property
off the delinquent list and back into productive use.
A further question arises as to how, after the county has
taken a tax deed, the county's deed can be eliminated from the
record. The attorney general's opinion states that the audi-
tor's memorandum of redemption under Section 64-2313
(Burns 1943) would sufficiently eliminate from the record the
transfer of title to the county. From the standpoint of con-
veying a good title this method of eliminating the county's
title is not so clear. The statutes contain specific provisions
as to the method of disposition of real estate owned by the
county30 9 and the elimination of the county's deed by merely
308. Ibid.
309. See §§ 26-2008, 26-534, 28-254, 28-256 (Burns 1943 Supp.).
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crossing it off the books would not seem to comply with the
requirements as to disposal of property by the county. In
situations where the county has bid in the property but not
taken a tax deed this difficulty might be avoided by the county
not taking its deed until after the two years in which the re-
demptioner is given the right to redeem has expired. On the
other hand the attorney general has ruled that the term "two
years next ensuing" relates back to the term where the lands
have been "bid in or title acquired and not disposed of" so
that presumably another two years redemption period would
begin after the county has acquired title. Only in the situation
where the county acquires title and immediately disposes of
that property in a manner provided by law can it be said that
the redemptioner does not have another two years in which
to redeem the property.
An opinion of the attorney general in 1941 under the old
act would seem to be still applicable. In this opinion the at-
torney general ruled that the redemptioner has the right to
redeem until the purchaser has requested the issuance of the
deed even though the two year period in Sec. 64-2301 has ex-
pired.310
Since the 1945 act does not purport to amend the 1941
act a further question arises as to the amount which the re-
demptioner must pay to redeem his land. If the redemption
is within six months, the amount in the two acts is the same.
However the 1941 act provides that if the redemption is made
after six months the redemptioner shall pay in addition to
the amount for which the land was bid in, 7% The 1945 act
provides that after six months the redemptioner shall pay in
addition to the 5% in the first six months a sum representing
1% of the amount for each 60 days or fractional part of any
sixty day period. Under the 1945 act if the redemptioner re-
deems in the seventh or eighth month he would only have to
pay 6% as compared with 7% under the 1941 act, whereas if
he redeems in the 11th or 12th month he would pay only 7%
under the 1941 act but 8% under the 1945 act. There is
nothing in the two acts to indicate whether the redemptioner
has a right of election during the first year after bidding by
the county. Presumably the 1945 act is controlling, at least as
to that part of the redemption period that occurs after the
passage of the Act.
310. Ops. Ind. Atty. Gem (1941) p. 345.
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Title Conveyed by the Tax Deed. Section 2 of the 1941
Act provides that the deed and conveyance of the land sold
shall be conclusive evidence that the sale was regular and
according to requirements of law. It further provides that the
deed shall convey to the purchaser a clear and indefeasible
title free and clear of all tax or other encumbrances. Several
questions will arise under this section. Section 64-2401 (Burns
1943), the old law as to the tax deed, says that a tax deed
vests " an absolute estate in fee simple". Does the 1941 Act
providing that the deed conveys "a clear and indefeasible
title" convey more than §64-2401? If it does then it would
appear that §64-2401 has been amended, although not specific-
ally amended by the 1941 Act. A further question arises as to
whether the conveyance shall be "conclusive evidence" that the
sale was regular. Does this clause repeal §64-2411
(Burns 1943) defining when the sale shall be valid and §64-
2416 defining proof that is required to defeat the title of a
tax deed? Considering the legislative declaration of purpose
in §5 and the requirement that the Act shall be given a
liberal interpretation, it would appear that one of the pur-
poses of the 1941 Act was to over-rule the judicial interpreta-
tions under §64-2416 and §64-2411 and limit, if not eliminate
attacks upon the validity of a tax title. However, §4311
of the 1941 Act provides that no action to contest the validity
of any title acquired under the act shall be brought after the
expiration of one year from the date of the execution of the
deed. It would appear, therefore, that the provision that the
deed is "conclusive evidence" does not mean that it cannot be
attacked as §4 implies that at least during one year
after the execution of the deed the validity of the title may be
attacked. The Attorney General in his brief in First Bank
& Trust Company of South Bend v. Ralston, conceded that
the provision that the deed was conclusive evidence might be
unconstitutional, but pointed out that §4 of the act
permitting an action to contest the validity of title within one
year clearly implied that the deed was not conclusive and at
most was only prima facie evidence of the regularity of the
proceeding.
Two decisions under the former act may still be applic-
311. Ind. Stat. Ann. §64-2212 (Burns 1943 Replacement).
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able to the 1941 Act. Schofield v. Green12 decided by the
Appellate Court in 1944 held that where the life tenant failed
to pay taxes a tax deed conveyed not only the interests of the
life tenant but also the fee. In 1942 in Fowler v. Burmaster3 13
the Appellate Court held that where the auditor failed to
comply with §§64-2201 and 64-2202 and failed to show
on the record the manner in which the notice was posted, the
place where it was posted, and the length of time the tax deed
was ineffective to convey title. The person holding title un-
der the tax deed contended that the, taxpayer had to show one
of the grounds set forth in §64-2416. The Appellate Court
pointed out that the Supreme Court had held to the contrary
in Skelton v. Sharp.314  While the Schofield case is un-
doubtedly still applicable to the present law as to the title
conveyed, the Fovler case brings the question previously dis-
cussed as to the effect of the provision that the title shall be
conclusive evidence that the sale was regular. An interpreta-
tion of the Act in light of the legislative purpose explained in
§5 would seem to require a review of the prior hold-
ings of the Supreme Court permitting attacks upon tax titles.
On the other hand the Assembly in 1943 seemed to have
had doubts as to, what effect the 1941 Act really had on con-
veying a valid tax title. In chapter 251 of the Acts of 1943
concerning the loan of the common school fund, the congres-
sional township school fund, and the permanent endowment
fund of Indiana University, the General Assembly provided
that persons applying for a loan must show a good and suffici-
ent title in fee simple "not derived solely from sale for taxes".
Thus while the 1941 General Assembly stated that their pur-
pose was to provide for good titles to real estate on which
taxes were delinquent, the 1943 General Assembly was of the
opinion that the 1941 Act did not convey a sufficiently good
title to warrant the loan of school funds on land acquired by
tax titles. It is difficult to see how the General Assembly can
hope to have private individuals recognize the validity of a
tax title when they themselves refuse to permit government
officials to recognize the validity of such title.
312. - Ind. App. -, 56 N.E. (2d) 506 (1944), 20 Ind. L. J. 194
(1945).
313. 112 Ind. App. 43, 41 N.E. (2d) 629 (1942). See also Smith v.
Fisher, 109 Ind. 654, 36 N.E. (2d) 945 (1941).
314. 161 Ind. 383, 67 N.E. 535 (1903).
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Disposition by the County. The 1941 Act provides in§3316 that whenever the county acquires title to any real
estate under this Act, the County shall sell the real estate
"without unnecessary delay" and that the sales shall be "in
the same manner now provided by law" for sales of land
owned by counties.316 When the county makes a sale, the Act
provides that the money received after payment of costs shall
be apportioned to the tax levying and tax certifying bodies in
proportion to their interests in the taxes for which the real
estate was sold based upon the several levies established by
them for the year last preceding the sale. Any surplus is to
go to the General fund of the county.
Difficult questions may be presented by county owner-
ship of numerous parcels of land acquired in this manner.
The effect of the 1941 Act requiring compulsory purchase by
the county if there is no private purchaser is to put the county
in the real estate business and probably with the most un-
desirable property in the county. If the county rents the
property are the proceeds subject to the gross income tax on
the grounds that it is engaged in a proprietary activity even
though the land was acquired in lieu of taxes? 31 7 A further
question arises as to the dutie of the county as a land owner
toward its tenants and the public at large as far as tort
liability is concerned.3 18 Since under the interpretation of the
Attorney General, the original owner has the right to redeem
for two years after aquisition by the county, a question arises
as to the duties of the county toward the prospective redemp-
tioner. A further question arises as to whether the county
can sell the land to the original owner or a person having an
interest therein who could have redeemed, and thereby defeat
all liens and Barrett Law Assessments. If the original owner
can purchase the land from the county at a public sale for
amounts less than the delinquent taxes, an effective device is
created for delinquent taxpayers to relieve themselves of the
burden of delinquent taxes and other encumbrances for a sum
less than the amount due. A constitutional question might
315. Ind. Stat. Ann. §64-2205 (Burns 1943 Replacement).
316. See note 309 Supra.
317. See discussions of this question on page 169 supra.
318. The Attorney General ruled in 1944 that county funds could notbe expended to make needed repairs on buildings on property bidin pursuant to the Tax Sale Act. See Ops. Atty. Gen. (1944)
p. 208.
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thereby be raised. To permit the original owner to re-acquire
the land by a payment less than the amount due permits
some taxpayers to escape part of their tax liability. This
might therefore violate the requirement that taxes shall be
uniform and equal.3 19 If such a result is permitted, property
owners who promptly pay their tax will pay more taxes than
those who default and re-purchase their property from the
County.
Statutes of Limitations. Section 4 of the Act as indicated
above limits actions tq contest the validity of the tax sale un-
der the Act to one, year from the date of the deed.
Section 6 of the 1941 Act specifically repeals §222
and §261 of the Act of 1919, §2, Ch. 65 of the Acts of 1932
and so much of §2 of Ch. 317 of the Acts of 1935 as requires
a tax sale to be not only for the delinquent taxes but also for
the delinquent municipal assessments of a city or town. It
also provides that all laws or parts of laws in conflict with
the Act are repealed.
Constitutionality Upheld. In 1944 the Supreme Court in
First Bank and Trust Co. of South Bend. v. Ralston,3 20 held
constitutional the provision of the 1941 Act requiring the
county to bid in the unsold land for a sum not including the
amount of the Barrett Law Assessments.
The bank brought suit for itself and on behalf of all
others similarly situated and owning and having an interest
in Barrett Law Bonds issued by the City of Indianapolis prior
to June 30, 1931 for a declaration of rights and an injunction,
under the Declartory Judgment Act, seeking to enjoin the
defendant county officials from making certain sales of real
estate.
The controversy was as follows:
The Bank alleged in its complaint, inter alia, that there were de-
linquencies in taxes and delinquencies in installments of Barrett Law
Assessments on property upon which the plaintiff's bonds were a lien;
that at various times these properties have been offered for sale includ-
ing the tax sale in April 1941 on account of the delinquencies but that
on no occasion was a bid received sufficient to pay the taxes and the
Barrett Law Assessments and that consequently no sale was made; that
the county officials are threatening to make sales pursuant to the 1941
Act. A temporary restraining order was issued and continued in force
until hearing. After hearing there was judgment dissolving the restrain-
ing order and for the defendants.
319. Ind. Const. Art. 10, 1.
320. 222 Ind. 584, 55 N.E. (2d) 115' (1944).
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In order to present the case for a construction of the statute, there
was a stipulation that Lot X in Indianapolis was liable for a Barrett
Law Bond owned by the Bank and that at time of effective date of the
Act taxes had been delinquent for a period of more than 5 years and that
none had been paid since 1930; that P owned a parcel of land, ac-
quired by tax title on which the taxes were delinquent for a period of 5
years or more prior to Jan. 1, 1941. It was further stipulated that the
property in question had been advertised for sale two or more times
prior to Jan. 1, 1941 and that the defendants were threatening to take
title of the property in question for the county pursuant to the Tax
Sale Act of 1941.
On appeal the bank's main contention centered on the
Barrett Law lien rather than on the property which it owned.
It contended that the Act would deprive it of its contractual
rights under the bonds.
The Court (Fansler, J.) held that the 1941 Act did not
deprive the bank of any substantive rights under its bond
contract. It found that the bank still had its remedy by sale
by the treasurer, if a purchaser could be found who would pay
the full amount of all liens and that the bank had its remedy
by foreclosure and sale subject to the tax lien. It held that
the provision by which the property could be sold for taxes
alone in event that it could not be sold for enough to satisfy
the taxes and Barrett Law lien merely constituted the grant-
ing of an additional remedy to the governmental unit whose
lien for taxes was a prior lien in any event.
As to the liens held by the bank as a purchaser at a tax
sale the court pointed out that such liens were always junior
to liens of subsequent taxes and liens of purchasers at sub-
sequent tax sales. The court also held that the statute was
applicable to cases in which the property has been advertised
for sale prior to its passage. The court did not pass on the
character of the title which the county will have when
it bids in the property upon a tax sale.
Since the property in question had already been adver-
tised for sale in 1941 when this action was brought, and the
1941. Act passed, for a sum equal to taxes, penalties, interest
and Barrett Law assessments, Judge Fansler is correct that
for the sale in question the bank had, until the first Monday in
December, the remedy of a tax sale to a purchaser who would
pay this total amount. However we have seen above that it
is no longer necessary to offer the property for sale for a
sum including the Barrett Law Assessments so that as to
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property advertised for sale after 1941 the only remedy of
the Barrett Law bondholder is that by foreclosure and sale
subject to the tax lien. He no longer has the remedy of a sale
to a purchaser who will pay the delinquent taxes and delin-
quent assessments.
Another point strongly pressed in the briefs was that the
sale under the 1941 Act extinguished the Barrett Law lien,
under the provision of, the Act that the sale shall be free and
clear of the tax and other encumbrances. Judge Fansler stated
that granting power to the governmental unit to sell for a sum
not including the Barrett Law Assessment did not deprive the
plaintiff of any right. "The lien on the property, or the
amount due thereunder, is not altered or modified in any
respect." If this statement refers to the situation prior to
sale, it is of course correct, but if it means that the county or
a purchaser at the tax sale takes subject to the lien, then the
statutory provision that the sale shall be free of encumbrances
has little meaning left.812
Taxpayers' Remedies, Injunctive Relief. In recent years
the Supreme Court has restricted the availability of the tax
refund provisions of §64-2819 for recovery of wrong-
fully assessed taxes so that it is practically non-available to
taxpayers as a means of asserting their rights to a correct
assessment of their property.2 2 The clause which restricts
the availability of the refund provisions is that which pro-
vides that no taxes shall be considered as having been wrong-
fully paid or as having been wrongfully assessed when the
taxes were extended or assessment made as the judgment of
taxing officer's authorized to make the assessment and con-
cerning which no complaints were registered at the time the
assessment was made. This provision prevents suits for re-
funds where the contention is overvaluation of the taxpayer's
321. Compare Ops. Ind. Atty. Gen. (1940) p. 40 ruling that in a sale
under § 222 Ch. 59 Acts of 1919 (repealed by Tax Sale Act
of 1941) to the highest bidder, the Barrett law lien was not ex-
tinguished. Section 222 provided the title to purchaser should be
"free and clear of tax encumbrances" and see Ops. Atty. Gen.(1943) p. 28 ruling that if real estate has been sold at a tax sale
and not sold for a sum sufficient to enforce payment of delinquent
ditch assessments, the bondholder has a right to foreclose the lien
held by virtue of his bond regardless of the tax sale. No mention
was made of the 1941 Tax Sale Act.
322. See Board of Com'rs of Marion County v. Millikan, 207 Ind. 142,
190 N.E. 185 (1934); Culbertson v. Board of Commissioners of
Fayette County, 208 Ind. 22, 194 N.E. 638 (1935).
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property and apparently prevents it in all other situations
where the taxpayer has not registered a complaint by apply-
ing for a rehearing or by appealing.32 . If a taxpayer complies
with the provisions requiring the filing of an application for
a rehearing or an appeal and thereby uses his administrative
remedies and hQ loses his contention either before the admin-
istrative board or an appeal to the court and he thereupon
pays the tax he would presumably be met with the plea of
res-judicata if he applied for a refund. Consequently tax-
payers are compelled if they desire to attack a property assess-
ment to resort to "preventive relief", that is, to seek an ad-
judication of their rights before any payment is made. Here
they may be met with the contention that the error is only
informal or an irregularity and therefore not subject to in-
junctive relief.
The Indiana courts however apparently are not; too strict
in requiring a traditional basis for equity jurisdiction in per-
mitting injunction suits to lie. In MoCreery v. Ijams,824 there
is no new development as to the use of the injunction but it
does restate the rule as to its use. The court said that while
the injunction may not be used against the collection of taxes
resulting from an assessment informal or irregular only, with-
out further showing the assessment was larger than it should
have been, assessments may be enjoined when made by a
board legally powerless to act. In that case the State Board
of Tax Commissioners has ordered a reassessment of certain
mineral properties in Sullivan county and then ordered the
County Board of Review which had convened pursuant to
§64-1201 on the first Monday of June to recess on July
5, 1939 and to reconvene later at a time to be fixed by the
state board. After the reassessment had been completed by
the township assessor the state board ordered the County
Board of Review to reconvene and consider the assessment so
made. Adequate notice was apparently given at all stages of
the proceeding. Nevertheless, the court did not compel the
taxpayer to resort to his administrative remedies and legal
remedies by making a direct appeal from the tax boards to
the courts,3 25 but permitted the taxpayer to enjoin the collect-
323. In Board of Com'rs v. Millikar supra n. 322 the Court indicated
that this requirement governed even though the tax payer had no
notice and could not therefore appeal.
324. - Ind. App. - , 59 NE (2d) - (1945).
325. Under Section 64-1020 (Burns 1943 Replacement).
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ion of the tax. The court held that the order of the state
board adjourning the county board and ordering it to re-
convene at a later date was illegal and that therefore the
action of the County Board of Review at its later meeting
increased the assessed valuation of the taxpayer's property
was void. The defendants contended that even if the action
of the County Board of Review was invalid injunctive relief
should not be granted in the absence of a showing that the
assessment as increased by the board of review was larger
than it should have been. The court held that this rule is
applicable only where the injunction is sought against the
collection of taxes part of which are illegal and part legal and
that since the assessment by the County Board of Review was
completely void an injunction against the collection of taxes
based on this assessment was proper.
Recovery of the Tax From the Legitimate Taxpayer When
Paid by Mistake by a Third Party
In Federal Land Bank of Louisville v. Dorman,28 the
Appellate Court in 1942 ruled that in a case where the Land
Bank paid by mistake taxes due on the land owned by the
defendant that the Land Bank could not recover such taxes
from the defendant and was not subrogated to the lien of the
state. The court followed the rule in this state that a volunteer
who in error pays the taxes of another cannot recover.
MISCELLANEOUS TAXES
Insurance Premium Tax. Section 39-4802 (Burns 1933)
provides that all foreign insurance companies doing business
in Indiana shall pay a gross premiums tax based on the
amount of gross premiums reduced by deductions allowed
which includes losses paid in Indiana, reinsurance paid on In-
diana risks and dividends paid to, residents insured and pre-
miums returned. As is customary in many states this tax is at
a higher rate for foreign insurance companies than for do-
mestic companies.32 7 In 1944 in United States v. Southeastern
Underwriters328 the United States Supreme Court held, 4 to 3,
326. 112 Ind. App. 111, 41 N.E. (2d) 661 (1942).
327. CCH State Tax Guide Service, paragraph 36-030. Domestic in-
surance companies in Indiana are not subject to this gross prem-
ium tax but do pay a 1% gross income tax under § 64-2601(o.) (p.) (Burns 1943 Replacement).
328. 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
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that: (1) insurance transactions which stretch across state
lines are "commerce among the several states" so as to make
them subject to regulation by Congress under the commerce
clause and (2) that the Sherman Act tended to prohibit con-
duct of insurance companies which restrain or monopolize
interstate fire insurance trade. In that case the United States
charged by indictment the Southeastern Association and its
membership as violators of the Sherman Act. The Under-
writers Association demurred on the ground that they were
not required to conform to the requirements of the Sherman
Act. Although the majority opinion was careful to point out
that the only question before them was the power of Congress,
this decision has thrown many state tax and insurance com-
missions into panic as to the validity of their taxation and
regulation of foreign insurance companies particularly those
which imposed different burdens on foreign companies than
on domestic companies.
In Prudential Insurance Company v. State of Indiana,
now on appeal before the state Supreme Court, the Prudential
Insurance Company brought suit to recover taxes paid under
the Indiana gross premiums tax on the theory that the tax
was unconstitutional as a burden on, and a discrimination
against, interstate commerce. The Superior Court of Marion
County held that this tax which was at a higher rate on
foreign insurance companies was invalid.11 9
It is clear that the mere fact that the Supreme Court held
that Congress has the power to regulate insurance trans-
actions in interstate commerce does not in, and of itself pro-
hibit the state from also regulating the same transactions. 30
In the absence of a showing that the Indiana gross premium
tax actually discriminates against the foreign insurance com-
panies it it doubtful whether there would be any substantial
federal question in this case. The company contends that the
discrimination is based on the fact that the 3% premium tax
here involved is not imposed on domestic insurance compan-
ies. This type of "discrimination" has been considered many
times and sustained against attacks under the equal protection
and due process clauses. See Lincoln National Life Insurance
329. CCH State Tax Guide Service, paragraph 86-030. In Michipin,
California, Idaho, New York, and South Carolina similar provisions
of the statutes of those states were held valid.
330. Cf. Mauer v. Hamilton 309 U.S. 598 (1940).
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Company v. Read331 which, decided after the Southeastern
Underwriters case, upheld an Oklahoma tax on foreign in-
surance companies at a higher rate than on domestic compan-
ies against attacks under the equal protection and due process
clauses (the commerce clause question was not before the
Court). The question therefore arises whether the burden of
proving an unconstitutional discrimination is any easier un-
der the commerce clause than it is under the equal protection
and the due process clauses of the U.S. Constitution. If the
standards of an unconstitutional discrimination are the same
under all three clauses, the Lincoln National case would seem
to foreclose any substantial federal question in this case. A
further factor in this case is the effect of the McCarran-
Ferguson Act (P. Law 15, approved March 9, 1945) which
provided that the continued regulation and taxation by the
several states of the business of insurance was in the public
interest and that insurance should be subject to the laws of
the several states which relate to regulation or taxation of
such businesses. This problem is now before the Indiana
Supreme Court.
Unemployment Compensation Tax. The Indiana Unem-
ployment Compensation Law332 provided prior to 1943 that an
employer subject to the tax included any employing unit which
together with one or more employing units is "owned or con-
trolled" directly or indirectly by the same interests or which
owned or controlled one or more other employing units and
which if treated as a single unit with such other employing
units or interests would be an employer within the definition
of the act (employing 8 or more individuals). Two decisions
in the Indiana Supreme Court in 1940 and 1943 turned on the
applicability of this section to the facts there involved. In
both Benner-Coryell Lumber Company v. Indiana Unemploy-
ment Compensation Board 33 and State Unemployment Com-
pensation Board v. Warrior Petroleum Company,83 the court
held that this provision was not applicable on the facts found
to situations where two establishments operating in corporate
form had the same majority stockholders. The court seemed
to require something approaching intent to evade the tax be-
331. 325 U.S. - (1945).
832. Ind. Stat. Ann. § 52-1502 et seq.
333. 218 Ind. 20, 29 N.E. (2d) 776 (1940) cert. denied, 312 U.S. 698.
334. 221 Ind. 180, 46 N.E. (2d) 827 (1943).
19461 TAXATION 219
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
fore the section would be- applicable. This provision of the
act was in effect deleted by Chapter 286 of the Acts of 1943.
The act now contains provisions governing only the situation
where an employing unit acquires another employing unit
subject to the tax, or where an employing unit subject to the
tax acquires another employing unit. Presumably if the tax
evasion motive is, present, such as in the situation where one
business is divided into two businesses in order to avoid the
tax, the court will be able to impose the tax on the theory that
the division of business was fictitious.
Alcoholic Beverage Taxes. The major problems in con-
nection with the alcoholic beverage tax have been in connect-
ion with selling to post exchanges on United States govern-
ment reservations. No cases have reached the courts but the
Attorney General made a ruling which turns on the fact
situation put to him33 5 and holds that sale to an army post on
a reservation ceded to the United States is not taxable.
Motor Fuel Tax. As in the alcoholic beverage tax the
principal development in this field of taxation has been in
determing the applicability of the tax to sales to contractors
working for the United States government and sales to post
exchanges on government reservations. The Attorney Gen-
eral's rulings as to the applicability of the tax to the con-
tractor turned on the form of the government contract so
that in the situation where the government contract provided
that title to all materials purchased by the contractor be
vested immediately upon delivery in the United States, the
motor fuel tax could not be imposed. 36 A 1942 opinion of
the Attorney General determined the tax liability of sales
to post exchanges. 3 7
335. Ops. Ind. Atty. Gen. (1943) p. 557.
336. Compare Ops. Ind. Atty. Gen. (1940) p. 206 with Ops. Ind. Atty.
Gen. (1941) p. 39.
337. Ops. Ind. Atty. Gen. (1942) p. 164; Johnson v. Yellow Cab Transit
Co., 321 U.S. 383, (1944), 20 Ind. L. J. 326 (1945).
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